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motion seeking to prevent such evidence was denied. [Cit.] Because the burglary of April 30, 2003, is within the applicable four-year statute of limitation, [Cit.] the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of it.” State v. Swint, 284 Ga.App. 343, 643 S.E.2d 840 (March 20, 2007). Trial court erred in dismissing (in the guise of a directed verdict) accusation charging defendant with battery, on grounds that State could not prove that offense occurred on date stated in accusation. “‘In proving the time of the commission of an offense the State is not, as a general rule, restricted to proof of the date alleged in the indictment, but is permitted to prove its commission on any date within the statute of limitations. Where, however, the indictment specifically alleges the date of the offense is material, the accused may be convicted only if the State’s proof corresponds to the date alleged.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885(1)(a) (311 S.E.2d 427) (1984). Because the accusation did not allege that the date was material, the State may offer any evidence relevant to the crimes during the statutory period of limitations. Id. Thus, the State did not have to show that the crimes occurred on May 5, 2003.” Accord, Holmes v. State , 291 Ga.App. 196, 661 S.E.2d 603 (April 16, 2008) (indictment alleged violation of protective order entered January 5, but protective order was not entered until January 9); Coats v. State , 303 Ga.App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (April 22, 2010) (no failure of proof where evidence showed offenses occurred after midnight on the date following the one alleged in the indictment). McCoy v. State, 278 Ga.App. 492, 629 S.E.2d 493 (March 27, 2006). Where proof of date of offense differed from that stated in indictment, trial court properly charged jury on statute of limitation. “Where the exact date of the commission of a crime is not a material allegation in the indictment, it may be proved as of any time within the statute of limitation. Frazier v. State, 252 Ga.App. 627, 629(2) (557 S.E.2d 12) (2001). An exception exists where the State seeks to show that the offense was committed at a time ‘substantially different from that alleged in the indictment [in order to] surprise[ ] and prejudice[ ] the defense in that it deprives the defendant of a defense of alibi or otherwise denies him his right to a fair trial.’ (Footnote and emphasis omitted.) Id. Here, the exact dates of the crimes were not material allegations of the indictment, Norman did not claim an alibi defense, and, in any event, the evidence did not show substantial differences between the December dates in the indictment and the October or November date when the alleged abuse may have taken place. Therefore, the trial court did not err in charging the jury regarding the statute of limitation, as its charge correctly stated the law. See Turner v. State, 202 Ga.App. 799, 800-801(1) (415 S.E.2d 524) (1992).” Crouch v. State, 279 Ga. 879, 622 S.E.2d 818 (November 21, 2005). “Crouch … asserts that the State failed to prove felony murder as set forth in the indictment, as the indictment stated that the date of Dixon’s death was August 8, 2000, when the only evidence was that she died on August 15, 2000. Crouch did not file a special demurrer to the indictment, see Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 179(2) (611 S.E.2d 52) (2005), and in any event, ‘the indictment did not make the date a material allegation, and the indictment sufficiently advised him of the charges against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense. [Cits].’ Scott v. State, 275 Ga. 305, 307(2) (565 S.E.2d 810) (2002). Any variance between the date of death alleged and the date proved at trial did not prejudice Crouch’s defense. Blackwelder v. State, 256 Ga. 283, 284(4) (347 S.E.2d 600) (1986).” Henry v. State, 274 Ga.App. 139, 616 S.E.2d 883 (June 30, 2005). “‘ The general rule is that when the exact date of the commission of the crime is not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense may be proved to have occurred any time within the statute of limitations.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dean v. State, 252 Ga.App. 204, 206(3) (555 S.E.2d 868) (2001). In this case, there is no statute of limitations issue. The victim’s testimony, alone, was sufficient to establish the time frame. OCGA § 24-4-8. Additionally, the fact that the indictment provided a six-year time frame does not render it insufficient. See Dean, supra at 207(4) (‘defendant could have been convicted upon proof that he committed the crimes alleged between March 1991 and March 1998’). Finally, as is required, the indictment informed Henry of the charges against him, enabled him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and protected him against another prosecution for the same offense. See Greeson v. State, 253 Ga.App. 161, 165(4) (558 S.E.2d 749) (2002). Thus, the indictment was not deficient.” Accord, Allen v. State , 275 Ga.App. 826, 622 S.E.2d 54 (October 13, 2005). Heath v. State, 269 Ga.App. 872, 605 S.E.2d 427 (October 4, 2004). “Heath claims the trial court should have granted him a continuance after the State gave notice during argument on a pre-trial motion the day his trial began that it would present evidence that the crime occurred in 1996, not 1995, as alleged in the indictment. The trial court correctly concluded that the dates in the indictment were not a material element of the crimes with which Heath was charged. See Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 510(1), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997) (rape and child molestation case). ‘Where the date alleged in the indictment is not a material element of the offense, the State may prove the offense as of any date within the statute of limitation.’ Id.” Defendant not entitled to a continuance on this basis unless asserting an alibi defense.