☢ test - Í

Dorsey v. State, 265 Ga.App. 404, 593 S.E.2d 945 (February 3, 2004). “‘The general rule is that when the exact date of the commission of the crime is not a material allegation of the indictment, the commission of the offense may be proved to have occurred at any time within the statute of limitations. There is an exception to this rule where the variance between the allegata and the probata surprises and prejudices the defendant by effectively barring an alibi defense.... ’ [cits.]” Defendant not prejudiced here because his attempt to state an alibi for the date alleged in the indictment failed: fact that he was with girlfriend part of day “does not prove that Dorsey could not have committed the crimes for which he was conicted,” although it was inconsistent with the victim’s testimony. Accord, Martin (October 20, 2008), above. Wilt v. State, 265 Ga.App. 158, 592 S.E.2d 925 (January 14, 2004). “In this case, the exact date of the crimes at issue was not a material part of the indictment because an exact date was not an essential element of any of the charged offenses, and because Wilt offered no defense, such as alibi, that might make the dates of the offenses material. [Cit.] In fact, we note that Wilt conceded at trial that the dates were not material. The victim was unable to give specific dates, but approximate dates can be determined based on the evidence the state did present. The dates proved at trial were prior to the return of the indictment and were within the applicable seven-year statute of limitation period. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the allegations of the indictment. [Cit.]” Epps v. State, 262 Ga.App. 113, 584 S.E.2d 701 (July 2, 2003). Accusation erroneously gave two dates for the offense, one a past date and one an obviously-erroneous future date. Held, since date was not an essential averment, this “did not make the accusation absolutely void.” Any date within the statute of limitations could be proven. The accusation was void as to the future date, but not the past date. “‘[U]nless the defects appearing in the indictment or accusation are so great that the indictment or accusation is absolutely void, [the] right to a perfect indictment or accusation may be waived, and is waived by going to trial under a defective indictment or accusation without complaint.’” Holder v. State, 242 Ga.App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (February 22, 2000). Deposit account fraud convictions affirmed; no fatal variance where “the dates alleged for the delivery of the checks in Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment were different from the dates proved at trial. … The date on which the checks were delivered is not an essential element of the offense of deposit account fraud; the State may prove the offense by the act and the intent. Berry v. State, 153 Ga. 169, 172-173(2), 111 S.E. 669 (1922).” Lovelace v. State, 241 Ga.App. 774, 527 S.E.2d 878 (January 11, 2000). Conviction for aggravated assault affirmed; evidence was sufficient though indictment alleged offense occurred on November 5, while evidence showed attack occurred just before midnight on November 4. “Alibi evidence does not make the date alleged in the indictment material unless proof of a different date effectively barred an alibi defense. Pickstock v. State, 235 Ga.App. 451(1), 509 S.E.2d 717 (1998). That was not the case here, for Lovelace's brother testified that he and Lovelace were together from 11:30 p.m. on November 4 to 1:30 a.m. on November 5. The evidence is sufficient if the State proves the offense occurred as of any date within the statute of limitation. Edgehill v. State, 253 Ga. 343, 345(3), 320 S.E.2d 176 (1984); Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 510(1), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997); Arnold v. State, 167 Ga.App. 720(1), 307 S.E.2d 526 (1983).” 7. DATE OF OFFENSE – DATE NOT SPECIFIC Watkins v. State, 336 Ga.App. 145, 784 S.E.2d 11 (March 10, 2016). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied plea in abatement arguing “that the State could have alleged the dates of Watkins’ crimes more specifically than the June 30, 2011 to January 1, 2012 time frame contained in the indictment. … [T]he State presented testimony that Watkins moved into a residence in the victim’s neighborhood on June 30, 2011; that the victim disclosed to her mother, on January 1, 2012, that Watkins had been molesting her; that the molestation began after Watkins moved to the neighborhood; and that the victim had been unable to articulate a more specific time frame for the molestation.” Citing Blanton (November 12, 2013), below. Ferguson v. State, 335 Ga.App. 862, 783 S.E.2d 380 (March 1, 2016). Sex trafficking and related convictions affirmed; indictment wasn’t defective for failing to state specific dates for the offenses alleged. “[T]he evidence authorized the jury to find that A.G. prostituted herself for Ferguson’s benefit multiple times a day nearly every day from approximately February 2007 through at least January 2009. The indictment’s allegation of a range of dates within that even longer range of time for the continuing offense of trafficking A.G. for sexual servitude certainly put him on notice of what he should be prepared to meet at trial. Blanton v. State, [324 Ga.App. 610, 617(2)(a) (751 S.E.2d 431) (2013)].”