☢ test - Í

Williams v. State, 277 Ga.App. 106, 108(2) (625 S.E.2d 509) (2005) (‘We are a court for the correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken, and we will not consider issues and grounds for objection, even of a constitutional magnitude, which were not raised and determined in the trial court’) (footnote omitted).” Boddie v. State, 327 Ga.App. 667, 760 S.E.2d 668 (June 19, 2014). Convictions for incest, aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed. No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to demur to indictment based on range of dates instead of specific dates charged. “ At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Boddie testified that he was away from S.B. at certain times between August and December, but in most instances did not testify as to specific dates or years, or whether he was out of town or just absent for a few hours. … Boddie ‘did not proffer any evidence showing that he had a possible defense’ for the series of offenses that recurred approximately twice weekly between August 9, 2007, and January 19, 2009.” “Further, at the motion for new trial hearing, Boddie's trial counsel testified that alibi was not a viable defense. She stated that because the crimes which Boddie was accused of committing took place as an ongoing pattern of conduct occurring approximately twice a week over a 13–month ‘timeframe, alibi didn't really fit into that. He just denied that it even had happened. So I don't think alibi was the appropriate defense in that ... he said it didn't happen.’” Blanton v. State, 324 Ga.App. 610, 751 S.E.2d 431 (November 12, 2013). Incest and child molestation convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied special demurrer based on range of dates for offenses alleged in indictment. 1. “[T]he evidence in this case showed that Blanton had engaged in at least 50 individual acts of incest with his older daughter throughout the two-year time period alleged in the indictment, not just during the months Blanton identifies in his brief.” Distinguishing cases where State presented no evidence as to when the offenses occurred, or evidence that they occurred within a narrower range than alleged: Mosby v. State, 319 Ga.App. 642, 643(1) (738 S.E.2d 98) (2013); Howard v. State, 281 Ga.App. 797, 798–799(1) (637 S.E.2d 448) (2006); State v. Meeks, 309 Ga.App. 855, 858(1) (711 S.E.2d 403) (2011). 2. Contrary to defendant’s argument, record didn’t show that his younger daughter reached age 16 years during the time alleged, making child molestation charge improper. “Blanton has failed … to cite to any evidence in the record establishing the victim's date of birth.” Accord, Ferguson (March 1, 2016), above; Watkins (March 10, 2016), above. Harris v. State, 324 Ga.App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (October 30, 2013). Theft by taking, RICO and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying special demurrers based on broad time-frame of offenses (October 1, 2010- November 21, 2011) alleged in indictment. “[T]he dates listed corresponded with the operation of Harris's company and many of the acts occurred during a time frame not known to the State. When reviewing a post-conviction appeal of the court's pre-trial ruling, ‘the standard of review occasioned by the trial court's denial of a special demurrer is harmless error; the question [is] whether the defense was prejudiced by the incorrect form. Specifically, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to narrow the range of dates alleged in the indictment materially affected [Harris's] ability to present a defense.’ (Footnote omitted.) Howard v. State, 281 Ga.App. 797, 799(1) (637 S.E.2d 448) (2006). Here, Harris has pointed to no specific harm to his ability to present his defense. The indictment informed him of the specific properties at issue and the conduct alleged to be unlawful. Harris does not show how his investigation or defense preparation was hindered by the indictment as written; therefore, this enumeration presents no basis for reversal. See id.” Scruggs v. State, 309 Ga.App. 569, 711 S.E.2d 86 (May 13, 2011). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied special demurrer to indictment. “We find Scruggs's assertion that he was entitled to have the time of day at which the crime was committed included in the indictment without merit. Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 630(3) (163 S.E.2d 730) (1968) (citing OCGA § 17–7–54 and Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44, 48 (1883)); Bostic v. State, 173 Ga.App. 494(1) (326 S.E.2d 849) (1985) (indictment need not specify time of day offense was committed).” State v. Hood, 307 Ga.App. 439, 706 S.E.2d 566 (December 15, 2010). Trial court properly denied general demurrer but erred by granting special demurrer. Special demurrer: “‘[A] special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of the indictment. [Cit.]’ Bramblett [ v. State, 239 Ga. 336, 337(1) (236 S.E.2d 580) (1977)]. In that case, the defendant claims that the indictment is ‘[i]mperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information.’ [ State v. Delaby, 298 Ga.App. 723, 724 (681 S.E.2d 645) (2009)]. When technical defects in the indictment are timely raised, [fn] ‘[t]he defendant is entitled ... to have a perfect indictment in form as to the essential elements of time and place.’ Johnson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 450, 450-451(1) (504 S.E.2d 290) (1998). Indictments that do not allege a specific date on which the crime was committed are not perfect in form and are subject to a timely special demurrer. Moore v. State, 294 Ga.App. 570, 576(2) (669 S.E.2d 498) (2008). ‘However, where the State can show that the evidence does not permit it to allege a specific date on which the offense occurred, the State is permitted to allege that the crime occurred between two