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particular dates.’ State v. Layman, 279 Ga. 340, 341 (613 S.E.2d 639) (2005). To that end, the State must be given the opportunity to present evidence concerning whether the offense dates are capable of being more specifically stated. Moore, 294 Ga.App. at 576-577(2). But ‘[w]here the State [is] reasonably capable of narrowing the range of dates alleged in the indictment, it must do so.’ State v. Layman, 279 Ga. at 341.” Distinguished from general demurrers, which is used when “challenging the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment [and] is appropriate when the indictment is ‘[f]atally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction.’” Delaby, supra . Indictment here, for participating in criminal street gang activity, is sufficient as to both substance and form; contrary to defendants’ argument, indictment adequately alleged existence of gang at time of alleged offenses. Based on Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803 (671 S.E.2d 497) (2009): “the indictment here sufficiently alleged that the criminal street gang was in existence and ongoing at the time of the commission of the enumerated offenses. Moreover, we agree with the State that it was not necessary for the indictment also to contain a specific allegation that the gang existed prior to the commission of any of the enumerated offenses, or to include a specific enumerated offense that was committed prior to the commission of any of the enumerated offenses in this case.” Further, date gang came into existence need not be alleged, since “a date certain was provided for each of the enumerated offenses. Moreover, … the indictment sufficiently alleged that the gang was in existence and ongoing at the time the enumerated offenses were allegedly committed. Based upon these dates, the defendants have all the information they need to formulate a defense that the gang did not exist at the time of each enumerated offense. The trial court's order is accordingly reversed.” Wilder v. State, 304 Ga.App. 891, 698 S.E.2d 374 (July 8, 2010). Reversed on other grounds, 290 Ga. 13, 717 S.E.2d 457 (November 7, 2011). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; indictment was not invalid though the range of dates alleged included dates after victim reached age of consent. “Wilder alleges that the indictment was defective because it alleged ‘a broad range of dates extending past the victims sixteenth birthday.’ The first four counts of the indictment allege offenses that require as an essential element that the victim be under the age of 16. These counts allege that the offenses (child molestation and statutory rape) occurred between July 1, 2003 and August 16, 2004. The victim turned 16 on April 12, 2004. ‘An accusation or indictment is not subject to a general demurrer unless there is a defect so extreme that the defendant can admit the charge as made and still be innocent.’ (Citation and punctation omitted.) Grizzard v. State, 258 Ga.App. 124-125(1) (572 S.E.2d 760) (2002), overruled on other grounds, Tompkins v. State, 265 Ga.App. 760, 765(2)(b) (595 S.E.2d 599) (2004), reversed in part on other grounds, Tompkins v. State, 278 Ga. 857, 858(2) (607 S.E.2d 891) (2005). Just as in Grizzard, Wilder ‘could not admit the charges and still be innocent as a matter of law.’ Grizzard, supra, 258 Ga.App. at 125(1). The indictment alleges that Wilder commited the crimes when the victim was under the age of 16 even though the exact dates were not known. Id. And the victim testified that she had sexual intercourse with Wilder in 2003 and 2004. The indictment was therefore not subject to a general demurrer. Id.” Robbins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (February 20, 2008). No ineffective assistance for failure to object to lack of specific dates in child molestation indictment; “ the charges were based on the recollections of a seven-year-old child, and Robbins does not show how the state could have reasonably narrowed the dates alleged in the indictment. Further, Robbins does not demonstrate that the length of the period in which the indictment alleged the crimes were committed materially affected his ability to present a defense, which did not rely on an alibi or other time sensitive claim.” Christian v. State, 288 Ga.App. 546, 654 S.E.2d 452 (November 21, 2007). Defendant was charged with two counts of theft by taking of cash from an estate; the counts spanned fifteen months and four months, respectively. “Christian contends that the form of the indictment was insufficient in that it … gave too broad of a date range for the thefts of estate money.” Held, defendant waived this contention by failing to bring it as a special demurrer prior to arraignment. “If a defendant wants greater specificity with regard to the time or circumstances of the alleged crime, … her appropriate remedy is a pre-trial special demurrer that challenges the form of the indictment. Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 341(1) (638 S.E.2d 791) (2006). See Croft v. State, 278 Ga.App. 107, 109(3) (628 S.E.2d 144) (2006). (‘[a] contention that a count of the indictment lacks sufficient specificity ... is an attack on the form of the indictment, which must be addressed by filing a special demurrer to the indictment’); .… A special demurrer challenging the form of the indictment ‘must be filed before pleading not guilty to the indictment; otherwise, the matter is waived. Raising the issue for the first time on appeal as [Christian] has done here is too late.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith, supra, 282 Ga.App. at 342(1).” Accord, Metts v. State , 297 Ga.App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (April 6, 2009). Stanford v. State, 288 Ga.App. 463, 654 S.E.2d 173 (October 29, 2007). “Stanford alleges his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a special demurrer requiring the state to allege a specific date on which the alleged offenses occurred. However, since Stanford did not allege the defense of alibi, the specificity of dates would not have