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been helpful. The indictment gave a range of dates that properly advised Stanford of the charges and gave him the opportunity to prepare a defense to those charges. Trial counsel did not err in failing to request a special demurrer under these circumstances.” Howard v. State, 281 Ga.App. 799, 637 S.E.2d 448 (October 5, 2006). Special demurrer should have been granted where evidence at hearing showed that State could have provided more specific date for offense than four month period stated; would have resulted in reversal on interlocutory appeal. Instead, post-conviction, “‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the failure to narrow the range of dates alleged in the indictment materially affected [Howard’s] ability to present a defense.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Holloway v. State, 278 Ga.App. 709, 711(1) (629 S.E.2d 447) (2006).” No prejudice shown here. Accord, Stroud v. State , 284 Ga.App. 604, 644 S.E.2d 467 (March 28, 2007) (no prejudice; entire range of dates was within statute of limitation); Stillwell v. State , 294 Ga.App. 805, 670 S.E.2d 452 (November 6, 2008) (no prejudice shown, no greater specificity on molestation charges possible); Harris (October 30, 2013), above (no prejudice shown). Holloway v. State, 278 Ga.App. 709, 629 S.E.2d 447 (March 15, 2006). “Holloway was indicted for one count of aggravated child molestation, three counts of child molestation, and one count of incest. Each count alleged that the crimes occurred between the dates of October 1, 2002 and November 1, 2003 . Holloway contends that the trial court erred in failing to quash the indictment because the State could have narrowed the range of dates alleged in the indictment, but did not do so. Holloway points to the fact that before trial the State learned of evidence that the alleged molestation did not take place until at least the summer of 2003. Because Holloway has already been tried and convicted of the alleged offenses, our review is limited to determining whether he was harmed by imperfections in the indictment. See White v. State, 269 Ga.App. 113, 115 (603 S.E.2d 686) (2004). The relevant inquiry is whether the failure to narrow the range of dates alleged in the indictment ‘materially affected his ability to present a defense.’ Gentry v. State, 235 Ga.App. 328, 330(3) (508 S.E.2d 671) (1998). Holloway argues that he was not able ‘to adequately investigate and prepare a possible alibi defense, due to the lengthy period over which the acts were alleged’ to have occurred. Holloway has not demonstrated, however, that narrowing the dates in the indictment to begin in the summer of 2003 would have enabled him to present an alibi defense. We have held that an indictment covering a period of approximately five years (see Davidson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 605, 608(2)(b) (499 S.E.2d 697) (1998)) did not materially affect the defendant’s ability to present a defense to molestation charges. Accordingly, Holloway has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to quash the indictment.” State v. Layman, 279 Ga. 340, 613 S.E.2d 639 (May 23, 2005). Case of first impression: “if an indictment alleges that a crime occurred between two particular dates, and if evidence presented to the trial court shows that the State can reasonably narrow the range of dates during which the crime is alleged to have occurred, the indictment is subject to a special demurrer.” Evidence at hearing on demurrer showed that range of dates of alleged murder was too broad – victim was seen alive after first date alleged, and was known to have been dead for some days prior to last date alleged. Trial court thus properly sustained special demurrer. Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga.App. 854, 614 S.E.2d 118 (April 14, 2005). Trial court erred in denying special demurrer to indictment, which failed to allege specific dates of child molestation and rape offenses, because state did not present evidence that it could provide no more specific dates than between “January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1998.” “The state argues in its brief that the victim was a young child trying to remember dates of repeated abuse and rape. While evidence that the victim is a minor who is incapable of adequately articulating exactly when the offense occurred is a factor the trial court can take into account in determining whether the state carried its burden of showing that it cannot establish a specific date or time frame in which the offense or recurring offenses occurred, no such evidence appears in the record before us, and it appears the trial court did not require the state to make any such showing below. Absent such a showing, we must conclude that the indictment is imperfect and subject to the special demurrer. Of course, this holding does not preclude the state from reindicting Blackmon upon the remand of this case to the trial court.” Accord, Arnold v. State , 305 Ga.App. 45, 699 S.E.2d 77 (July 8, 2010) (special demurrer properly denied; record showed that young molestation victim couldn’t remember specific dates when molestation occurred); Mosby v. State , 319 Ga.App. 642, 738 S.E.2d 98 (February 4, 2013). Compare O’Rourke (June 19, 2014), above (defendant waived right to require State to present evidence proving that it couldn’t allege a more specific date by agreeing that the trial court could rule on the parties’ briefs). Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). “‘[W]e have recognized an exception to the rule that an indictment must allege a specific date where the evidence does not permit the state to identify a single date on which the offense occurred, so the indictment instead may allege that the offense occurred between two particular dates.’ [Cit.] In