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this case, it appears from the evidence that the exact dates were unknown. [Cit.]” Accord, Berman v. State , 279 Ga.App. 867, 632 S.E.2d 757 (June 16, 2006); Robbins ( February 20, 2008), above; Mullis v. State , 292 Ga.App. 218, 664 S.E.2d 271 (June 25, 2008). South v. State, 268 Ga.App. 110, 601 S.E.2d 378 (June 10, 2004). On special demurrer prior to trial, defendant was “entitled to an indictment perfect in form and substance.” Trial court should have granted demurrer based on failure to allege exact dates of offenses, where record supported finding that state “‘has failed to show that it cannot determine from the evidence the exact dates of the alleged … offenses.’ [cit.]” “The State simply chose not to list these dates due to the number of alleged acts. This is not a valid excuse for failing to provide South with the dates of the alleged offenses.” Epps v. State, 262 Ga.App. 113, 584 S.E.2d 701 (July 2, 2003). Accusation erroneously gave two dates for the offense, one a past date and one an obviously-erroneous future date. Held, since date was not an essential averment, this “did not make the accusation absolutely void.” Any date within the statute of limitations could be proven. The accusation was void as to the future date, but not the past date. “‘[U]nless the defects appearing in the indictment or accusation are so great that the indictment or accusation is absolutely void, [the] right to a perfect indictment or accusation may be waived, and is waived by going to trial under a defective indictment or accusation without complaint.’” Snider v. State, 238 Ga.App. 55, 516 S.E.2d 569 (April 21, 1999). “ When the date is not alleged as an essential averment of the crime charged, any offense of the nature charged which is shown by the evidence at trial and occurred within the statute of limitation, including the dates alleged in the indictment, is encompassed by the indictment. Miller v. State, 226 Ga.App. 509, 511(2), 486 S.E.2d 911 (1997); Robinson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 577(1), 445 S.E.2d 564 (1994). In such a situation, the State is not restricted to proof of a single transaction, but may prove or attempt to prove any number of acts of the nature alleged within the period, ‘although punishment upon conviction is limited to a single offense, and acquittal or conviction, upon proper plea, operates as a bar to further prosecution for any offense of the nature charged within the period. [Cits.]” Grantham v. State, 117 Ga.App. 444(1), 160 S.E.2d 676 (1968). See also Miller, supra.” 8. DEATH PENALTY, AGGRAVATING FACTORS Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 653 S.E.2d 456 (October 29, 2007). Apprendi [ v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) (2000))] line of cases does not require pleading of statutory aggravating circumstances in indictment; the statutory aggravating circumstances are not “elements” of “death eligible murder.” “[U]nder Georgia law statutory aggravating circumstances are sentencing factors rather than ‘elements’ of death eligible murder.” Accord, Arrington v. State , 286 Ga. 335, 687 S.E.2d 438 (November 9, 2009); Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (October 25, 2004). Statutory aggravating factors supporting death sentences need not be alleged in indictment. Based on Terrell v. State , 276 Ga. 34, 572 S.E.2d 595 (2002). Accord, Lewis v. State , 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (September 19, 2005); Walker v. State , 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (October 2, 2006); Thomason v. State , 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (November 6, 2006); Foster v. State , 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010). 9. DESCRIPTION OF ANIMALS Ford v. State, 306 Ga.App. 606, 703 S.E.2d 71 (October 27, 2010). Cruelty to animals convictions affirmed; accusation was not deficient for failing to specifically identify the animals in question. “Although Ford argues that the accusation as written could subject her to double jeopardy because she could face prosecution for the same crime again because the animals are not identified, the accusation clearly specified that the acts were committed ‘on or about the 19th day of June 2007,’ and that the dogs were deprived of food, water, and medical care. Moreover, pictures of the subject dogs were introduced at trial. Even were the accusation couched in more descriptive terms such as the breed or color as argued by Ford, the same issue as to the uniqueness of the dog would be present because color and breed, while identifying characteristics, are not unique to a specific dog.” Citing Smith v. State, 160 Ga.App. 26 (285 S.E.2d 749) (1981) (“the accusation was sufficient in that it ‘identified the animals by species or breed and by location, and distinguished between similarly described animals on the basis of living and dead animals.’”) and Sirmans v. State, 244 Ga.App. 252 (534 S.E.2d 862) (2000) (“the accusation identified the animals by species ... and distinguished between similarly described animals on the basis of living and dead animals.”). 10. DESCRIPTION OF CHARGE/OFFENSE Moon v. State, 335 Ga.App. 642, 782 S.E.2d 699 (February 10, 2016). Aggravated child molestation, sexual exploitation