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of children and related convictions affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment alleged that defendant possessed a prohibited photograph, “but the evidence showed instead that the child pornography he possessed was in the form of digital images.” Palatini v. State, 333 Ga.App. 523, 774 S.E.2d 818 (July 14, 2015). Physical precedent only; interlocutory appeal of denial of special demurrer to indictment charging sexual exploitation of children. Indictment charges defendant with possessing “numerous digital images, depicting minor female children, engaged in lewd exhibition of their genital area.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, indictment wasn’t required to specify “which illegal images he possessed”; “the indictment charged the offense in the language of OCGA § 16–12–100(b)(8), and provided Palatini with the description of the particular act constituting the violation of the statute.” Bryant v. State, 320 Ga.App. 838, 740 S.E.2d 772 (March 27, 2013). Cocaine possession and related convictions affirmed; indictment was sufficient to charge defendant with possession though it “was denominated as ‘possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.’ 1. The indictment actually charged Bryant with ‘knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully, ... possess[ing] a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of the Controlled Substances Act[.]’ … ‘[I]t is immaterial what the offense is called, if the averments of the presentment are such as to describe an offense against the laws of the State.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jackson [ v. State, 316 Ga.App. 588, 592(2), 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012)]; Striplin v. State, 284 Ga.App. 92, 94, 643 S.E.2d 361 (2007). ‘[A]n inconsistency between the denomination and the allegations in the indictment is an imperfection, but is one that is subject to a harmless error test on appeal; and a defendant who was not at all misled to his prejudice by any imperfection cannot obtain reversal of his conviction on this ground.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Striplin, supra, 284 Ga.App. at 94, 643 S.E.2d 361. Although the challenged offense was denominated as ‘possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,’ the allegations tracked the language of possession of a controlled substance and fully apprised Bryant of the offense charged. See OCGA § 16–3–30(a). Bryant has failed to show that his defense was prejudiced in any way by the inconsistency between the denomination of the offense and the allegations in the indictment.” 2. Even if the accusation charged possession with intent to distribute, defendant could have been convicted of simple possession as a lesser included offense. “Notably, Bryant himself requested a jury charge on the offense of possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Given Bryant's specific request for the lesser included offense, he cannot show that any imperfection in the indictment prejudiced him.” State v. Wilson, 318 Ga.App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (September 25, 2012). In prosecution for aggravated assault on peace officer and related offenses, trial court erred in granting oral demurrer made after jury impaneled. Indictment set out facts sufficient to charge defendant with aggravated assault, but not on a police officer. “[A] challenge to an indictment that is based upon an alleged variance between the offense named in the indictment and the facts alleged in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment, so that such challenge must be brought by special demurrer. Jones v. State, [240 Ga.App. 484, 486(2) (523 S.E.2d 73) (1999)] (It is axiomatic that it is not the name given to a crime in the indictment, but the indictment's description of the facts that constituted the crime, that establishes the offense charged.); see Morris v. State, [310 Ga.App. 126, 131(3) (712 S.E.2d 130) (2011)] (‘It is immaterial what the offense is called in the indictment as long as the averments of the presentment are such as to describe an offense against the laws of the State.’) (citations and punctuation omitted); Hill v. State, 257 Ga.App. 82, 84(1) (570 S.E.2d 395) (2002) (“It is the description of the crime, rather than the description and number of the section under which it appears in the Code[,] which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). See, e.g., Doe v. State, [306 Ga.App. 348, 350(1) (702 S.E.2d 669) (2010)] (The indictment informed the defendant that he was accused of attempting ‘to influence the winning of Georgia Lottery prizes by tampering with lottery materials[,]’ and, thus, was sufficient to charge him under subsection ( b ) of OCGA § 50–27–27, even though the indictment referred to the offense of ‘falsely uttering’ a lottery ticket, which is a crime under subsection ( a ) of OCGA § 50–27–27.).” As special demurrer must be made within 10 days of arraignment, defendant’s oral demurrer at trial was untimely. Striplin v. State, 284 Ga.App. 92, 643 S.E.2d 361 (March 8, 2007). Accusation was not “fatally flawed” where it described defendant’s DUI – less safe offense as “DUI UNDER AGE 21.” “ Although ‘under 21’ is not an element of the offense of driving under the influence (less safe), ‘its inclusion was mere surplusage, and can be entirely omitted without affecting the charge and without detriment to the accusation. Mere surplusage will not vitiate an indictment, and need not be established in proof. The material facts which constitute the offense charged must be stated and they must be proved in evidence. But allegations not essential to such purpose, which might be entirely omitted without affecting the charge and without detriment to the indictment, are considered as mere surplusage, and may be