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disregarded in evidence.’ (Citation omitted.) Broadnax-Woodland v. State, 265 Ga.App. 669, 672(2) (595 S.E.2d 350) (2004) (the word ‘knowingly’ in accusation charging defendant with driving without proof of insurance was mere surplusage); see also Roseberry v. State, 251 Ga.App. 856, 858(3) (554 S.E.2d 816) (2001) (the word ‘solely’ in accusation charging defendant with making phone calls ‘solely’ to harass the victim was mere surplusage).” Accord, Jackson v. State , 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012) (erroneous reference to “aggravated battery” in count charging burglary not subject to general demurrer). Gentry v. State, 281 Ga.App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (July 27, 2006). Caption in accusation misstating title of offense (“trafficking in methamphetamine” instead of “manufacturing methamphetamine”) is “mere surplusage, is not essential to proving the crime alleged in the body of Count 1, and does not specify the manner in which the crime was done so as to require its proof;” hence it “did not seriously mislead or hinder [defendant’s] defense.” “‘It is immaterial what the offense is called, if the averments of the presentment are such as to describe an offense against the laws of the state. It is not the name given to the bill which characterizes it, but the description in the averments of the indictment.... It is useful to remember that the purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy,’” quoting State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 238 S.E.2d 38 (1977). Nye v. State, 279 Ga.App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (April 19, 2006). Accusation charging defendant with speeding but citing wrong code section was sufficient. “In determining whether the instrument is valid, ‘[i]t is the description of the crime, rather than th description and number of the section under which it appears in the Code which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rank v. State, 179 Ga.App. 28(1) (345 S.E.2d 75) (1986).” “Nye’s objection to the improper code citation in the indictment was a special demurrer, and his failure to challenge the indictment before entering his plea constitutes a waiver of his right to be tried on a perfect indictment. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 180(2) (611 S.E.2d 52) (2005).” Phillips v. State, 278 Ga.App. 198, 628 S.E.2d 631 (March 13, 2006). Indictment was not defective where it charged defendant with aggravated stalking by harassing victim, where code section defines offense as “harassing and intimidating.” “‘The law of this state does not require expression of a charge contained in an indictment, in the verbatim language of the statute.’ (Citations omitted.) Chenault v. State, 234 Ga. 216, 223(6) (215 S.E.2d 223) (1975). ‘This Court has held that an indictment substantially in the language of the Code is sufficient in form and substance. Where the indictment alleges an “offense,” and names and describes the offense in terms of the penal statute, and alleges that the act was “unlawfully” committed, and that it was “contrary to the laws” of the State, and employs language from which it must necessarily be inferred that the criminal intent existed, it is not void because it fails to expressly allege the criminal intent.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Hammock v. State, 201 Ga.App. 614, 615-616(1)(b) (411 S.E.2d 743) (1991) (indictment was not void for its failure to allege that the child molestation was done with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the [defendant]).” Accord, Hairston v. State , 322 Ga.App. 572, 745 S.E.2d 798 (July 1, 2013). State v. Barnett, 268 Ga.App. 900, 602 S.E.2d 899 (August 5, 2004). Trial court erred by dismissing counts of indictment styled as “aggravated assault (family violence)” and “family violence battery (felony).” “The trial court reasoned that this additional language was inappropriate, excessive, and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. [Cit.] The trial court also concluded that the designation ‘felony’ inappropriately injected the issue of punishment into the indictment.” Code sections support descriptions of offenses as “family violence,” however, and that term puts defendant on notice that enhanced sentence is sought. Even if language is “mere surplusage,” count was not subject to dismissal therefor. The reference to the charge as a “felony” also did not subject the charge to special demurrer; “[s]ince the indictment did not reference the sentencing for the offense charged, we find that it did not inject the issue of punishment.” Accord, Gentry v. State , 281 Ga.App. 315, 635 S.E.2d 782 (July 27, 2006) (caption identifying charge as “trafficking in methamphetamine” was mere surplusage; text actually charged defendant with “manufacturing methamphetamine”). Riddle v. State, 267 Ga.App. 630, 600 S.E.2d 709 (May 28, 2004). Indictment not defective because it accused defendant of possession of “crack” without adding the word “cocaine.” “‘[T]here is no reasonable probability that [Riddle] misunderstood the charges against him, was surprised or harmed by the wording of the indictment, or is not protected against a later prosecution for the same offense.’ Wright v. State , 232 Ga.App. 104, 106(2), 501 S.E.2d 543 (1998).” Lopez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 178, 598 S.E.2d 898 (April 23, 2004). “‘An indictment substantially in the language of the Code is sufficient in form and substance.’ Reed v. State, 205 Ga.App. 209, 210 (422 S.E.2d 15) (1992)” (emphasis in