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original). Fact that jury asked questions about the charge is irrelevant. Clark v. State, 266 Ga.App. 334, 596 S.E.2d 783 (March 17, 2004). “OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1) defines the crime of trafficking in cocaine as knowingly possessing ‘28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine…’ Clark was indicted for knowingly possessing ‘more than 400 grams of a mixture containing 10% or more of cocaine….’ The absence of the word ‘purity’ from the indictment does not render the indictment void.” Bradford v. State, 266 Ga.App. 198, 596 S.E.2d 715 (March 10, 2004). “‘An accusation or indictment is not subject to a general demurrer unless there is a defect so extreme that the defendant can admit the charge as made and still be innocent. In contrast, an accusation or indictment is subject to special demurer if it is not “perfect in form as well as substance.” By special demurrer an accused claims, not that the charge in an indictment or accusation is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as would be asserted by general demurrer), but rather that the charge is imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information,’” quoting State v. Jones , 251 Ga.App. 192, 193, 553 S.E.2d 631 (2001). Indictment here tracked the language of the code section, and was specific enough to notify defendants “that they must be prepared to meet charges that they took specific amounts of money from specific victims on specific dates.” Defendants are protected from double jeopardy. Their general and special demurrers were properly denied. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga.App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (March 5, 2004). “Unlike an aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require a specific criminal intent; rather, it requires only a general criminal intent as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1, which in the case of simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) is a general intent to injure.” Indictment for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon thus was sufficient although it did not specifically allege intent. Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003). Indictment for child cruelty which alleged that defendant caused child “excessive physical harm” was not defective, though OCGA § 16-5-70(b) defines child cruelty as causing child “excessive physical pain.” “In the context of this statute, causing ‘physical ... pain’ and causing ‘physical harm’ are so related that the indictment was sufficient to inform Robles of the charge and to allow her to prepare an intelligent defense.” Hardin v. State, 277 Ga. 242, 587 S.E.2d 634 (October 20, 2003). “Hardin contends that the indictment charging him with methamphetamine trafficking was defective because it did not explicitly charge that Hardin had to ‘knowingly’ be in possession of the contraband. The indictment was not defective, however, because it charged that Hardin had the methamphetamine ‘under his control,’ which is sufficient to infer the necessary criminal intent and to put Hardin on notice of the crime for which he is charged. Hardin could not admit the allegations in the indictment and avoid the conviction.” State v. Burrell, 263 Ga.App. 207, 587 S.E.2d 298 (September 12, 2003). A single act of aggressive driving, directed toward four occupants of another vehicle, can be charged as four separate counts of aggressive driving, each naming a different victim, and those victims may be drivers or passengers. “‘A person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person’ [emphasis in Court of Appeals decision, not statute]. Notably, the statute does not limit the applicability of the offense as going toward ‘another driver’ ; the legislature could have made this distinction but apparently chose not to. Under OCGA § 40-6-397, the State must show that the indicted acts constituting aggressive driving (in this case, following too closely and overtaking) were committed with the requisite intent directed at a specific person named in the indictment.” By contrast, “reckless driving is not directed toward a specific person,” and thus “the same reckless acts of driving cannot be punished multiple times by simply naming a different ‘person or property’ that the acts allegedly endangered.” Trial court properly quashed multiple counts of indictment regarding reckless driving, but should not have quashed aggressive driving counts. Gantt v. State, 263 Ga.App. 102, 587 S.E.2d 255 (September 8, 2003). Accusation charging defendant with violating OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2), DUI-drug, was not subject to demurrer for failing to specify the drug. “‘OCGA § 17-7- 71(c) provides that every accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the law ... shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116, 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990). We have held that simply reciting the statute violated, although not desirable, is sufficient to meet the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-71(c).” Even if error, it was harmless: “ Gantt herself was in the best position to know which drug or drugs