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she had ingested, and she was therefore not prejudiced or misled. ” Accord, Buchanan v. State , 264 Ga.App. 148, 589 S.E.2d 876 (November 14, 2003). Spence v. State, 263 Ga.App. 25, 587 S.E.2d 183 (September 2, 2003). Conviction for fleeing and eluding reversed. “The accusation charged Spence with this offense by alleging that he ‘did ... drive a vehicle and willfully fail or refuse to bring his vehicle to a stop when given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.’” Accusation did not “allege that Spence was eluding a police officer or vehicle when he failed to stop in response to visual or audible signals (2) to specify the signals to which he failed to respond, only alleging that they were either visual or audible or (3) even to allege that the signals were given by police. Thus, even if Spence admitted the allegations as charged, he would not be guilty of any crime and the accusation was fatally defective.” “We find in this case that merely reciting a description of the statute, along with some, but not all, of the elements of the crime was insufficient given the deficiencies in the allegations noted above.” State v. Tate, 262 Ga.App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (July 14, 2003). Indictment for simple battery was sufficiently specific when it alleged that the victim suffered “visible bodily harm,” without further description. “A simple test of the validity of this count is whether Tate can admit all the allegations of the accusation and be innocent of having committed an offense.” “Every accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the law or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct,” OCGA § 17- 7-71(c). Carrell v. State, 261 Ga.App. 485, 583 S.E.2d 167 (June 4, 2003). Indictment accused defendant of reckless conduct, “alleging that he drove at a high rate of speed, attempted to ram other cars, and drove at night without headlights.” Speeding and driving without headlights at night could constitute reckless conduct, which is an act of criminal negligence; but intentionally attempting to ram other cars, by definition, could not. “The trial court did not tie the intentional act of attempting to ram other cars specifically to reckless conduct or lead the jury to believe that it could convict Carrell of reckless conduct based on that act. And, as explained in the previous division, since the indictment charged that the crime was committed in more than one way and the jury’s verdict could have been based on any of the acts alleged in the indictment, there is no basis for concluding that the reckless conduct conviction was based on the act of attempting to ram other cars. Under these circumstances, we find that the reference to the attempted ramming of other cars in the indictment is ‘an unnecessary description of an unnecessary fact, which need not be proved, because the State was not required to prove [that he attempted to ram other cars] in order to convict [defendant] of [reckless conduct].’” Hogan v. State, 261 Ga.App. 261, 582 S.E.2d 210 (May 14, 2003). Indictment not fatally flawed because it did not allege the assault was unlawful , and that defendant attempted to cut victim. “The proper way to challenge either the validity or the form of an indictment is by filing a general or a special demurrer.” See also Meadows (November 9, 2001), below. Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 573 S.E.2d 44 (November 25, 2002). Indictment alleging assault “with a handgun, a deadly weapon,” was not subject to demurrer for specifying manner in which gun was used to assault victim. “The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more certain and definite, but whether it contains the elements of the offense charged, apprises the accused of what he must be prepared to defend against, and protects against double jeopardy.” Hill v. State, 257 Ga.App. 82, 570 S.E.2d 395 (August 20, 2002). “[T]he state was not required to specify the statute the defendant allegedly violated. ‘It is the description of the crime, rather than the description and number of the section under which it appears in the code which furnishes the criterion for determining whether the indictment is good.’” The trial court does not have to conduct a hearing on such a motion because the issues raised can be resolved through consideration of the record. See also Nye (April 19, 2006), above. Accord, Doe v. State , 306 Ga.App. 348, 702 S.E.2d 669 (October 5, 2010) (language of indictment, describing offense of attempting to influence winning of lottery prize, controlled over erroneous reference to code section dealing with falsely uttering a state lottery ticket) ( affirmed on other grounds, 290 Ga. 667, 725 S.E.2d 234 (March 5, 2012)). State v. Meadows, 252 Ga.App. 376, 556 S.E.2d 479 (November 9, 2001). Trial court erred in granting demurrer to simple battery accusation. Court of Appeals found no impropriety where accusation charged defendant with simple battery by stating Defendant “did unlawfully intentionally cause physical harm....” The word “unlawfully” was not redundant and prejudicial, but simply helped define the manner in which the State claimed the simple batteries were committed. See also Hogan (May 14, 2003), above.