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Bell v. State, 252 Ga.App. 74, 555 S.E.2d 747 (October 17, 2001). Defendant was charged with violation of Georgia Controlled Substances Act on eight counts. Charges included four counts of sale of cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine, two counts of trafficking in cocaine, and one for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant argued, “State failed to show possession, delivery, and sale of cocaine as alleged in complaint” (emphasis added.) Held, “even though the indictment was formed in the conjunctive, proof that [Defendant] committed crime by any of the methods charged would form a basis for upholding his conviction.” See also Murden v. State , 258 Ga.App. 585, 574 S.E.2d 657 (November 25, 2002). Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 484, 523 S.E.2d 73 (October 4, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment where indictment described an offense, though not the one named – count one claimed to charge aggravated child molestation, but actually charged child molestation. “‘It is not the name, but the description of the crime, which characterizes the offense charged.... An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment. State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 489, 238 S.E.2d 38 (1977). Where the accused desires to take exception to the form of an indictment, it is essential that he should do so by a demurrer or motion to quash, made in writing and before entering a pleading to the merits.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Phillips v. State, 215 Ga.App. 526(2), 451 S.E.2d 517 (1994).” “Although the jury verdict stated Jones was guilty of aggravated child molestation, the trial court conformed the verdict to the pleadings and the evidence (see OCGA § 17-9-40), and Jones was convicted of and sentenced for the lesser included offense of child molestation.” 11. DESCRIPTION OF DRUG/SUBSTANCE State v. Wright, 333 Ga.App. 124, 775 S.E.2d 567 (July 13, 2015). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly granted general demurrer to indictment for drug possession. Indictment alleged that defendant possessed a substance not listed “by name within the statutory list of Schedule 1 controlled substances,” describing it as “a substituted 2– aminopropan–1–one.” State argues that this phrase “indicates that the substance falls under OCGA § 16–13–25(12)(L), which in pertinent part identifies as a Schedule 1 controlled substance ‘[a]ny compound ... structurally derived from 2– aminopropan–1–one by substitution at the 1–position with either phenyl, naphthyl, or thiophene ring systems[.]’ But the indictment's language does not clearly refer to a substance under OCGA § 16–13–25(12)(L). Its use of the term ‘substituted’ is ambiguous and could be construed to include compounds that do not match the precise definition of the statute and, thus, are not controlled substances. So construed, the indictment would not charge a crime.” Walker v. State, 323 Ga.App. 685, 747 S.E.2d 691 (August 8, 2013). Conviction for sale of TFMPP affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment referred to substance, in part, as piperazine, but chemical analyst called it “pipraline,” where both referred to it as TFMPP. Distinguishing Williamson v. State, 134 Ga.App. 864, 216 S.E.2d 684 (1975), where “there was no evidence introduced at trial that the drug listed in the indictment was the same as that identified at trial. See Williamson, supra, 134 Ga.App. at 865(1), 216 S.E.2d 684.” In re: S.C.P., 320 Ga.App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 474 (March 7, 2013). Whole court opinion. Delinquency adjudication affirmed; no fatal variance where petition alleged trafficking in methamphetamine and evidence showed trafficking in methamphetamine mixture. Based on Rochefort v. State, 279 Ga. 738 (620 S.E.2d 803) (2005); overruling contrary cases Elrod v. State, 269 Ga.App. 112 (603 S.E.2d 512) (2004) and Daniel v. State, 251 Ga.App. 792, 792–793 (555 S.E.2d 154) (2001). Serna v. State, 308 Ga.App. 518, 707 S.E.2d 904 (March 17, 2011). Convictions for possession of dangerous drug and related offenses affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment incorrectly referred to the drug as “amyl nitrate” instead of “alkyl nitrite.” “Ámyl nitrate” isn’t on the list of dangerous drugs, but alkyl nitrite, which the evidence showed the defendant to possess, is. Importantly, defendant didn’t file a general demurrer to the indictment. “‘A motion for [directed verdict or] new trial is not the proper method to attack the sufficiency of an indictment and does not provide a basis for this Court to review the indictment.’ (Punctuation and citations omitted.) McKay [ v. State, 234 Ga.App. 556, 556-559(2) (507 S.E.2d 484) (1998)].” Citing “ Hardin v. State , 142 Ga.App. 795 (237 S.E.2d 202) (1977), in which this Court affirmed the conviction of a defendant who was indicted for possessing a certain compound alleged to be a controlled substance, but which was actually a nonexistent compound with a name similar to an actual controlled substance. See id. at 796(2). This Court concluded that the difference was due to an ‘obvious typographical error in the indictment’ and found the variance to be harmless. Id. We find this reasoning persuasive here in light of the similarity in name between the indicted chemical and the proven chemical. Further, the indictment notified Serna of the date of the