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offense, the type of offense, and the basis for the offense; and Serna was convicted of the same offense listed in the indictment. Compare Smith v. State, 202 Ga.App. 664, 665 (415 S.E.2d 481) (1992) (reversing conviction of offense not charged in indictment). Based on these circumstances, Serna's defense was not compromised at trial, and he was protected from a second prosecution for the same offense. Therefore, the variance between the allegations in the indictment and proof at trial was not fatal. See Hardin, 142 Ga.App. at 796(2). See also Murray v. State, 157 Ga.App. 596, 598-599(4) (278 S.E.2d 2) (1981) (finding no fatal variance despite a discrepancy in the name of the chemical compound).” Trial court erred, but harmless, in submitting issue of fatal variance to jury in jury charge. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga.App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (July 7, 2010). Defendants’ conviction for methamphetamine trafficking affirmed. Trial court properly denied demurrer to two counts of indictment, both charging defendant with trafficking meth on same date, but apparently referring to two different amounts of the drug. “The indictment was not required to include additional facts specifying the locations where the methamphetamine was found inside the residence. “While the defendant is entitled to know the particular facts constituting the alleged offense to enable him to prepare for trial, it is not necessary for the State to spell out in the [indictment] the evidence on which it relies for a conviction.” FN1 (Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Golden v. State, 299 Ga.App. 407, 411(3), 683 S.E.2d 618 (2009). See also Watson v. State, 178 Ga.App. 778, 780(1), 344 S.E.2d 667 (1986); Mell v. State, 69 Ga.App. 302, 303, 25 S.E.2d 142 (1943). Because the allegations of the indictment were sufficient to be easily understood by the jury, to allow Fyfe to prepare her defense, and to protect Fyfe from double jeopardy, the trial court's decision overruling Fyfe's special demurrer was authorized. See Coker v. State, 185 Ga.App. 103, 103-104(1), 363 S.E.2d 356 (1987).” Holloway v. State, 297 Ga.App. 81, 676 S.E.2d 445 (March 26, 2009) No fatal variance where indictment alleged that defendant possessed a “crack cocaine smoking device,” while evidence showed that it was rather a component of such device. Page v. State, 296 Ga.App. 431, 674 S.E.2d 654 (March 4, 2009). DUI accusation was not fatally flawed because it described benzoylecgonine as a controlled substance instead of “a metabolite of a controlled substance – cocaine.” Davis v. State, 281 Ga.App. 855, 637 S.E.2d 431 (September 15, 2006). Indictment charging defendant with ‘criminal attempt to traffick in cocaine’ was not required to allege the purity of the substance, which defendant was negotiating to purchase from a confidential police informant and which never actually existed. “This case … does not involve a mixture of cocaine. The indictment clearly charged that Davis attempted to purchase three kilograms of cocaine, not that he completed the crime. [fn] There is no requirement that the State specifically place the adjective ‘pure’ before the word cocaine in the indictment, particularly given that the operative statute [OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1)] does not use such wording. [Cits.] Indeed, there was no actual cocaine involved, and we fail to see why the State should be required to allege the purity of nonexistent cocaine. The indictment tracks the applicable statutes in a manner that is easily understood, and it apprised Davis of both the crime and the manner in which it was alleged to have been committed. Moreover, if Davis admitted the allegations precisely as set forth in the indictment, he would be guilty of criminal attempt to traffic in cocaine. [Cit.] Thus, the indictment is not defective, and the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss it.” Rochefort v. State, 279 Ga. 738, 620 S.E.2d 803 (October 11, 2005). “[Defendant] urges that there is a fatal variance because the accusation charged him with possession of more than 300 tablets of ephedrine, but the proof showed that the tablets contained pseudoephedrine. … [H]owever, for purposes of OCGA § 16-13-30.3, ‘ephedrine’ and ‘pseudoephedrine’ are synonymous, so that the one includes the other. OCGA § 16-13-30.3(a)(1). The explanation for why the substances are deemed to be functional equivalents is established by the testimony of the State’s expert, who noted that ‘ephedrine’ and ‘pseudoephedrine’ can be used interchangeably, have the same chemical formulas and induce the same physical effects. Therefore, there was no fatal variance between the accusation charging possession of ephedrine and the proof at trial showing possession of pseudoephedrine. See Sims v. State, 258 Ga.App. 536, 537(1), 574 S.E.2d 622 (2002) (no fatal variance where statute treats two substances equally).” Accord, In re: S.C.P. (March 7, 2013), above. Gantt v. State, 263 Ga.App. 102, 587 S.E.2d 255 (September 8, 2003). Accusation charging defendant with violating OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(2), DUI-drug, was not subject to demurrer for failing to specify the drug. “‘OCGA § 17-7-71(c) provides that every accusation which states the offense in the terms and language of the law ... shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Broski v. State, 196 Ga.App. 116, 395 S.E.2d 317 (1990). We have held that simply reciting the statute violated, although not desirable, is sufficient to meet the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-71(c).” Even if error, it was harmless: “Gantt herself was in the best position to know which drug or drugs she