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Newsome v. State, 296 Ga.App. 490, 675 S.E.2d 229 (March 5, 2009). Trial court erred by denying defendant’s special demurrer to accusation for criminal trespass “because the accusation failed to identify with particularity the property of the victim he was alleged to have interfered with and damaged. … It is difficult, if not impossible, to prepare a defense to a criminal trespass charge, or to protect against double jeopardy on such a charge, if a defendant is not sufficiently apprised of the particular property he or she is alleged to have damaged or interfered with. Thus, ‘[w]here timely demand is made by special demurrer, the defendant is entitled to have such a definite and particular description of the property as will enable him to know the exact transaction in which the State claims he violated the law.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Traylor, 158 Ga.App. 786, 787 (282 S.E.2d 376) (1981) (larceny). See also Morrow v. State, 17 Ga.App. 116 (86 S.E. 280) (1915) (indictment subject to special demurrer when it failed to identify property owned by the victim that was the basis for the trespass charge).” Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 663 S.E.2d 844 (June 25, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s demurrer and motion to quash his indictment for theft by taking by a police officer; identity of owner of property stolen was “not a material element of the crime” and thus not required to be alleged in the indictment. All that is required is “for the State to prove that the stolen property belonged to someone other than the defendant in order to support a theft by taking conviction.” Accord, Burrell v. State , 293 Ga.App. 540, 667 S.E.2d 394 (September 15, 2008) (evidence supported defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass to car, although car was owned by different person than victim alleged in indictment). Wilson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 69, 661 S.E.2d 221 (April 11, 2008). “The fact that the evidence revealed that the stolen weapon was a .45 caliber pistol while the indictment described it as a .25 caliber handgun did not create a fatal variance.” Holder v. State, 242 Ga.App. 479, 529 S.E.2d 907 (February 22, 2000). Deposit account fraud convictions affirmed; no fatal variance where “the indictment alleged the check amount to be $1,730 and the amount proved at trial was $1,730.60.” Abney v. State, 240 Ga.App. 280, 523 S.E.2d 362 (October 6, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for burglary affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment “charged [defendant] with entering the dwelling house of McGee, but the evidence at trial showed that McGee neither owned the house nor resided there.” McGee was son of owner and caretaker of property. “See Manemann v. State, 147 Ga.App. 747, 748-749(4), 250 S.E.2d 164 (1978) (no fatal variance where burglary indictment alleged that property was owned by person who turned out to be the janitor, not the owner).” Accord, Murray v. State , 328 Ga.App. 192, 761 S.E.2d 590 (July 10, 2014) (burglary indictment identified premises as Cotton’s dwelling place, but Cotton didn’t buy the property until several days after the burglary). Forthe v. State, 237 Ga.App. 134, 514 S.E.2d 890 (March 18, 1999). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s special demurrer to theft indictment. Indictment alleged seven counts of misdemeanor theft and one count of felony theft of money from a business, stating specific dates but not specifying the amounts of the thefts except alleging that they were more or less than $500. “[I]t is not necessary for a theft by taking indictment to allege the specific amount taken. … The indictment sufficiently apprises Forthe of the charges against him so as to allow him to prepare a defense and, along with the record built thereon, satisfies double jeopardy concerns.” Overrules State v. Stamey, 211 Ga.App. 837, 440 S.E.2d 725 (1994). Beasley and Ruffin dissent. Accord, Roman v. State , 300 Ga.App. 526, 685 S.E.2d 775 (October 19, 2009) (“the value of the stolen property is not an essential element of the crime of theft by taking, but is relevant only for purposes of determining the punishment for the offense.”). Stanford v. State, 236 Ga.App. 597, 512 S.E.2d 708 (February 22, 1999). State was not required to prove ownership of dwelling to prove arson under OCGA § 16-7-60(a)(1), even though alleged in the indictment. “Under OCGA § 16-7- 60(a)(1), an individual commits the offense of arson in the first degree, when he or she knowingly damages by fire ‘[a]ny dwelling house of another without his consent ... whether it is occupied, unoccupied, or vacant.’ Stanford contends that because the indictment charged that he damaged ‘the property of the Columbus housing authority occupied by LaKesha Weaver,’ the State was required to introduce evidence that the building was indeed owned by the housing authority. But evidence showing that the damaged property was owned by the housing authority was not necessarily required. ‘[L]awful occupancy by one in charge constitutes ownership as contemplated by the [arson] statute ..., and the question of legal title is not involved.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hufstetler v. State, 171 Ga.App. 106, 109(6), 319 S.E.2d 869 (1984). Thus, the ‘ownership’ of the dwelling by the housing authority ‘was an unnecessarily minute description of an unnecessary fact alleged in the indictment and need not have been proved.’ Id.”