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13. DESCRIPTION OF SEXUAL ACTS Moon v. State, 335 Ga.App. 642, 782 S.E.2d 699 (February 10, 2016). Aggravated child molestation, sexual exploitation of children and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to form of indictment. Contrary to defendant’s argument, indictment wasn’t defective for failing “to allege that [defendant] ‘physically’ injured the child victim. … The indictment charged that Moon committed aggravated child molestation ‘by inserting [his] finger ... into the vagina of [M.O.] ... causing injury to [M.O.’s] vagina.’ We fail to see how injury to a vagina could be anything other than physical.” Kay v. State, 306 Ga.App. 666, 703 S.E.2d 108 (October 29, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; no fatal variance where indictment alleged defendant touched victim’s vagina, but evidence showed that all touching was outside victim’s clothing. “[O]ur law does not require that ‘the State present testimony that precisely tracks the language found in the indictment.’ Cherry v. State, 283 Ga.App. 700, 703(2)(a) (642 S.E.2d 369) (2007). Nor does our law require a showing that the victim was touched beneath her clothing. See Watson v. State, 222 Ga.App. 814 (476 S.E.2d 96) (1996); Bragg v. State, 217 Ga.App. 342, 343(2) (457 S.E.2d 262) (1995).” State v. Marshall, 304 Ga.App. 865, 698 S.E.2d 337 (July 7, 2010). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s specific demurrer, finding that indictment for criminal attempt to entice a child “was not definite enough to put him on notice of the acts against which he was to defend.” Indictment alleged, in relevant part, that defendant “did attempt to entice said child into his vehicle for the purpose of indecent acts”; trial court found that this “failed to inform Marshall of the ‘indecent acts’ that the state expected to prove.” “The appellate courts of this state have previously held that the words “indecent acts” in the context of OCGA § 16-6-5(a) are not so vague and undefined as to prevent a person from recognizing the conduct they forbid. Howell v. State, 172 Ga.App. 805, 806(2), 324 S.E.2d 754 (1984) (‘We find that persons of common intelligence would not differ as to application of the statute in regard to the meaning of ‘indecent acts' committed on a child.’). … And, the crime charged in and of itself alerted Marshall to the fact that he was being accused of acting with the intent of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor: Chapter 6 of Title 16 of the Official Code of Georgia is entitled, “Sexual Offenses,” and OCGA § 16-6-5(a) proscribes the ‘solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct or conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Cits.] … Significantly, because Marshall was indicted with criminal attempt to commit the crime of enticing a child for indecent purposes, by definition, he fell short of the crime's commission. See Wittschen [ v. State, 259 Ga. 448(1), 383 S.E.2d 885 (1989)]. Thus, any evidence of his criminal intent is necessarily implicit. Compare Peavy v. State, 159 Ga.App. 280, 281-282(1)(a), 283 S.E.2d 346 (1981).” “See Snider v. State, 238 Ga.App. 55, 59(2), 516 S.E.2d 569 (1999) (‘It has been broadly held that an indictment may charge lewd and lascivious conduct in general statutory terms without particularizing details which would be offensive to decency.’) (citation and punctuation omitted.); Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 134-135, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968) (same). Compare D'Auria v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 500-501(1), 512 S.E.2d 266 (1999).” Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 520 S.E.2d 258 (June 29, 1999), affirmed on other grounds, 272 Ga. 323, 528 S.E.2d 788 (May 1, 2000). No fatal variance where indictment alleged that defendant put his finger “ in the vagina” of the child molesting victim, but “the victim testified that he … rubbed his hand on her vagina.” “In Winter v. State, 171 Ga.App. 511-512(1), 320 S.E.2d 233 (1984), we addressed the same issue Buice raises here-whether a fatal variance exists when the defendant is charged with placing his finger in the vagina of his victim, but the victim testifies that the defendant never penetrated the vagina. We concluded that, under those circumstances, there was no fatal variance as the defendant was sufficiently apprised of the charges against him. Id. We further noted that there was no danger that the defendant was misled or prejudiced by the language of the indictment. Id. As there is no meaningful distinction between this case and Winter, Buice's claim of error lacks merit.” Snider v. State, 238 Ga.App. 55, 516 S.E.2d 569 (April 21, 1999). “With respect to the statutory offenses of child molestation and child cruelty, the indictment followed the statutes and, when such offenses are charged, ‘“(w)e think the terms of the statute on which the indictment is based distinctly individuate the defined offense[s] and that the use of those terms in the indictment is sufficient to give defendant reasonably certain notice of the specific acts charged and thus enable him to prepare his defense. (Cits.)” Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 134-135, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968). ‘It has been broadly held that an indictment may charge lewd and lascivious conduct in general statutory terms without particularizing details which would be offensive to decency. (Cit.)”’ Id. Burnett v. State, 202 Ga.App. 563, 564- 565(2), 415 S.E.2d 43 (1992). See also State v. Black, 149 Ga.App. 389, 391(4), 254 S.E.2d 506 (1979).” Distinguishing Military Circle Pet Center No. 94 v. State, 181 Ga.App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 555 (1987) (term “neglect” was insufficient