☢ test - Í

Rogers v. State, 265 Ga.App. 628, 595 S.E.2d 326 (February 16, 2004). “At the police station, Officer Edwards put Rogers in an interview room with a tinted window which was covered by window shades that could be rolled up and down. Hawkins and Clark were placed in an adjoining room. Officer Edwards brought Clark up to the window and asked Hawkins to go to the back of the room. When the shades were half way up, Clark identified Rogers as the robber. The shades were brought back down and then raised for Hawkins, who identified Rogers as the man he had seen driving the vehicle outside the store. The two identifications were made approximately 90 minutes after the robbery.” Held, while this was “suggestive” and a one-suspect show-up “presents a danger of irreparable misidentification,” no “‘substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification’” is shown in this case given the factors set out in Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972): “the witnesses’ opportunity to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witnesses’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witnesses’ prior description and their level of certainty.’ [Cits.]” Here, the witnesses “both had an opportunity to see the robber at close range, in adequate light, and at a time when their attention was completely focused on him. The identifications occurred only an hour and a half after the robbery…. [B]oth witnesses identified Rogers immediately and without any sign of uncertainty.” Identification testimony admitted despite “some [age and weight] difference between [witness’s] initial description of the robber and Rogers.” Anderson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 428, 594 S.E.2d 669 (February 4, 2004). “Although showing suspects singly to a witness for identification purposes is inherently suggestive, an identification need not be excluded as long as under all the circumstances the identification was reliable notwithstanding any suggestive procedure. [Cit.] Our inquiry here is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. [Cit.] To evaluate that likelihood, we consider factors that include the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [Cit.]” Cashier’s opportunity to observe robber’s face for two minutes and ability to give detailed description of physical features and clothes, his certainty “of his identification at the show-up which took place within an hour of the armed robberies” made his testimony admissible. Jackson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 848, 581 S.E.2d 382 (April 11, 2003). Trial court did not err in admitting evidence of one- on-one show-up, although defendant “was surrounded by uniformed officers and was handcuffed when the victim identified him,” where burglary victim “was no more than eight to ten feet” from defendant and described his stature and clothing. Victim, age 82, gave chase, and identified defendant when police brought him back to scene less than an hour later. Horne v. State, 260 Ga.App. 640, 580 S.E.2d 644 (March 27, 2003). “Horne contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the out-of-court, pre-trial identification by the store manager. Although one-on-one show-ups have been sharply criticized and are inherently suggestive, the identification need not be excluded as long as the identification was reliable notwithstanding any suggestive procedure under all the circumstances. The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. In the present case, the record shows that the store manager viewed Horne’s face for approximately ten seconds from a distance of thirty to forty feet. According to the store manager, he was able to get a good look at Horne during that time. In fact, the store manager gave police and the manager of the second store a description of Horne. And, the store manager positively identified Horne on the scene less than thirty minutes after seeing him commit the crime at his store. Under the circumstances, the identification was reliable, and the trial court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous” (emphasis added). Accord, Ford (February 29, 2008), above. Porter v. State, 258 Ga.App. 897, 575 S.E.2d 753 (December 16, 2002). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; identification in one-on-one pre-trial show-up properly admitted. “Although showing suspects singly to a witness for identification purposes is inherently suggestive, an identification need not be excluded as long as under all the circumstances the identification was reliable notwithstanding any suggestive procedure. Our inquiry here is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. [T]o evaluate that likelihood, we consider factors that include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Here, victim had several minutes to observe defendant during daylight hours, his attention was focused on him, his description was accurate and he was certain of his identification both at show-up and at trial. Accord, Miller v. State , 266 Ga.App.