☢ test - Í

378, 597 S.E.2d 475 (March 18, 2004) (good opportunity to view during attempted robbery, “heightened attention,” accurate descriptions, “showups occurred in a well-lit location in the vicinity of the incident” approximately 45 minutes after the incident, both witnesses were certain of their identification); Tiggs v. State , 287 Ga.App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (August 17, 2007). Salazar v. State, 245 Ga.App. 878, 539 S.E.2d 231 (September 13, 2000). Statutory rape conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of victim’s show-up identification. 1. “A one-on-one showup is inherently suggestive. [Cit.] But both state and federal courts have recognized countervailing considerations that can render one-on-one confrontations permissible, and even helpful. For instance, speedy investigation and prompt identification enhance accuracy and reliability, which expedite the release of innocent subjects. Baynes v. State, 218 Ga.App. 687, 688, 463 S.E.2d 144 (1995). In this case, the showup was an on-the-scene confrontation conducted as soon as possible after the suspect’s apprehension. Given the practicalities inherent in such a situation, an immediate on-scene confrontation is helpful both to law enforcement agencies and to suspects who may be innocent. Pierce v. State, 191 Ga.App. 225(1), 381 S.E.2d 532 (1989).” 2. “Contrary to Salazar’s contention, the fact that he was in a police car when he was identified by the victim does not render the identification inadmissible. Jenkins v. State, 216 Ga.App. 433(3), 454 S.E.2d 543 (1995). See also Mattison v. State, 215 Ga.App. 635, 636(2), 451 S.E.2d 807 (1994) (showup while suspect in back of patrol car upheld). This factor, and the minor discrepancies in the victim’s description were simply subjects for cross- examination. Semple v. State, 271 Ga. 416, 419, 519 S.E.2d 912 (1999).” 3. Identification here passes the Neil v. Biggers test: “the victim had an excellent opportunity to view the suspect during the crime, as it was committed face to face, and her attention was focused on him. According to police officers, her description before the showup both of the suspect and his clothing was extremely accurate, and the victim was absolutely certain of her identification. Further, the showup here took place after the victim and her mother had found Salazar and pointed him out to the police.” Distinguishing Banks v. State, 216 Ga.App. 326, 320, 454 S.E.2d 784 (1995): “The elderly victim could not see too well; the victim admitted he was not paying attention to this suspect during the crime but was focusing his attention on an accomplice; and he was mistaken about the time of day at which the showup took place. In addition, the victim’s description differed ‘in important respects’ from the suspect’s appearance at the showup.” Accord, Butler v. State , 276 Ga.App. 161, 623 S.E.2d 132 (November 1, 2005). Self v. State, 245 Ga.App. 270, 537 S.E.2d 723 (July 21, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress, as show-up identifications weren’t unduly suggestive. “‘There is no per se exclusionary rule applied to pre-indictment confrontations. Pre-indictment confrontations should be scrutinized to determine if they are unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. The totality of the circumstances must be viewed to determine if there is a likelihood of misidentification which offends against due process and the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include [(1)] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [(2)] the witness' degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, and [(4)] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Flores v. State, 228 Ga.App. 152, 153, 491 S.E.2d 86 (1997).’ Huff v. State, 239 Ga.App. 83, 85(1), 519 S.E.2d 263 (1999). In the present case, the showup identification occurred approximately three and one-half hours after the second incident, and the three people who identified Self were the victims in the second incident. They testified that they talked face-to-face with Self for three to five minutes in conditions that were well lighted. The victims' outside lights were on by their respective front doors where Self and the victims spoke. For the showup, Self was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car. Separately, each victim looked through the car window, and the officer shined a light into the car. The officer asked if the individual looked familiar to them. The three victims identified Self as one of the individuals who impersonated an officer.” Williams v. State, 241 Ga.App. 670, 527 S.E.2d 272 (December 21, 1999). Conviction for entering an auto affirmed; evidence of show-up identification, ten days after crime, was properly admitted based on victim’s opportunity to view defendant at time of crime, and prior knowledge of him. “Applying these factors, we find that under the totality of the circumstances there was not a likelihood of irreparable misidentification. [Victim] Pitts paid close attention to the man in the truck. Pitts, who had an unobstructed view of Williams in the truck from only fifteen feet away, testified that Williams was plainly visible for two minutes in the truck . Pitts also saw Williams' face quite clearly when Williams turned around after Pitts broke the window. Furthermore, Pitts testified several times that, without a doubt, Williams was the man he saw in his truck and that this identification was based on his opportunity to view Williams in his truck rather than at the showup . Finally, although the time period between the crime and the showup was ten days, because Pitts showed such certainty, we find that this passage of time did not affect his ability to identify Williams. See Hood v. State, 199 Ga.App. 774, 775-776, 406 S.E.2d 120 (1991) (a showup identification 12 days after the crime was not unnecessarily