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suggestive under the totality of the circumstances therein).” Azizi v. State, 270 Ga. 709, 512 S.E.2d 622 (February 22, 1999). Evidence of out-of-court identification was properly admitted, although witness accidentally encountered defendant in lobby of police station. “[Witness] Ms. Lum was waiting in the lobby of the police station when Azizi walked by her. Continuing the argument, Azizi asserts this impermissibly suggestive show-up gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). … The evidence demonstrates that the encounter between Ms. Lum and Azizi was not orchestrated by the police. Ms. Lum had driven to the station with another witness; she was simply waiting for that witness when she saw Azizi. No one asked Ms. Lum to look at Azizi, much less identify him. See Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 84-85, 463 S.E.2d 868 (1995) (no evidence that witness was coerced to make identification). No one suggested that Azizi was a suspect, or why he was in the police station. Thus, the encounter between Ms. Lum and Azizi occurred purely by chance; it cannot be said that it was unduly suggestive. See Herron v. State, 155 Ga.App. 791, 793(3), 272 S.E.2d 756 (1980) (no denial of due process where pretrial confrontation is accidental and not arranged by police). ” Accord, Perry v. New Hampshire , 10-8974, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694, 2012 WL 75048 (January 11, 2012). Barber v. State, 236 Ga.App. 294, 512 S.E.2d 48 (February 8, 1999). “Barber argues that the identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive because he was shown to the witnesses in a one-on-one setting, handcuffed, and in the presence of police officers. See Banks v. State, 203 Ga.App. 355, 416 S.E.2d 866 (1992). … [W]e find that the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Although the robbery was short in duration, both [victims] Myrhol and McGlothlin had a clear opportunity to observe the attacker. The robbery occurred in a well-lit area beneath a street light. The gunman came very close to each of the witnesses-about two feet from McGlothlin and four or five feet from Myrhol. McGlothlin testified that she looked directly at the gunman’s face during the incident. Myrhol testified that she intentionally made eye contact with the gunman and paid close attention to his face during the robbery. Both witnesses testified that they had no doubt about their identification of Barber. Myrhol also testified that, when she heard Barber’s voice at the police station, she recognized it as the gunman’s voice. McGlothlin gave a detailed, accurate description of the attacker to Officer Jackson when he arrived on the scene. Finally, only about an hour or an hour and a half elapsed between the time of the robbery and the identification at the police station.” 6. OUTSIDE COURT – SINGLE PHOTOGRAPH Sorrells v. State, 326 Ga.App. 888, 755 S.E.2d 586 (March 28, 2014). Physical precedent only. Conviction for sale of cocaine affirmed, but remanded to consider ineffective assistance. “[T]he trial court was authorized to conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” “ Sorrells points out that the drug transaction occurred at night and that the street-side encounter was brief. He asserts that, because the detectives had attempted to make other drug buys that night, [Officer] Stapleton ‘could have confused the identification,’ pointing out that Stapleton admittedly did not take any notes or otherwise record any physical description of the seller of the cocaine. Sorrells points out further that, prior to being shown the single photograph, Stapleton had given the backup detective no description of the seller.” Evidence supporting admission of officer’s identification of defendant: this was the only “street-side drug transaction” the officers conducted that night; area was illuminated by street lights and vehicle headlights, and officer’s eyes were adjusted to the conditions; the “exchange had taken ‘[t]hirty seconds to a minute,’ during which time the seller had leaned down and toward his opened window, then reached across him which had brought the seller's face to within ‘[a] matter of inches’ of his own. Stapleton testified that ‘it was not the kind of situation where you would avert your face,’ explaining that the whole purpose for the encounter was ‘to identify local street-level dealers, to go out and attempt to purchase ... drugs from street-level dealers.’ Further, Stapleton had verbally engaged the seller.” Officer was trained in identification; recognized defendant from the community (though he didn’t know his name); and “immediately recognized” him when shown defendant’s picture a “short while” later. State v. Mojica, 316 Ga.App. 619, 730 S.E.2d 94 (July 5, 2012). In prosecution for kidnapping with bodily injury and related offenses, no error in trial court’s grant of motion to suppress out-of-court identification. “[Victim] Raissian was working after hours in her office when she noticed Mojica, an employee of the office building's cleaning service, walk through her office to reach a filing area behind that office. Later that evening, as Raissian walked down the hall from her office to the printer, she was startled to see the same man in her peripheral vision, but then calmed down once she recognized him as a cleaner. As she turned to look back, the man told her ‘I need you to cooperate with me’ and dragged her into a dark office where she was choked until she passed out.” When she regained consciousness, she was severely injured. She told building security officers that “the same person who cleaned her floors earlier that evening” was her