☢ test - Í

attacker, and gave a description of him. The building cleaning supervisor gave defendant’s worker id badge to a police officer. “Officer Behry showed the identification badge to Raissian and asked her if she recognized the person as her attacker. Raissian said it was and that she recognized him as the man who cleaned her floor earlier.” Held, trial court could find that “there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” from this procedure. “Because Raissian's testimony that she had the opportunity to see her attacker in the lighted hallway prior to her attack conflicts with testimony from responding officers who interviewed her directly after the attack when she said that she had been grabbed from behind; because Raissian did not have the opportunity to see her attacker during the assault since they were in a darkened office and her attention was focused on her own survival; because the ER physician who treated Raissian testified that the injury to her brain could have caused memory loss; and because several cleaners working at the building that evening fit Raissian's description of a tall, broad-shouldered Hispanic male; we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress.” Leeks v. State, 309 Ga.App. 724, 710 S.E.2d 908 (June 1, 2011). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no error in admitting evidence of single-photo out-of-court identification. “[W]e have held that displaying a single photograph to a witness is impermissibly suggestive. See [ Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286, 702 S.E.2d 888 (2010)]. But such evidence ‘should be suppressed only if a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification exists.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McBride v. State, 297 Ga.App. 421, 422, 677 S.E.2d 438 (2009). The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include ‘1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal during the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; and (4) the length of time between the crime and the showup confrontation.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Crawford v. State, 297 Ga.App. 187, 191(2), 676 S.E.2d 843 (2009). Here, the trial court's ruling was supported by evidence that the victim 1) knew Leeks from the neighborhood; 2) described him to an officer on the scene; 3) spent 30 minutes or more with Leeks in an apartment talking with him then defending herself against his attack; 4) quickly and confidently identified Leeks as her assailant upon seeing his picture; and 5) identified Leeks at the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial. See id.; see also Jennings v. State, 277 Ga.App. 159, 163(3), 626 S.E.2d 155 (2006) (identification reliable under the circumstances). In this case, the trial court did not clearly err in denying Leeks's motion to suppress on this ground.” Wright v. State, 302 Ga.App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220 (January 25, 2010). Trial court properly admitted victim’s identification of defendant from a single photograph shown by officer. “Although we have held that the display of a single photograph to a witness is impermissibly suggestive ( Bradley v. State, 152 Ga.App. 902, 903 (264 S.E.2d 332) (1980)), the victim had an independent basis for his identification of Wright as he previously met him through Wright's sister and also attended a social gathering with Wright just two days prior to the shooting. Further, the victim had observed Wright with dread locks on the date of the shooting, and indicated to Officer Sapp that Wright had dread locks, as depicted in the photograph. See Ford v. State, 285 Ga.App. 106, 108(1)(b) (645 S.E.2d 590) (2007) (“[E]ven if a pretrial identification is tainted, an in-court identification is not constitutionally inadmissible if it does not depend upon the prior identification but has an independent origin.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). While the officer's display of a single photograph to the victim was error, under the totality of the circumstances, we find it to be harmless. See Brittian [ v. State, 274 Ga.App. 863, 865(2) (619 S.E.2d 376) (2005)] (identification of defendant was independently supported by testimony of a passenger and the fact that vehicle was co-registered to defendant).” McBride v. State, 297 Ga.App. 421, 677 S.E.2d 438 (April 9, 2009). Identification by undercover agent based on single photo was properly admitted. “Here, there was evidence that Agents Jones and Blackman had ample opportunity to observe McBride during the drug transaction. The transaction took place during daylight; Blackman dealt with McBride on a face-to-face basis; Jones observed the transaction standing next to Blackman; both agents were able to describe McBride by the clothes he was wearing on the day of the transaction; the agents videotaped him immediately after the transaction as the perpetrator; and they identified McBride with certainty at trial.” See also Bonner (April 13, 2006), below. Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377, 659 S.E.2d 372 (March 31, 2008). Witness’s out-of-court identification was not tainted when she was shown a single photo of defendant. “At the time of her identification, [witness] Hogue had known ‘Black’ [defendant’s street name] for seven years and had had contact with him on a daily basis. Hogue had had a sexual relationship with defendant, and knew him both by his street name and his legal name. Thus, showing Hogue a single photograph of defendant merely confirmed her previous identification of him. It follows that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress Hogue’s identification of defendant.” Accord, Leeks ( June 1, 2011), above; Walker v. State ,