☢ test - Í

295 Ga. 688, 763 S.E.2d 704 (September 22, 2014) (witness “had lived down the street from [co-defendant Flowers] for 11 years and had spent a lot of time with the Flowers family”). Bonner v. State, 278 Ga.App. 854, 630 S.E.2d 127 (April 13, 2006). Witness’s pre-trial identification was admissible even though State conceded that showing the witness a single photograph was suggestive. “Here, the crime occurred outdoors on a clear afternoon. Agent Mitchell shook Bonner’s hand, and Bonner was standing less than two feet from Agent Mitchell at the time the transaction was completed. Moreover, Agent Mitchell was an undercover agent who had been trained in observation and identification techniques. He observed Bonner during what he described as a ‘regular cocaine deal’ and was able to focus his attention towards the identification of the perpetrators. After returning to a safe location, Agent Mitchell reviewed the videotape of the transaction and dictated an accurate physical description of Bonner. Finally, upon being presented with the mug shot of Bonner, Agent Mitchell evidenced a high level of certainty in ‘immediately’ identifying him as the man who had assisted in the sale of the cocaine. Although over three months passed between the time of the crime and Bonner’s identification through his mug shot, we have held that such a period is ‘not of such length as to undermine identification.’ Crumbley v. State, 189 Ga.App. 384, 385(1) (375 S.E.2d 482) (1988) (finding sufficient indicia of reliability despite a five-month lapse of time between the crime and identification); see also Cummings v. State, 233 Ga.App. 806, 808-809(4) (505 S.E.2d 73) (1998) (two-year period between crime and identification ‘did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification’).” See also McBride (April 9, 2009), above. Paige v. State, 277 Ga.App. 687, 627 S.E.2d 370 (February 1, 2006). No error in admitting evidence of victim’s identification of defendant from a photograph shown to her “by a private citizen before she identified him in a police line-up. We find no merit in this enumeration because police did not employ the suggestive procedure of which Paige complains. ‘The due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitution protects the citizens against state action rather than against citizen action. In order for the Fourteenth Amendment to come into play in an identification procedure, state action must be involved.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Nowlin v. State, 225 Ga.App. 447, 449- 450(3) (484 S.E.2d 14) (1997). See also Sweet v. State, 278 Ga. 320, 322(1) (602 S.E.2d 603) (2004). In cases not involving state action, a witness’s credibility in identifying the defendant is a matter for the jury to decide. Dunn v. State, 262 Ga.App. 643, 645(2) (586 S.E.2d 352) (2003); Thomas v. State, 247 Ga.App. 798, 800(2) (545 S.E.2d 354) (2001).” Jennings v. State, 277 Ga.App. 159, 626 S.E.2d 155 (January 9, 2006). “We find no error in the trial court’s admission of the prior victim’s testimony identifying Jennings as the man who raped her. Although showing the prior victim a single photograph of Jennings while asking ‘Is this him?’ was improper and suggestive, this type of one-on-one photo show-up did not require suppression of the victim’s subsequent identification of Jennings as the rapist if evidence showed that the subsequent identification was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Lindsey v. State, 182 Ga.App. 10, 13-14 (354 S.E.2d 650) (1987); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U .S. [188, 198-199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)]; Payne v. State, 233 Ga. [294, 299-300, 210 S.E.2d 775 (1974)]. In this case, the totality of the circumstances showed that the prior victim’s identification of Jennings was reliable. The prior victim had ample opportunity to see Jennings over a period of five to six hours in close proximity at the time of the prior rape, the victim gave an accurate general description of Jennings to police prior to any identification, and she positively identified him without hesitation in the photographic lineup shortly after the rape.” Brittian v. State, 274 Ga.App. 863, 619 S.E.2d 376 (August 2, 2005). Defendant used someone else’s stolen driver’s license during a traffic stop, but was subsequently identified and arrested for forgery. “After her arrest, the two officers involved in the stop were shown a photograph of Brittian and identified her as the driver of the vehicle during the traffic stop.” “While this court has held that the display of a single photograph is impermissibly suggestive as set forth in Bradley v. State, 152 Ga.App. 902, 903 (264 S.E.2d 332) (1980), the record indicates that this conviction was not based solely on the identification of the [defendant] by the officer, but also on separate testimony by one of the passengers and the fact that the vehicle in question was co-registered to Brittian. Moreover, the fact that the police officers were shown the photograph of Brittian separately reduced the likelihood of irreparable misidentification. In this case, while the use of a single photograph for identification purposes was error, it was harmless based on the totality of circumstance [Cit.]” Cited with approval, Wright (January 25, 2010), above. Guyton v. State , 272 Ga. 529, 531 S.E.2d 94 (May 30, 2000). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no improper identification where “the victim was being interviewed by a detective when, without any prompting from the detective, she reached into a file on his desk, removed a photo from it, and identified the man depicted in the photo as her assailant. Under these facts, the victim's in-court identification of appellant was not tainted by a biased pre-trial array