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arranged by the State that gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Bradley v. State, 152 Ga.App. 902, 264 S.E.2d 332 (1980).” YY. IDENTITY Smith v. State, 304 Ga.App. 708, 699 S.E.2d 742 (June 30, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; fact that defendant had same name and date of birth as perpetrator of similar transaction offense was sufficient to prove his identity as that perpetrator. “Officer Greene's testimony that he arrested a David Smith with a date of birth of February 23, 1984 was sufficient circumstantial evidence that Smith committed the motor vehicle theft in 1998. See OCGA § 24-4-40(a) (‘[c]oncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity]); Rary v. State, 228 Ga.App. 414(1) (491 S.E.2d 861) (1997) (circumstantial evidence can be used to establish a defendant's connection to an independent crime).” Brown v. State, 293 Ga.App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (September 16, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for giving false name. “ Brown argues that the state failed to prove or establish his true name. At the suppression hearing and at trial, however, the court sounded the case of ‘The State of Georgia versus Ralph Brown.’ Brown's counsel stated that he was appearing on behalf of ‘Ralph Brown,’ and the accusation, to which Brown waived formal arraignment, identified him as Ralph Brown. The record shows a concordance between the name ‘Ralph Brown’ and the person charged in the accusation. As we have previously found, such ‘[c]oncordance of name alone is some evidence of identity.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 368(1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998). Furthermore, ‘[i]dentity of name presumptively imports identity of person, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 368-369, 498 S.E.2d 579. There is no contrary evidence here. Without objection or repudiation from Brown, the trial court, Brown's own attorney, and the accusation identified him as Ralph Brown. Under these circumstances, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Ralph Brown falsely presented himself to Bohannon as ‘Robert Brown.’ See Singleton [ v. State, 259 Ga.App. 184, 186(3), 577 S.E.2d 6 (2003)]; Brown v. State, 236 Ga.App. 478, 480-481(2), 512 S.E.2d 369 (1999).” Vicks v. State, 289 Ga.App. 495, 657 S.E.2d 876 (February 5, 2008). Fingerprint evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s identity as perpetrator of identity fraud (opening bank account in fictitious name using misappropriated social security number). “[T]he State introduced evidence that the fingerprint on the signature card matched the fingerprint of a person named ‘Sandra Vicks’ maintained in the Sheriff’s office. And ‘concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity. Identity of name presumptively imports identity of person, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 201-202(1) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003). Furthermore, the State’s expert testified that the two fingerprints matched. The evidence was sufficient to show that Vicks was the person who attempted to open the account. See Id.” Accord , Rowe v. State , 302 Ga.App. 239, 690 S.E.2d 884 (February 8, 2010); Henderson v. State , 303 Ga.App. 898, 695 S.E.2d 334 (May 6, 2010). Walsh v. State, 283 Ga.App. 817, 642 S.E.2d 879 (March 1, 2007). Issue regarding defendant’s correct name authorized admission of prior convictions, showing name previously used. “Blanket denials concerning identity made that issue one for the jury and authorized admission of prior convictions; overwhelming evidence of guilt made any error harmless,” citing Johnson v. State, 233 Ga.App. 301, 303-305(3)(b-c) (504 S.E.2d 8) (1998). Gibson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 610, 533 S.E.2d 783 (April 14, 2000). False name and related convictions affirmed. “Contrary to Gibson's contention, the State did provide evidence that his name was Michael Gibson and not Michael Smith or Michael Simmons. Several witnesses identified him as Michael Gibson, he personally signed the indictment as ‘Michael Gibson,’ and he was consistently referred to as Michael Gibson throughout the trial without repudiation. Such evidence is sufficient to establish that Michael Gibson is appellant's real name. Brown v. State, 236 Ga.App. 478, 480- 481(2), 512 S.E.2d 369 (1999). “Concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity. Identity of name presumptively imports identity of person, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 368-369(1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998). Under this evidence and Officer Myers' unrebutted testimony that Gibson identified himself as Michael Simmons, the evidence was sufficient to support Gibson's conviction of the second count alleging he gave a false name to a law enforcement officer.” Evans v. State, 240 Ga.App. 215, 522 S.E.2d 506 (September 13, 1999). “Evans contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the firearm possession charge, specifically because the State did not prove that he was the same Gabriel Evans as the one named in the certified copies of two felony convictions introduced in support of the charge. Witnesses identified Evans as Gabriel Evans on the record. The certified copies of the previous convictions, to