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which Evans raised no objection, identified the felon by the same name. ‘Identity of name presumptively imports identity of person, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga.App. 368-369(1), 498 S.E.2d 579 (1998).” ZZ. IMMIGRATION STATUS Junior v. State, 282 Ga. 689, 653 S.E.2d 481 (November 21, 2007). Trial court properly prohibited defendant from cross-examining witnesses about their immigration status. “The immigration status of the victims was not an issue relevant to the matter being tried; i.e., whether Junior committed the crimes charged. [fn: Junior argues that he should have been able to explore the immigration status of a victim in the same manner he would be able to explore the possibility that the State has made a deal with a testifying co-defendant. See Perez v. State, 254 Ga.App. 872 (564 S.E.2d 208) (2002). But, see also Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 274-275(4) (528 S.E.2d 250) (2000). Pretermitting whether the analogy is apt, and whether the State of Georgia is able to make any deal advantageous to one in this country illegally, the State’s motion was that Junior not be permitted to ask the victims what their immigration status was; the motion did not encompass any and all questions concerning whether the victims received any benefit in exchange for their testimony. ] Sandoval v. State, 264 Ga. 199(2)(a) (442 S.E.2d 746) (1994); Lemons v. State, 270 Ga.App. 743, 749-750(4) (608 S.E.2d 15) (2004). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Junior’s cross-examination of the testifying victims.” Accord, Salazar v. State , 314 Ga.App. 83, 722 S.E.2d 902 (February 9, 2012). AAA. IMPEACHMENT See WITNESSES – IMPEACHMENT, below BBB. IMPOUNDMENT Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (June 25, 2007). Officers properly seized and impounded murder victim’s truck to secure it for later search pursuant to search warrant. “‘Impoundment is valid “only if there is some necessity for the police to take charge of the property.” [Cit.]. “The ultimate test for the validity of the police’s conduct in impounding a vehicle is whether, under the circumstances then confronting the police, their conduct was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” [Cit.]. The determinative inquiry, therefore, is whether the impoundment was reasonably necessary under the circumstances, not whether it was absolutely necessary.’ Carlisle v. State, 278 Ga.App. 528, 529-30 (629 S.E.2d 512) (2006). See also Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 375-77 (254 S.E.2d 337) (1979), abrogated on other grounds in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112) (1990). While the truck was not impeding a public roadway, its owner was a murder victim, the most recent user was the prime suspect in the crime and had not yet been apprehended and, as the truck was not secure since it was unlocked with the keys inside, the trial court did not err in concluding it was reasonable for the police to impound the car in order to prevent tampering. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454(5) (579 S.E.2d 214) (2003).” CCC. IN CAMERA INSPECTION See subheading EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE – IN CAMERA INSPECTION, above DDD. INDEPENDENT ACTS See subheading SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS , below EEE. INDICTMENT/ACCUSATION State v. Brown, S16A0122, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1627959 (April 26, 2016). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for gang offenses; trial court properly granted motion in limine preventing State from introducing in evidence “a federal indictment involving parties unrelated to Appellees.” The pending federal indictment was against members of a gang allegedly affiliated with defendants here in Virginia. “We agree with the trial court that the federal indictment is inadmissible. An indictment is simply a ‘formal written accusation of a crime,’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 891 (10 th ed., 2014), and the assertions therein are nothing more than hearsay statements by the prosecutor bringing the charges. See OCGA § 24–8–801(c) (defining ‘hearsay’). As mere hearsay, a bare indictment is simply not admissible evidence. OCGA §§ 24–4–402, 24–8–802.[Cit.] See also Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 431(8), 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006) (noting that ‘the indictment does not constitute any evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt’); Hicks v. State, 315 Ga.App. 779, 785(4), 728 S.E.2d 294 (2012) (noting that ‘the allegations of the indictment did not constitute evidence’). The fact that this case involves alleged violations of the Georgia street gang act does not alter this result.” FFF. INSANITY/MENTAL ILLNESS Simon v. State, 321 Ga.App. 1, 740 S.E.2d 819 (March 28, 2013). Verdict of guilty but mentally ill on aggravated assault and related charges affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, and the opinions of his expert witnesses, evidence didn’t demand a finding of insanity. “Although the evidence shows Simon suffered from a mental illness, this is insufficient