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to establish legal insanity under Georgia law. Rogers v. State, 195 Ga.App. 446, 447–448(2), 394 S.E.2d 116 (1990). … Jurors are not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses regarding a defendant's sanity; instead, they may rely on the rebuttable presumption of sanity, unless the proof of insanity is overwhelming. Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 701(1), 334 S.E.2d 175 (1985). The evidence did not clearly establish a delusion ‘as to a fact which, if true, would justify the act.’ Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215, 217–218(2), 184 S.E.2d 655 (1971); see Rodriguez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 43(1), 518 S.E.2d 131 (1999) (evidence supported finding that shooting was not connected to the defendant's delusions.) Moreover, that Simon apologized to police when he was in custody and said that he was acting under the effects of ‘laced’ marijuana suggested a guilty conscience and a rational awareness of actions rather than actions driven by a delusional compulsion. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 188, 191(1)(a), 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (flight ‘can serve as circumstantial evidence of guilt’); Johnson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 721, 722(2), 566 S.E.2d 440 (2002) (‘a defendant's attempt to influence a witness ... is evidence of consciousness of guilt’). Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we are constrained to hold that the Simon was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis of his insanity defense.” Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 724 S.E.2d 377 (February 27, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported jury’s finding that defendant wasn’t insane. “The State presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist that appellant's efforts to clean up the blood and hide the body indicated appellant knew the wrongfulness of his actions, his statement to police that he acted in self-defense was a rational motive for appellant's escalating fight with [victim] Cooper, and that the expert saw no evidence appellant was delusional at the time of the crimes.” Brown v. State, 285 Ga. 772, 683 S.E.2d 581 (September 28, 2009). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly excluded defense expert testimony that defendant was depressed at the time he murdered his estranged wife. “Brown argues that his depression was clearly a factor in his actions, and that by preventing [expert] Webb from so testifying, the trial court effectively coerced Brown into testifying on his own behalf in order to address his ‘behavior and mens rea.’ Brown never raised the defenses of insanity, delusional compulsion or mental incompetency. In fact, Webb's written report, following the evaluation of Brown, stated that Brown was then competent to stand trial, that there was no evidence that Brown was not able to determine right from wrong at the time of the killing, and that there was no evidence that Brown was acting on the basis of a delusional compulsion. Indeed, as already noted, at trial, Brown adamantly denied that he had ‘snapped,’ and recounted how he tried to methodically inflict the victim's injuries. Brown sought to introduce evidence of his depression at the time of the attack as a circumstance for the jury to consider in deciding whether he had the intent to kill the victim. But, any depression suffered by Brown was not a legal defense to the murder; the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine Brown's guilt in light of the absence of an insanity or other relevant mental health defense. Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603(2) (555 S.E.2d 716) (2001); compare Turpin v. Lipham, 270 Ga. 208, 219 (510 S.E.2d 32) (1998) (expert assistance needed in penalty phase of death penalty trial for jury to understand effect mental problems might have had on defendant's commission of murder). Thus, the exclusion of Webb's testimony did not deny Brown the right to a defense nor compel him to take the stand in order to defend himself.” Shepherd v. State, 280 Ga. 245, 626 S.E.2d 96 (January 30, 2006). “‘ In Georgia, a person is not legally insane simply because [he] suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis. Rather, a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant did not “have [the] mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act” or a mental disease caused “a delusional compulsion [that] overmastered [his] will to resist committing the crime.” [OCGA §§ 16-3-2, 16-3-3, 17-7-131(a)(1)]. A defendant who is not insane may nonetheless be found guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the crime, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime and had “a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.” [OCGA § 17-7-131].’ Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 690(1), 572 S.E.2d 565 (2002).” Robinson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 87, 611 S.E.2d 759 (March 9, 2005). Evidence did not demand a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity under OCGA § 16-3-3 (delusional compulsion insanity). “Robinson had the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 441 (350 S.E.2d 21) (1986). Furthermore, ‘[a] finding of insanity based upon OCGA § 16-3-3 requires proof that (1) the accused acted under a delusional compulsion; (2) the criminal act was connected with the delusion; and (3) the delusion related to a fact which, if true, would have justified the act.’ (Citation omitted.) Appling v. State, 222 Ga.App. 327, 329(3) (474 S.E.2d 237) (1996).” The defendant claimed that he thought the passengers on the bus he hijacked were conspiring to get him. “Here, however,