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Robinson told the psychologist that he ended up steering the bus because the bus driver was experiencing an unspecified difficulty, as opposed to saying that he took over steering the bus because of his fear of being harmed. See Rodriguez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 43(1) (518 S.E.2d 131) (1999) (evidence supported finding that shooting was not connected to the defendant's delusions). Furthermore, there was evidence that Robinson’s delusion was that people on the bus were planning to harm him. Since this delusion did not place Robinson in immediate physical danger, a trier of fact could conclude that, even if Robinson was motivated by his delusion to forcibly exercise control over the bus, the delusion did not justify that behavior. See VanVoorhis v. State, 234 Ga.App. 749, 750 (507 S.E.2d 555) (1998) (defendant’s belief that her mother would attack her in the future did not justify knife attack on her mother); Appling, supra, 222 Ga.App. at 329(3) (defendant was under the delusion that he was being pursued by a gang, but the delusion did not place him in danger of imminent bodily harm). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could conclude that Robinson failed to prove his insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” McDowell v. State, 269 Ga.App. 475, 604 S.E.2d 575 (September 7, 2004). “McDowell’s mental illness was not relevant in the absence of an insanity defense. Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603(2) (555 S.E.2d 716) (2001) (psychological evidence irrelevant in light of defendant’s failure to assert an insanity defense).” Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 598 S.E.2d 488 (June 28, 2004). “The standard of mental competency to stand trial is the same as the standard of mental competency to waive the right to counsel. [ Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398(II)(A) (113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321) (1993)]. The prohibition against subjecting incompetent persons to trial often is enforced in Georgia pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130(a), which provides for a special jury trial on the question of competence ‘[w]henever a plea is filed that a defendant in a criminal case is mentally incompetent to stand trial.’ However, even when no such plea is entered, a trial court still bears the constitutional duty to inquire into a defendant's competency where it ‘appears to be in question at the time of trial.’ Colwell v. State, 273 Ga. 634, 635(2) (544 S.E.2d 120) (2001); see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375(II) (86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815) (1966). In Lamar’s case, no plea was made that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial. [Cit.] Nevertheless, the trial court undertook its constitutional duty to inquire into Lamar’s competency. In that regard the trial court, after noting the lack of a request for a competency trial, considered the results of a mental health examination that Lamar had very recently undergone that had shown Lamar to be mentally competent. Based on this information, together with its own observations of Lamar’s pre-trial behavior, the trial court correctly found that competence was not a factor in deciding whether or not to allow Lamar to undertake his own representation. Colwell, supra, 273 Ga. at 637(3)(b).” Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (May 13, 2003). “‘[E]vidence that the defendant does not remember, or was in a ‘blanked out’ state of mind during the commission of the acts charged, is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.’” Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 572 S.E.2d 545 (November 12, 2002). Trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a licensed clinical social worker on the issue of defendant’s “level of intellectual functioning” because the witness was not a medical doctor. Witness testified about her background, training and years of experience in evaluating the mental condition of patients; that she is licensed in Georgia to make diagnostic impressions using the DSM IV, and that she has authority to commit a person against his will. Three justices dissent. Fuss v. State, 271 Ga. 319, 519 S.E.2d 446 (July 6, 1999). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was not insane at time he killed his mother with an ax, despite evidence of mental illness. “‘[T]he fact that a person is schizophrenic or suffers from a psychosis does not mean he meets the test of insanity requiring a verdict of not guilty on the basis of insanity. [Cit.]’ Nelms v. State, 255 Ga. 473, 475(2), 340 S.E.2d 1 (1986). The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was not compelled to accept the testimony of Fuss's psychologist, but was authorized to find proof of Fuss's criminal intent based upon the testimony of the State's expert, as well as the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and other circumstances connected with Fuss's acts. Pittman v. State, 269 Ga. 419, 420, 499 S.E.2d 62 (1998); Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59(1), 455 S.E.2d 579 (1995).” GGG. INSURANCE Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). “Glidewell claims that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object to testimony by Glidewell’s former spouse that Glidewell was a beneficiary of the victim’s life insurance policy. ‘[I]n order to admit evidence of an insurance policy there must be some independent evidence of a nexus between the crime charged and the existence of the insurance policy.’ Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49,