☢ test - Í

50(3) (401 S.E.2d 482) (1991). However, defense counsel, through cross examination of the victim’s adult daughter, had previously shown that the daughter had received over $120,000 from the victim’s insurance policies, but that she was not sure if Glidewell received any money from the policies. Glidewell’s trial counsel had therefore opened the door to the life insurance policy issue by eliciting testimony tending to show that Glidewell had not benefitted from insurance on the victim’s life. An objection would not have excluded the testimony concerning the victim's life insurance policy which was subsequently solicited by the prosecutor, and Glidewell’s trial counsel were not deficient for failing to make the objection. ‘Since defendant first opened the door to this line of questioning, he cannot now complain.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818, 822(3) (546 S.E.2d 509) (2001).” Bryan v. State, 271 Ga. 231, 518 S.E.2d 672 (June 14, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for malice murder and arson reversed; trial court erred by admitting evidence of automobile liability insurance policy. “In Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991), we held that ‘in order to admit evidence of an insurance policy there must be some independent evidence of a nexus between the crime charged and the existence of the insurance policy. ’ We subsequently reaffirmed that holding and cautioned prosecutors that they undertake the risk of reversal if they attempt to introduce evidence of an insurance policy without first establishing the required nexus. Woodham v. State, 263 Ga. 580, 439 S.E.2d 471 (1993). In this case, the connection between the insurance policy and crimes is tenuous at best. Unlike our previous cases, which involved life insurance, this case involves automobile liability insurance. See Woodham, 263 Ga. at 581-582, 439 S.E.2d 471 (defendant's girlfriend was named beneficiary of victim's life insurance policy); Stoudemire, 261 Ga. at 50, 401 S.E.2d 482 (defendant was named beneficiary of victim's life insurance policy); Jowers v. State, 259 Ga. 401, 382 S.E.2d 595 (1989) (defendant was named beneficiary of victim's life insurance policy). The only way that the policy could have benefitted the defendant would be through a claim made by her mother's estate against her for negligence in the automobile accident. Even if the estate prevailed, its debts would have to be paid prior to any distribution to beneficiaries under a will or to heirs at law if there was no will. Although the state is generally entitled to present evidence of motive, it cannot introduce evidence of an automobile liability policy that has only an indirect, contingent relationship to the crime. Moreover, the state failed to present any independent evidence that Bryan knew about the increased insurance coverage. Cf. Bagwell v. State, 270 Ga. 175, 177, 508 S.E.2d 385 (1998) (defendant was beneficiary of husband's life insurance policies, stated that she knew about the insurance, filed a claim a month after his death, stated she was arrested because of her claims, and showed a complete lack of emotion about her husband's death). Her husband was the policy holder and the only family member who dealt with the insurance agent. His agent had twice suggested that he increase his liability insurance, and he increased his coverage on his automobile at the same general time he increased the coverage on his home and lake property. The fact that Bryan knew the car was insured is not relevant. Without independent evidence of a connection between the insurance and the crime, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the policy increase.” HHH. INTELLIGENCE Thompson v. State, 295 Ga. 96, 757 S.E.2d 846 (April 22, 2014). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded expert evidence of defendant’s low IQ, “which, his counsel argued, was relevant to his defense that the shooting was accidental because his mental disability prevented him from understanding how to use the crossbow properly.” “Evidence of a criminal defendant's mental disability may be presented in support of a defense of insanity or delusional compulsion (see OCGA §§ 16–3–2 and 16–3–3); a claim of incompetency to stand trial (see OCGA § 17–7–130); or, since such pleas were authorized, a plea of guilty but mentally ill or guilty but mentally retarded (see OCGA § 17–7–131)—none of which Appellant raised in this case. [fn] For more than 150 years, however, this Court has consistently upheld the exclusion of evidence of a defendant's diminished mental condition when offered to support other defenses or to negate the intent element of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608, 715 S.E.2d 48 (2011) (‘“[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.”’) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262 (282 S.E.2d 325 (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603, 555 S.E.2d 716 (2001) (rejecting the defendant's argument that ‘he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,’ because ‘the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant's refusal to assert an insanity defense or that he was mentally ill at the time of the conduct in question’); Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 200, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996) (same); Reece v. State, 212 Ga. 609, 609–610, 94 S.E.2d 723 (1956) (‘Weak-mindedness alone is no defense to crime. The evidence in the record that the defendant had the mentality of a child nine or ten years old does not relieve him from responsibility for crime.’ (citation omitted)); McKethan v. State, 201 Ga. 23, 38, 39 S.E.2d 15 (1946) (‘That the accused, though able to distinguish between right and wrong, might be unable to evaluate the quality and consequences of his act to the same degree as a normal or average individual, is no defense.’); Goosby v. State, 153 Ga. 496, 496, 112 S.E. 467 (1922) (holding that the trial court did not err in prohibiting a witness from testifying that the defendant was ‘weak-minded,’ because ‘the answer would have