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been immaterial, as weakness of mind would not have constituted a defense nor excused the crime’); Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 68, 57 S.E. 227 (1907) (affirming the exclusion of evidence that ‘the defendant, from the time of his childhood, had been of feeble intellect and weak intelligence,’ because the defense was not that he ‘was either an idiot or an insane person, or that he labored, at the time of the homicide, under any form of delusional insanity’); Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 3[6] (1849) (‘It is not competent to prove that the defendant is of weak mind, where it is admitted that he is neither idiot, lunatic nor insane.’), overruled on other grounds in Armistead v. State, 18 Ga. 704, 707 (1855).[fn] See also Bryant v. State, 271 Ga. 99, 101, 515 S.E.2d 836 (1999) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from childhood sexual abuse because that mental state was ‘not relevant to Bryant's defense of accident’ in shooting the victim). It should be noted that Georgia takes a more restrictive position on this issue than many other jurisdictions, where the admission of evidence relating to a defendant's deficient mental condition to support defenses other than those based on diminished mental capacity or to negate a required element of a crime has been authorized by statute or judicial decision in at least some circumstances. See generally Paul H. Robinson et al, Criminal Law Defenses, Vol. 1, § 64(a) (2013). Georgia, however, is not such a jurisdiction, and if the law established by our longstanding precedent is to change, it would be better done as a matter of public policy legislated by the General Assembly.” Benham concurs specially, encouraging legislative reform. Melton concurs in judgment only. Accord, Perkins v. State , 328 Ga.App. 508, 759 S.E.2d 626 (June 24, 2014) (“mental illness less than legal insanity or incompetency at the time of the crime is not a defense to the crime”); Allen v. State , 296 Ga. 785, 770 S.E.2d 824 (March 27, 2015) (Psychiatrist’s testimony that defendant “is susceptible to being ‘led’ into crime by another person to a greater extent than most people” properly excluded). III. INTENT/MALICE See also subheading INTELLIGENCE, and OFFENSES – CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES – POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, below 1. INTENT, GENERALLY Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188, 751 S.E.2d 354 (November 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported finding of malice. “Browder testified that he had no intent to shoot anyone but meant only to shoot into the air to warn McNeal away from the car. Implied malice, however, may be found when the defendant's conduct exhibits a reckless disregard for human life. Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 260(4), 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Linson v. State, 287 Ga. 881, 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010). This Court has adopted the definition of implied malice as being “extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others—though unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury—and which actually causes the death of another.... [R]eckless disregard for human life may be the equivalent of a specific intent to kill.” Id. (Citation and punctuation omitted.)” Harris v. State, 324 Ga.App. 411, 750 S.E.2d 721 (October 30, 2013). Theft by taking, RICO and related convictions affirmed. Defendant and his co-defendants were convicted of numerous offenses stemming from their taking over and renting out numerous vacant houses, pretending to be the rightful owners. Trial court properly granted State’s motion in limine, prohibiting defendant from “from arguing that he lacked criminal intent because he believed he was authorized under various civil theories to take over the properties he believed to be abandoned. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that Harris could refer to the properties as ‘vacant,’ but not ‘abandoned,’ and he could not proffer his mistaken belief of civil law to justify his actions. We note that Harris was allowed to argue that he lacked criminal intent based on his belief that he could ‘rehabilitate’ the vacant properties and based on his behavior in openly advertising and posting notices announcing his intentions with respect to the properties. Based on this, Harris's counsel argued that ‘[t]hey actually believed what they were doing was legitimate.’ Therefore, Harris was not prohibited from arguing that he lacked criminal intent based on his subjective belief and as manifested by his actions. [fn] Furthermore, ‘“[a]ll citizens are presumed to know the law, and ignorance of the law excuses no one.’” Henry v. State, 295 Ga.App. 758, 760 (673 S.E.2d 120) (2009). Harris's theories on civil law were mistaken, and the trial court's ruling preventing him from presenting those incorrect legal theories to the jury was not reversible error based on the record before us. See generally Mincey v. State, 303 Ga.App. 257, 257–258 (692 S.E.2d 809) (2010) (‘A defendant's ignorance of the fact that he was violating the law does not relieve him of criminal intent if he intended to do the act that the legislature prohibited. Criminal intention may be found from the circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’) (footnote omitted); Taylor v. State, 233 Ga.App. 221, 222(1) (504 S.E.2d 57) (1998) (‘Failure to give a charge on mistake of fact is not error where the evidence shows that a party has made a mistake of law.’) (punctuation omitted).” Thomas v. State, 320 Ga.App. 101, 739 S.E.2d 417 (March 5, 2013). Kidnapping conviction affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence supported finding of intent. Fact that defendant “attempted to flee from [child victim’s] aunt by running away and hiding in some bushes, and his flight from the scene presents evidence of consciousness of