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guilt.” “Thomas further contends that he lacked the criminal intent to kidnap the victim based on evidence showing that he was suffering from Schizoaffective Disorder and Borderline Intellectual Functioning, and that he had not been taking his medications at the time of the offense. [fn] However, Thomas conceded that the evidence did not support a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, see OCGA § 16–3–2, and ‘mental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608(4)(a) (715 S.E.2d 48) (2011); see also Wallin v. State, 285 Ga.App. 377, 383(b) (646 S.E.2d 484) (2007) (noting that ‘a person is not legally insane simply because he suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis’) (citation omitted). There is no medical evidence that Thomas's mental illness prevented him from forming the intent to kidnap. Rather, the forensic psychiatrist who examined Thomas soon after his arrest testified that Thomas was not exhibiting any symptoms consistent with psychosis at the time.” Accord, Young v. State , 332 Ga.App. 361, 772 S.E.2d 807 (May 14, 2015) (“mental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.”). Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 738 S.E.2d 74 (February 4, 2013). Murder conviction affirmed; jury could find that defendant’s actions went beyond discipline of child victim and thus showed malice. “It is true that a parent—or someone acting in loco parentis—may apply some force to a child as a disciplinary measure without violating the law. But the application of such force must be reasonable, and if it is not, it may go beyond mere discipline and instead amount to malicious infliction of ‘cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.’ Tabb v. State, 313 Ga.App. 852, 857(2), 723 S.E.2d 295 (2012) (‘[A]pplied force is legally justified [to discipline a child] only when a parent's conduct in disciplining a child is reasonable.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 16–3–20(3) (‘The defense of justification can be claimed ... [w]hen the person's conduct is the reasonable discipline of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis [.]’). Here, the evidence concerning the severity and scope of the injuries that Jamira sustained would permit an inference that whoever struck Jamira did so maliciously and that the injuries were not the result of reasonable disciplinary measures.” Hickman v. State, 311 Ga.App. 544, 716 S.E.2d 597 (August 30, 2011). Convictions for aggravated assault and attempted motor vehicle hijacking affirmed. Contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence supported finding of intent to hijack vehicle. Victim saw defendant, a person unknown to her, approaching her menacingly in a parking lot. She offered him her car keys, but he instead forced her at knifepoint into vehicle and assaulted her. “[T]he trial court, as the fact finder, was authorized to conclude that Hickman rejected the car keys when the victim offered them simply because it was his intent to abscond with both the car and the victim.” Duvall v. State, 289 Ga. 540, 712 S.E.2d 850 (July 11, 2011). Reversing 305 Ga.App. 545, 699 S.E.2d 761 (2010), in VGCSA prosecution, trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to charge on mistake of fact based on defendant’s claim that he didn’t know what the pills he possessed were. Arrested for loitering and obstruction of officers, a search incident to arrest revealed three Ambien tablets in defendant’s pockets. “The entire basis of appellant’s defense at trial was that he knew he possessed the sleeping aids, but that he believed the pills were some form of over-the- counter medication and not Zolpidem Tartrate.” Trial court declined charge on mistake of fact, and Court of Appeals agreed, “construing OCGA §§ 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 not to require the defendant to know that the pills he possessed were a controlled substance.” Supreme Court disagrees: “[T]he criminal intent required by OCGA § 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 is intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug. … Therefore, possessing Zolpidem Tartrate, which one knows or understands to be Zolpidem Tartrate is a violation of OCGA § 16-13-30(a) because Zolpidem Tartrate, which one believes or understands to be an over-the counter medication (such as Doxylamine Succinate, sold as an over-the-counter sleep aid under the brand name Unisom) is not a crime because the requisite mens rea is not present. It is this latter scenario which appellant asserts to be the case. … Appellant’s knowledge of the chemical identity of the substance in his possession is purely a question of fact. As such, it should have been a question for the jury, and the jury should have been instructed to consider the defense of mistake of fact.” Court of Appeals took the facts differently, believing that the defense was that “appellant knew that the three pills in his possession were Zolpidem Tartrate, but that he asserted a defense based on not knowing that Zolpidem Tartrate is a controlled substance under Georgia law. Were that the case,” Supreme Court says, “the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the matter would have been correct.” Query: does this open the door for a drug couriers to remain willfully ignorant of what substances they possess? See Maddox v. State , 272 Ga.App. 440, 612 S.E.2d 484 (February 10, 2005) (arson case; approving charge on willful ignorance as supplying the element of knowledge of critical facts), and cases cited therein; Taylor v. State , 293 Ga.App. 551, 667 S.E.2d 405 (September 16, 2008) (forgery case; ‘ mistake of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only if it is not superinduced by the fault or negligence of the [defendant]’). Williams v. State, 308 Ga.App. 296, 707 S.E.2d 532 (March 8, 2011). Conviction for theft by taking motor vehicle