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affirmed; evidence sufficed to prove intent. “Williams argues that the evidence did not establish his criminal intent to use the car for his own purposes. But ‘his intent to take it for his own temporary use without the owner's authorization evinces an intent to commit a theft.’ Smith v. State, 172 Ga.App. 356, 357(2) (323 S.E.2d 257) (1984) (defendant's intention to take a car battery to charge another car, although he claimed he did not intend to keep the battery sufficiently evinced his intent to commit theft). Accord Thornton v. State, 301 Ga.App. 784, 791-792(3)(b) (689 S.E.2d 361) (2009).” Pittman v. State, 307 Ga.App. 748, 706 S.E.2d 126 (February 8, 2011). Battery conviction affirmed; “[c]ontrary to Pittman's argument, evidence that he had suffered a concussion approximately a week earlier did not demand a finding that he lacked the requisite criminal intent to commit the battery as charged .” Mattox v. State, 305 Ga.App. 600, 699 S.E.2d 887 (August 18, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and related offenses affirmed; evidence supported finding of intent to rape as element of aggravated assault. “Here, the State presented evidence that Mattox removed C.C.'s underwear while on top of her in her bed and then licked her genital and anal areas. The evidence also showed that Mattox only stopped sexually assaulting C.C. after she pleaded with him and offered him money. Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to infer that Mattox had the requisite intent to rape C.C. as charged and therefore was also authorized to find that Mattox was guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape beyond a reasonable doubt.” Machado v. State, 300 Ga.App. 459, 685 S.E.2d 428 (October 14, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for attempt to commit child molestation affirmed; jury could reject defendant’s explanation that he entered victim’s shower, naked, as a practical joke, and not with intent to “get sexually aroused.” “Whether Machado's actions were immoral or indecent and done with the requisite intent were questions for the jury. See Cornelius v. State, 213 Ga.App. 766, 768(1), 445 S.E.2d 800 (1994); Chapman v. State, 170 Ga.App. 779, 780(1), 318 S.E.2d 213 (1984); see also Klausen v. State, 294 Ga.App. 463, 465(1), 669 S.E.2d 460 (2008) (jury could infer from defendant's actions in the child's presence that he acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires).” Sims v. State, 296 Ga.App. 461, 675 S.E.2d 241 (March 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (his fists); Sims's argument that he only intended to escape [from the deputy/victim] and not to injure the officer is not cause for reversal. ‘Unlike an aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, aggravated assault with a[n object] which is likely to result in serious bodily injury does not require a specific criminal intent; rather, it requires only a ... general intent to injure. General intent to injure may be proven by circumstantial evidence and is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine.’ (Citations omitted.) Maynor v. State, 257 Ga.App. 151, 153 (570 S.E.2d 428) (2002).” Gordon v. State, 294 Ga.App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (November 26, 2008). 1. Jury could find that defendant intended to commit assault despite defendant’s claim of self-defense. “The jury … is solely responsible for determining the accused's intent in committing an act, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and judging the witnesses' credibility. OCGA § 16-2-6 (whether an accused committed an act with criminal intention is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact after consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act); Adams v. State , 239 Ga.App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (August 22, 2008) (‘[C]riminal intent may be inferred from the circumstances, ... [and the] jury was not required to accept [Gordon's] trial testimony as true, but could judge his credibility and weigh his testimony against other evidence.’) (punctuation and footnotes omitted).” 2. Trial court properly sustained prosecutor’s objection to defense counsel’s question to defendant on stand, “Did you intend to assault him?” “The State proceeded to explain that it was not objecting to Gordon testifying about what he was thinking, but that defense counsel should not be allowed to ask Gordon whether he was guilty of the crime as alleged in the indictment, because that was an ultimate question of fact reserved for the jury. The court agreed and asked defense counsel to rephrase the question. Defense counsel then asked Gordon, ‘Did you intend to shoot that man?’ The State did not object, and Gordon answered, ‘No.’” “[T]he trier of fact is solely responsible for determining whether an accused committed an act with the requisite criminal intent. OCGA § 16-2-6. Thus, in this case, whether Gordon shot Jackson with the intention of assaulting him (in other words, with the intention of injuring him or of placing him in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury) or whether Gordon shot in the direction of Jackson while acting in self-defense was an issue of ultimate fact to be decided by the jury. Id.; Adams v. State, supra . Thus, the court did not err in sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's question. See Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga.App. 878, 879(3) (476 S.E.2d 604) (1996) (‘Ordinarily, a witness may not express his opinion as to an ultimate fact, because to do so would invade the province of the jury.’) (citation and punctuation omitted).”