☢ test - Í

Klausen v. State, 294 Ga.App. 463, 669 S.E.2d 460 (November 10, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for child molestation based on masturbating in child’s presence. “[W]hether [Klausen's] intentions were innocent as he asserted to the officers, ... or to arouse his own sexual desires as found by the jury, was peculiarly a question of fact for determination by the jury and even when a finding that the accused had the intent to commit the crime charged is supported by evidence which is exceedingly weak ... the verdict will not be set aside on that ground. Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectable only inferentially, and the law accommodates this.’ Arnold v. State, [249 Ga.App. 156, 158(1)(a) (545 S.E.2d 312) (2001)]. Here, the jury was entitled to infer from Klausen's actions in the child's presence that he acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires.” Accord, Parrott v. State , 318 Ga.App. 545, 736 S.E.2d 436 (November 15, 2012). Murray v. State, 293 Ga.App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (September 11, 2008). 1. “‘Intent to rape is a jury question. It need not be declared expressly but may be inferred by the jury from the circumstances of the case, ’ quoting Goodall v. State, 277 Ga.App. 600, 602(1)(a) (627 S.E.2d 183) (2006). “The circumstances in this case show that Murray attacked his stepdaughter and ripped off her shorts, tried to force her legs open, asked if she was ‘going to let him do it,’ and beat her bloody when she refused. … Here, the evidence amply supports the jury's finding that Murray assaulted the victim with the intent to rape her.” 2. Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for child molestation. “‘Intent, which is a mental attitude, can be inferred, and the law accommodates this.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Collins v. State, 276 Ga.App. 358, 359(1) (623 S.E.2d 192) (2005). ‘In determining the intent with which an act is done, the jury may consider the defendant's words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted. ’ (Citation omitted.) Phillips v. State, 269 Ga.App. 619, 629(8) (604 S.E.2d 520) (2004). In the case at bar, whether Murray had the requisite intent when he grabbed the victim's head and pushed it toward his genitals, put his hands on her genital area and breast, and put his mouth on her breast, was an issue for the jury to resolve. See Andrew v. State, 216 Ga.App. 427, 428 (454 S.E.2d 542) (1995).” Accord, Schlesselman v. State , 332 Ga.App. 453, 773 S.E.2d 413 (June 10, 2015) (defendant’s intent to commit child molestation could be inferred from his emails offering “to pay for a night of ‘companionship’ with the child” and asking for “guidelines” for permitted activity, “which can be construed as sexual in nature.”). Moran v. State, 293 Ga.App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (July 23, 2008). “ Moran's argument that the State failed to prove that, when he threatened to kill Jackson, he intended to terrorize her, as required by OCGA § 16-11-37(a), … lacks merit. ‘The intention with which an act is done is peculiarly for the finder of fact. It is often difficult to prove with direct evidence an individual's intent as it existed at the time of the act for which [he] is being prosecuted. Thus, intent is often proved through the use of circumstantial evidence.’ (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Williams v. State, 271 Ga.App. 755, 756 (610 S.E.2d 704) (2005). In this case, regardless of any unfulfilled threats Moran may have uttered in the past, the evidence authorized the jury to find that on the night of June 18, 2006, when Moran threatened to kill Jackson as he pinned her down and raised a cinder block over her head, his purpose was to terrorize her. Nelson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 92, 97-98(1)(c) (625 S.E.2d 465) (2005) (evidence authorized terroristic threats conviction where the defendant threatened to hurt and kill the victim, the victim feared for her safety as a result, and the defendant bruised the victim's face); Williams v. State, 271 Ga.App. at 756 (evidence authorized terroristic threats conviction where the defendant told a seven- year-old child that she was going to kill the child's mother); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga.App. 254, 254-255 (485 S.E.2d 830) (1997) (evidence authorized terroristic threats conviction where the defendant returned to the residence he had previously shared with the victim to reclaim some possessions, furiously dragged the victim from the yard into a bedroom, pointed a handgun at her, and repeatedly said he was going to kill her).” Holmes v. State, 291 Ga.App. 196, 661 S.E.2d 603 (April 16, 2008). Evidence supported intent element of defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking. “Although Holmes contends he was not guilty of aggravated stalking because his intent was to rekindle his failed marriage, not to intimidate and harass, intent is a question of fact to be determined by the jury upon consideration of Holmes’ words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted,” citing Phillips v. State, 260 Ga.App. 278 (628 S.E.2d 631) (2006). Cochran v. State, 285 Ga.App. 175, 645 S.E.2d 662 (April 26, 2007). “For purposes of [first degree cruelty to children], malice in the legal sense, imports the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result. Intention may be manifest by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense. Intent is a question of fact to be determined upon consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted. Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 395(3) (627 S.E.2d 579) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).”