☢ test - Í

Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga.App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (February 6, 2007). “Whether a defendant intended his actions is a question of fact to be determined by the jury ‘upon consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ (Punctuation omitted.)” quoting Kennedy v. State, 272 Ga.App. 347, 349 (612 S.E.2d 532) (2005). “We will affirm the jury’s finding of intent unless clearly erroneous. See id.” Not clearly erroneous here. Melton v. State, 282 Ga.App. 685, 639 S.E.2d 411 (December 1, 2006). “‘The intent with which an act is done is peculiarly a question of fact for determination by the jury.... Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectible only inferentially, and the law accommodates this.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Howard v. State, 268 Ga.App. 558, 559-560 (602 S.E.2d 295) (2004).” Evidence here was sufficient to permit inference that defendant intended to have sex with victim knowing that she lacked mental capacity to consent. Accord, Taylor v. State , 292 Ga.App. 846, 666 S.E.2d 85 (July 3, 2008) (jury could infer intent element of child molestation from the act of licking the victim’s back); Williams v. State , 308 Ga.App. 296, 707 S.E.2d 532 (March 8, 2011) (theft of motor vehicle). Sheffield v. State, 281 Ga. 33, 635 S.E.2d 776 (October 2, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to establish intent element of malice murder. “‘[I]n Georgia, the crime of malice murder is committed when the evidence shows either an express or, in the alternative, an implied intent to commit an unlawful homicide. This meaning of malice murder is consistent with the general rule that crimes which are defined so as to require that the defendant intentionally cause a forbidden bad result are usually interpreted to cover one who knows that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result, whether or not he desires the result to occur. Thus, a malice murder can be shown not only by evidence that the defendant acted with the deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof, but also by evidence that the defendant acted where no considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. In other words, evidence that the defendant acted with implied malice is, for purposes of demonstrating his guilt of the crime of malice murder, no less probative than proof that he acted with a specific intent to kill.’ Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 259(4) (507 S.E.2d 744) (1998) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.). Moreover, ‘the malice which is required for murder can be formed in an instant so long as it is present at the time of the act of killing. ’ Brewer v. State, 280 Ga. 18, 21(3)(c) (622 S.E.2d 348) (2005).” Accord, Taylor v. State , 282 Ga. 44, 644 S.E.2d 850 (May 14, 2007); Jackson v. State , 282 Ga. 668, 653 S.E.2d 28 (November 5, 2007); Allen v. State , 284 Ga. 310, 667 S.E.2d 54 (September 22, 2008); Stahl v. State , 284 Ga. 316, 669 S.E.2d 655 (September 22, 2008); Spears v. State , 284 Ga. 817, 671 S.E.2d 810 (January 12, 2009); Platt v. State , 291 Ga. 631, 732 S.E.2d 75 (October 1, 2012) (evidence of implied malice: “Appellant, who had threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot her, wrapped her body with a large boulder, placed her in the pond, and then, for days, misled the victim's mother and the authorities about the victim's whereabouts.”). Mobley v. State, 279 Ga.App. 476, 631 S.E.2d 491 (May 18, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to support finding of intent to kidnap and rape: “the evidence reflected that Mobley grabbed the victim and tried to duct tape her mouth. Mobley made no attempt to take the victim’s purse or car keys during the attack. The victim testified that ‘[Mobley] wasn’t going for anything else. He was going for me.’ Significantly, the evidence also showed that Mobley possessed pornographic pictures of a woman who reportedly looked strikingly similar to the victim. Based upon this circumstantial evidence, the jury was authorized to find that Mobley had the requisite intent to detain, abduct, and rape the victim as charged. See Williams v. State, 165 Ga.App. 69, 69-70(1) (299 S.E.2d 402) (1983); Meier v. State, 190 Ga.App. 625, 628(4) (379 S.E.2d 588) (1989) (defendant’s possession of pornographic materials tends to show bent of mind toward sexual conduct); Collins v. State, 171 Ga.App. 906, 908(2) (321 S.E.2d 757) (1984) (finding that ‘the jury could probably infer the pornographic magazines were a type of blueprint empirically linking them to the execution of the violent assaults, both physical and mental, and the battering, bruising and abusing of the [victim]’).” See also Murray (September 11, 2008), above. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 136, 630 S.E.2d 640 (April 27, 2006). Evidence sufficed for jury to find intent, overcoming defendant’s defense of accident, in his conviction for aggravated assault in the shooting of a fellow hunter. Among other things, “[t]he jury … could have considered Wilson’s actions after the shooting. Criminal intent is a question for the jury and may be inferred from the accused’s conduct, before, during and after the commission of the crime. Crowder v. State, 271 Ga.App. 177, 180(2) (609 S.E.2d 134) (2004). Here, Wilson removed the victim’s orange vest, concealed two weapons, failed to render aid to the victim, and failed to alert paramedics of the victim’s location in the woods. Although Wilson denied that he did these acts, the jury was authorized to believe the State’s version of events and