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reject Wilson’s claim that the incident was an accident. See, e. g., Gearin v. State, 255 Ga.App. 329, 333(1) (565 S.E.2d 540) (2002). There was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to find that Wilson’s actions exhibited utter disregard for the safety of the victim, thereby negating his defense of accident.” Collins v. State, 276 Ga.App. 358, 623 S.E.2d 192 (November 14, 2005). “We ‘will not disturb a factual determination by the jury on intent unless it is contrary to the evidence and clearly erroneous.... [E]ven when a finding that the accused had the intent to commit the crime charged is supported by evidence which is exceedingly weak and unsatisfactory[,] the verdict will not be set aside on that ground,’” quoting Gearin v. State , 255 Ga.App. 329, 565 S.E.2d 540 (2002). Jury was free to reject defendant’s claim that he touched child’s vagina incidental to keeping them from falling off the four-wheeler they were riding. Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (August 12, 2005). “The prosecutor did not ask the victim for his opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Brown committed the indicted acts with the criminal intent required to authorize the jury to convict. Rather, the State’s question sought to elicit testimony regarding whether it appeared to this eyewitness that the movement of Brown’s arm which propelled the point of the sword he held through the victim’s body was within Brown’s control. We find no authority supporting the position that whether observed physical behavior was within the actor’s control, or whether it was involuntary, is the sort of opinion testimony which is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-9- 65.” Accord, Patterson v. State , 327 Ga.App. 695, 761 S.E.2d 101 (June 24, 2014) (victim properly allowed to testify that defendant’s act of setting her on fire was “intentional”). Meeks v. State, 274 Ga.App. 517, 618 S.E.2d 152 (July 19, 2005). Evidence was sufficient to support finding of intent to commit theft in defendant’s burglary prosecution: “Meeks claims that he was unaware of what he was doing when he committed the burglary, pointing to evidence that he was taking medication on the day of the burglary and had experienced a seizure two weeks earlier. [fn] There was no evidence, however, regarding any specific medical condition of Meeks or the type of medication Meeks was taking. Further, there was no evidence that a medical condition, the medication, or the seizure could have affected Meeks’ ability to form the intent to commit the crimes on the day of the burglary.” “‘Generally speaking, in a burglary trial a jury must, of necessity, find intent to commit a felony [or theft] on the basis of circumstantial evidence.’ (Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 496(1) (512 S.E.2d 241) (1999).” Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga.App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (June 21, 2005). Defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to commit aggravated assault against the occupants of the vehicle other than the one who owed him money for drugs, but “in light of the testimony at trial concerning the number of rounds Cornelius fired into the confined space of Hunt’s single cab pickup truck, the jury was authorized to conclude that Cornelius was shooting indiscriminately at the occupants of the truck.” Barrow v. State, 269 Ga.App. 635, 605 S.E.2d 67 (September 16, 2004). “‘Although mere possession of cocaine cannot serve as the basis for a conviction for intent to distribute, the intent can be established with expert testimony that the amount of cocaine found was greater than would normally be had for individual use.’ Glenn v. State, 251 Ga.App. 336, 338-339(2) (553 S.E.2d 323) (2001). Here, the trial court certified [officer] as an expert with regard to the delivery and packaging of narcotics for distribution. [officer] testified that the street value of cocaine is over $100 per gram and that the amount of cocaine found by the officers was consistent with distribution of the drug, rather than personal use. Such evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Barrow possessed the cocaine with intent to distribute. [cits.]” Lewis v. State, 269 Ga.App. 94, 603 S.E.2d 492 (August 11, 2004). Approves this charge: “[E]vidence of a defendant’s conduct before, during and after the crime may be considered in determining whether a defendant is concerned in the commission of the crime. Conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one’s criminal intent may be inferred.” Distinguishes Renner v. State , 260 Ga. 515, 397 S.E.2d 683 (1990) (error to charge on flight as evidence of guilt), Bridges v. State , 268 Ga. 700, 492 S.E.2d 877 (1997) (error to charge presumption that one “intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts”); charge here, including charges on burden of proof in general and specifically as to intent, was correct and not burden shifting. Phillips v. State, 269 Ga.App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (June 22, 2004). “‘Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectible only inferentially, and the law accommodates this. OCGA § 16-2-6.’ Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205 206(1) (419 S.E.2d 86) (1992).”