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Burdette v. State, 259 Ga.App. 59, 576 S.E.2d 47 (December 23, 2002). “Whether or not one has the requisite intent to commit a crime is a question for the jury.” Thus, trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from asking victim whether defendant intended to burn her. Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 554, 532 S.E.2d 674 (July 5, 2000). Evidence was sufficient to support malice murder conviction despite defendant’s claim that, as he pointed the gun at the victim to rob her, “that she ‘grabbed the gun, and it just went off.’” “‘Evidence that [Jackson] acted in reckless disregard for human life is, for purposes of demonstrating his guilt of the crime of malice murder, as equally probative as evidence that he acted with a specific intent to kill.’ Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 259, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998).” Hill v. State , 243 Ga.App. 614, 533 S.E.2d 779 (April 14, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for child cruelty, and specifically the element of malice. Conviction was based on failing to promptly seek treatment for child’s injuries after being scalded by hot water. “‘For purposes of this Code section, malice in the legal sense [ ] imports the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced, or the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result. Intention may be manifest by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense. Intent is a question of fact to be determined upon consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brewton v. State, 266 Ga. 160, 161(2), 465 S.E.2d 668 (1996). Being afraid because one might get in trouble is neither justification nor excuse for refusing to obtain medical care for one's injured child.” Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s expert evidence that defendant had a psychological condition that caused her to “‘to be able to block out things that she doesn't want to see’ and that ‘her whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see things that are too painful to see.’ ” “Porter's counsel then argued that Porter's defense was that she had no knowledge of the abuse her husband was inflicting on her son. He argued that the psychologist's testimony and report were admissible to show that in her expert opinion Porter was not aware of the signs and symptoms of the abuse, even though a normally perceptive person would have been aware.” 1. The defense presented was not an insanity defense. Rather, the defense went to the defendant’s knowledge, not her intent or ability to form the intent to commit the offenses. 2. Witness’s observation that such conditions “usually happens when one is subjected to some type of abuse or severe emotional distress as a child,” and acknowledgment that she had no knowledge of defendant having experienced such abuse, didn’t make evidence inadmissible. Witness’s testimony that defendant exhibited the condition was based on scientific training plus testing of defendant; she “did not testify she concluded that Porter's condition was the result of childhood trauma.” 3. “ Neither was Dr. Speyer's testimony inadmissible as going to the ultimate issue of whether Porter did have knowledge of her husband's abuse. ‘ It is well settled that an expert may give an opinion or conclusion even on the ultimate issue when that conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. [Cit.]’ Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 458(2), 523 S.E.2d 54 (1999). In this case, it is clear that the jury would have no way of reaching a conclusion on this issue without the testimony of the expert.” 4. Distinguishing cases where defendant sought to present expert testimony of his own state of mind where issue was based on a “reasonable man” standard: justification, Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996) (“justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant”) and voluntary manslaughter, Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997) (“voluntary manslaughter required the jury to decide whether the provocation was sufficient to excite deadly passion in a reasonable person, not in this particular defendant”). “In this case, no ‘reasonable man’ standard is involved. Instead, to prove that Porter was a party to causing her son unnecessary pain and depriving him of medical treatment, it was necessary that the State show that she knew her son suffered such pain and required medical treatment.” Baker v. State, 241 Ga.App. 666, 527 S.E.2d 266 (December 20, 1999). Physical precedent only. Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed; evidence sufficed to establish defendant’s “‘intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person,’ OCGA § 16-6-4(a)” despite defendant’s testimony “that he had ‘strong feelings’ for C.W. and, on appeal, argues that his intercourse with C.W. was an ‘act of love.’” “‘Whether the requisite intent for child molestation existed was a question of fact, to be determined by the jury after considering all the circumstances surrounding the acts of which the accused is charged, including words, conduct, demeanor, and motive. Also, in child molestation cases[,] evidence of other similar or connected sexual offenses against children is admissible to corroborate the testimony of the victim as well as to show the lustful disposition of the defendant. Thus, in considering whether [Baker] had the requisite intent to molest the second victim, the jury was authorized to consider incidents