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concerning the first victim.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McGarity v. State, 224 Ga.App. 302, 304(2), 480 S.E.2d 319 (1997).” Eberhart v. State, 241 Ga.App. 164, 526 S.E.2d 361 (November 30, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for simple battery affirmed; evidence supported finding of intent. “‘The intention with which an act is done is peculiarly for the jury.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Haney v. State, 234 Ga.App. 214, 216(1), 507 S.E.2d 18 (1998). See also Grimsley v. State, 233 Ga.App. 781, 784(1), 505 S.E.2d 522 (1998). It is often difficult to prove with direct evidence an individual's intent as it existed at the time of the act for which they are being prosecuted. See Johnson v. State, 158 Ga.App. 183, 184(1)(b), 279 S.E.2d 483 (1981); Davis v. State, 53 Ga.App. 325, 326, 185 S.E. 400 (1936). Therefore, it is often necessary to prove such intent through the use of circumstantial evidence. See Williams v. State, 208 Ga.App. 12, 13, 430 S.E.2d 157 (1993); Davis v. State, supra at 327, 185 S.E. 400. ‘Intent, which is a mental attitude, is commonly detectible only inferentially, and the law accommodates this. OCGA § 16-2-6.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grimsley v. State, supra. A jury may infer that a person acted with criminal intent after considering the ‘words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ OCGA § 16- 2-6. See also Thrasher v. State, 225 Ga.App. 717, 718(1), 484 S.E.2d 755 (1997); Nichols v. State, 210 Ga.App. 134, 138(7), 435 S.E.2d 502 (1993). In order to support a conviction, such circumstantial evidence does not have to exclude every possible hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt, but only reasonable hypotheses. OCGA § 24-4-6; Haney v. State, supra; Harris v. State, 222 Ga.App. 56, 58, 473 S.E.2d 229 (1996); Nichols v. State, supra.” Accord, Hickman (August 30, 2011); Able v. State , 312 Ga.App. 252, 718 S.E.2d 96 (October 27, 2011). Bowers v. State, 241 Ga.App. 122, 526 S.E.2d 163 (November 29, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for first degree child cruelty. “[A]lthough Bowers testified he did not intend to harm H.B., the jury was authorized to find the beating malicious. Malice means the absence of justification or excuse and either an actual intent to cause the particular harm produced or the wanton and wilful doing of the act with an awareness of the plain and strong likelihood that harm may result. Sims v. State, 234 Ga.App. 678, 681(1)(b), 507 S.E.2d 845 (1998). We find no evidence in the record indicating that this beating was justified or that Bowers could not appreciate the harmful consequences of his actions.” Accord, Hill (April 14, 2000), above. 2. STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSES State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (November 5, 2012). Reversing 313 Ga.App. 305, 721 S.E.2d 549 (November 9, 2011), and reinstating convictions for vehicular homicide, second degree, and failure to yield to pedestrian. Trial court properly declined to charge jury on defense of accident. 1. Contrary to Court of Appeals, “‘strict liability’ traffic offenses are not offenses with no criminal intent element. They do not require the specific intent or wrongful purpose that is an element of other crimes, but they do require the defendant to have voluntarily committed the act that the statute prohibits, which typically involves driving at a particular time and place (e.g., through a red light, see OCGA § 40–6–20(a)) or in a particular way (e.g., too fast, see OCGA § 40–6–181).” 2. Defense of accident may apply in strict liability offenses “only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the prohibited act. Contrary to Ogilvie's assertion, this does not eliminate the accident defense in traffic offense cases. The defense must be based, however, on evidence that the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an unforseeable physical ailment or external force. Cf. Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 532, 536–537 (552 S.E.2d 499) (2007) (holding that a justification instruction was required on a failure to maintain lane charge based on evidence that the defendant accelerated and hit a utility pole to avoid an armed attack); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga.App. 614, 615 (347 S.E.2d 354) (1986) (holding that a charge on accident was required in a prosecution for obstructing a police officer based on the defendant's testimony that she obstructed the officer when she fell due to illness).” Thus, on the failure to yield to a pedestrian charge here, for example, “[a] charge on accident is appropriate for this crime only when there is evidence that the defendant did not voluntarily drive into the crosswalk.” 3. Defendant’s claim that child suddenly ran in front of her did not state a defense of accident. “If Ogilvie had been indicted for a crime that required her to have intentionally or maliciously hit the child, like murder, see OCGA § 16–5–1, this evidence would have supported an accident instruction, because it would tend to show that she did not act with the requisite “criminal ... intention.” OCGA § 16–2–2. As explained above, however, that was not the type of intent required to commit a strict liability traffic offense.” Rather, the defense raises an issue of proximate cause with regard to the vehicular homicide charge. “In the language of § 40–6–393(c), the evidence raised the issue of whether Ogilvie's alleged violation of § 40–6–91 was ‘the cause of [the child's] death.’ The trial court committed no error in this regard, however, giving the jury a full charge on proximate cause, in addition to charging the relevant language of those two statutes.” “Cause” here means “proximate cause,” citing State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646 (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010).