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3. TRANSFERRED INTENT Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 778 S.E.2d 785 (October 19, 2015). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to two felony murders, one under the doctrine of transferred intent. Cash helped Wright ambush his wife’s suspected lover, Jackson, whom Wright killed with a shotgun. Wright also killed the lover’s companion at the scene, McAdams, expressing surprise that it wasn’t Mrs. Wright. As the evidence allowed a finding that Wright intended to kill both Jackson and Mrs. Wright, “the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was a party to the aggravated assault of McAdams under the doctrine of transferred intent.” Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (July 11, 2011). Aggravated assault (on Anderson) should have merged with felony murder of Bennett, who was killed when defendant was shooting at Anderson. “‘Although the felony murder and the underlying felony were committed on different victims, the count of the indictment alleging felony murder sets forth the aggravated assault against [Anderson] as the underlying felony supporting the charge of felony murder. [Cit.] “Accordingly, a separate conviction and sentence on that aggravated assault count was not authorized and must be vacated.” [Cits.]’ Wyman v. State, 278 Ga. 339(1), 602 S.E.2d 619 (2004). See also Bolston v. State, 282 Ga. 400, 401(2), 651 S.E.2d 19 (2007).” Boatright v. State, 289 Ga. 597, 713 S.E.2d 829 (June 27, 2011). Malice murder, burglary and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in charging jury on transferred intent. “Although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that appellant shot the victim under the mistaken belief that the victim was Craig Aiken, there was no evidence that appellant was intending to shoot any other person when he shot the victim so as to bring this case within the typical ‘innocent bystander’ scenario in which the doctrine of transferred intent is applied. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372, 375(5), 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996); Foster v. State, 264 Ga. 369(1), 444 S.E.2d 296 (1994).” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Taylor v. State, 296 Ga.App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (February 19, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s aggravated assault conviction arising from gang rumble. “Taylor's group and Southside Mafia members agreed to meet at the park to ‘settle’ a dispute. Taylor knowingly took part and pointed a gun out of the window as the red car approached the Southside Mafia leader, conduct certain to draw fire from Southside Mafia members in the park. Under these circumstances, a reasonable fact finder could determine that Taylor and the other participants in the gun battle shared a common criminal intent – to assault each other with guns, intent that then transferred to the innocent bystanders. [fn] And given Taylor's role in the gun battle, he is not absolved of responsibility simply because he may have fled the scene before the shots struck the victims. See Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 605(1) (619 S.E.2d 644) (2005) (defendant gang member who instigated attack on rival gang criminally responsible for death of victim of attack, even though defendant fled the scene before fatal shot was fired).” Accord, In re: I.C. , 300 Ga.App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (October 16, 2009) (juvenile who shot BB gun out car window deemed to have intended to harm victim who was struck, regardless of who he intended to shoot). Accord, Emmanuel v. State , 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009). Birt v. State, 285 Ga.App. 105, 645 S.E.2d 596 (April 13, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for damage to property where he shot at police officer, striking and damaging building behind him instead. “Birt argues that he cannot be convicted of criminal damage to property because he intended to strike the police officer, not the apartment. But, it is black-letter law that ‘[u]nder the doctrine of transferred intent, when an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127(1)(b) (475 S.E.2d 627) (1996). The principle of transferred intent applies equally to criminal damage to property. In Rentz v. State, 162 Ga.App. 357, 357-358(1) (291 S.E.2d 434) (1982), we affirmed the conviction of the [defendant] for criminal damage to property as well as aggravated assault when he fired a gun at two victims, missed, and struck a grocery store, causing damage to the window and interior.” Accord, Burrell v. State , 293 Ga.App. 540, 667 S.E.2d 394 (September 15, 2008) (conviction for criminal damage to car upheld where defendant threw knife at estranged girlfriend, striking and denting car owned by someone else instead). Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 423, 614 S.E.2d 65 (June 6, 2005). Defendant could be convicted of aggravated assault (or here, felony murder based on aggravated assault) where defendant fired at intended victim but hit someone else, even though the actual victim never apprehended receiving a violent injury. “‘[W]hen an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own