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wrong and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.’ [Cit.] Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127(1)(b) (475 S.E.2d 627) (1996).” Accord, Jordan v. State , 322 Ga.App. 252, 744 S.E.2d 447 (June 13, 2013); Luke v. State , 324 Ga.App. 531, 751 S.E.2d 180 (November 7, 2013); Cash (October 19, 2015), above. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (March 29, 2004). “The indictment charged [defendants] with aggravated assault against one of the victims, Hunter, by shooting at him with a handgun, a deadly weapon. [Defendants] argue the State failed to establish the elements of this crime because neither of them knew that Hunter was in the house at the time of the shooting; Hunter himself slept through the entire shooting; and none of the bullets fired into the house reached the bedroom where Hunter was asleep…. [Defendants’] primary objective was to kill Mills, whom they blamed for the death of Culler’s brother, but it was likely that violent harm would also be inflicted against all persons inside the home. When an unintended victim (such as Hunter) is subjected to harm due to an unlawful act intentionally aimed at someone else (such as Mills), the law prevents the actor from taking advantage of his own misdirected wrongful conduct and transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was intended to the one who suffered harm. [Cit.] Accordingly, it is of no import that [defendants] were unaware that Hunter was in the home. It is obvious that by intentionally firing into the home, [defendants] were likely to seriously injure all the occupants, not just their primary target, Mills. Such harm was likely regardless of whether a particular occupant (such as Hunter), was aware of the shooting as it occurred. It follows that the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict on the charges of aggravated assault against Hunter.” Carter v. State, 245 Ga.App. 275, 537 S.E.2d 706 (July 21, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported finding of transferred intent “even if Carter inadvertently stabbed Davis. … Under that doctrine, when an unintended victim is injured because of an unlawful act directed against someone else, the law transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it. Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127(1)(b), 475 S.E.2d 627 (1996). In this case, the jury could have found that Carter's unlawful intent to stab Gresham was transferred to Davis when he inadvertently stabbed her in the back as she intervened in the fight. See Harris v. State, 233 Ga.App. 696, 697–698(1), 505 S.E.2d 239 (1998).” Dunn v. State, 242 Ga.App. 525, 530 S.E.2d 236 (February 29, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove malice as an element of aggravated battery: “‘A person acts “maliciously” when [she] acts intentionally and without justification or serious provocation.’ (Emphasis in original.) Wade v. State, 258 Ga. 324, 330(11)(d), 368 S.E.2d 482 (1988). See also Roundtree v. State, 227 Ga.App. 777, 490 S.E.2d 526 (1997). Viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that Dunn acted intentionally and without justification or serious provocation in firing the shot in question. See Harden v. State, 164 Ga.App. 59, 60(2), 296 S.E.2d 372 (1982) (whether defendant acted maliciously in striking victim was for jury). Although Dunn may not have intended to shoot the bystander, ‘when an unintended victim is struck down as a result of an unlawful act actually directed against someone else, the law ... transfers the original intent from the one against whom it was directed to the one who actually suffered from it.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Happoldt v. State, 267 Ga. 126, 127(1)(b), 475 S.E.2d 627 (1996).” JJJ. INTERNET PAGES See subheading FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS – INTERNET PAGES, above KKK. INTOXICATION Smith v. State, 276 Ga.App. 41, 622 S.E.2d 413 (October 20, 2005). “Smith claims … that the evidence showing he was intoxicated precluded a finding that he had formed the requisite criminal intent to commit these crimes. ‘To establish a voluntary intoxication defense, [Smith] would have had to show that the intoxication had “resulted in the alteration of brain function so as to negate intent. Even then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary.” Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491(8) (371 S.E.2d 384) (1988).’ Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265, 273(2)(e) (455 S.E.2d 37) (1995). As in Peters v. State, 224 Ga.App. 837, 838(1) (481 S.E.2d 898) (1997), ‘[a]lthough the evidence indicates that [Smith] had been drinking on the night of the incident and even perhaps that he was drunk, no evidence sufficient to support a voluntary intoxication defense was presented.’ See Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 88(16) (463 S.E.2d 868) (1995). Specifically, he failed to present any evidence that ‘the intoxication altered his brain functioning so as to negate intent and that the alteration was more than temporary.’ Rattansay v. State, 240 Ga.App. 165, 166-167(1)(c) (523 S.E.2d 36) (1999). See Couch v. State, 229 Ga.App. 151(1) (493 S.E.2d 577) (1997). Beyond alcohol abuse and intoxication on the night of the crime, Smith needed to show ‘clinical and objective signs or testing by diagnostic procedures and psychometric tests’