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to demonstrate permanent brain injury. Burgos v. State, 233 Ga.App. 897, 900(1) (505 S.E.2d 543) (1998). Even if such had been shown, the weight and credibility of such evidence would have been up to the judge as the trier of fact.” Gibson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 773, 516 S.E.2d 816 (April 27, 1999). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault, trial court properly rejected defendant’s request to charge that all intoxication would defeat a finding of intent. “[I]nability to distinguish between right and wrong is not a defense if it is the consequence of voluntary intoxication. Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736, 743(10), 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988). Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590, 277 S.E.2d 505 (1981), relied on by Gibson, is not authority to the contrary.” LLL. INTRINSIC EVIDENCE See subheading CHARACTER EVIDENCE – INTRINSIC EVIDENCE, above MMM. JUDICIAL NOTICE See new OCGA § 24-2-201 DeLong v. State, 310 Ga.App. 518, 714 S.E.2d 98 (July 6, 2011). Evidence was insufficient to support conviction for VGCSA violation; State failed to present evidence that Ambien is the same as the Schedule IV substance Zolpidem, and “this Court has previously held that the trade name of a statutorily designated controlled substance is not the proper subject of judicial notice.” Citing “ Elrod [ v. State, 143 Ga.App. 331, 331(2), 238 S.E.2d 291 (1977)] (reversing conviction when testimony referred to drug's trade name without evidence linking that name to the listed controlled substance because ‘[i]n the absence of a specified designation of the drug Demerol, ... the courts cannot “notice” whether a certain substance falls within the prohibitive scope of a broad category of drugs’ (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Tant v. State, 247 Ga. 264, 266 n. 1, 275 S.E.2d 312 (1981) (citing to Elrod for the proposition that ‘the generic equivalent of a trade name is not the proper subject of judicial notice’ and holding that ‘the testimony as to the trade name, Quaaludes, ... was sufficiently connected with the generic equivalent, methaqualone, by the description of the pills, or tablets, by the witnesses and by the crime lab report’).” Gaddis v. State, 310 Ga.App. 189, 712 S.E.2d 599 (June 20, 2011). Probation revocation affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of OnTrak TesTstik, both based on expert opinion and judicial notice of other Georgia court decisions. Judicial notice of other court rulings. “Gaddis claims that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of another superior court ruling that found the drug test in question to be of verifiable certainty. The claim is without merit. … ‘Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature,’” quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525-526(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982). “Furthermore, contrary to Gaddis' claim, the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of another court's ruling. “[I]f a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mann v. State, 285 Ga.App. 39, 42 (645 S.E.2d 573) (2007). Here, the trial court did just that, announcing its intention to take judicial notice of the prior court ruling in question and giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue.” Cantrell v. State, 295 Ga.App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32 (January 23, 2009). Trial court erred in taking judicial notice of conditions of defendant’s bail bond from another case in same court, without so stating on record to allow defendant opportunity to challenge the fact so noticed. “Because the validity of Cantrell's waiver of Fourth Amendment rights and the reasonableness of imposing such a waiver as a condition of his pretrial release are also challenged by Cantrell, it was not proper for the court to take judicial notice of the bond order's waiver provision without following the procedure required by Graves [269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 901-903(2), 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000)].” Mann v. State, 285 Ga.App. 39, 645 S.E.2d 573 (April 12, 2007). Trial court erred in taking judicial notice of facts [here, prior expert testimony regarding reliability of drug test strips] without notice and opportunity to be heard by parties. “While taking judicial notice of testimony in other cases before the same court might provide a basis for a trial court to conclude that a scientific test has reached a scientific state of verifiable certainty, [fn] the trial court must follow the procedural requirements announced by our Supreme Court in Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 775(4) (504 S.E.2d 679) (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900 (537 S.E.2d 80) (2000). Specifically, ‘if a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.’ Id. at 795(4)(a). The Supreme Court’s