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act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. ... And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incident to and growing out of the original purpose[, so long as] ... they are a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy.’ Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457, 459 (588 S.E.2d 691) (2003) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). And a collateral crime is a natural and probable consequence of the original purpose of the conspiracy if that crime is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the original conspiracy. See id.” “[T]his Court has rejected the argument that a co-conspirator to a robbery must know that his fellow conspirator has a gun before he can be found guilty of felony murder based on armed robbery. See Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 386 (578 S.E.2d 858) (2003) (holding that the defendant's knowledge of whether his coconspirator had a gun ‘was not a necessary component of his guilt for armed robbery and, consequently, for felony murder’ and that ‘[a]ll that the State was required to prove was that Appellant was a member of a conspiracy to rob the store and that [his co- conspirator's] use of the weapon was naturally or necessarily done in furtherance of that crime’).” Evidence here supported finding that murder was “a reasonably foreseeable consequence” of the conspiracy to rob the victims. Accord, Boccia v. State , 335 Ga.App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (February 12, 2016). New v. State, 327 Ga.App. 87, 755 S.E.2d 568 (March 27, 2014) Evidence supported finding that defendant intentionally possessed child pornography files. GBI analyst testified that defendant’s computer contained shadow files of child pornography that had previously been erased from the computer. Along with other evidence, “the shadow copies on New's computer were evidence of prior possession of the original images, no matter the manner in which those original images were viewed—whether New downloaded the original images or limited his action to temporarily viewing the images on a web page. See Ward v. State, 994 So.2d 293, 301–02 (Ala.Crim.App., 2007) (affirming conviction when evidence established that defendant constructively possessed child pornography by viewing images online); see also [ State v. Mercer, 324 Wis.2d 506, 782 N.W.2d 125, 127 (¶ 33) (Wis.Ct.App., 2010)] (affirming conviction for possession of child pornography, despite absence of any file type on subject computer, when monitoring software tracked employee's Internet searches and showed ‘a habit of surfing for pornography’ and using search ‘terms associated with child pornography and looked at images and text stories’).” Other evidence here: “the expert's testimony as to LimeWire logs that indicated searches for and downloads of child pornography, the number of child pornography images discovered, the user-installed deletion software and attendant settings, and the fact that New photographed [child victims] engaged in ‘strip wrestling.’” Distinguishing Barton (June 21, 2007), below , where “the evidence established only that the images of child pornography had been downloaded automatically and stored in the defendant's cache folders.” Sorg v. State, 324 Ga.App. 595, 751 S.E.2d 196 (November 8, 2013). Evidence supported conviction for knowingly possessing child pornography: “evidence showed that the child pornography images found in the cache folder on Sorg's computer had all been intentionally accessed on the date the officer observed Sorg with his computer. Moreover, an officer observed the images on Sorg's computer and also watched as Sorg attempted to close and minimize the pornographic images of children. These actions all indicated that the images were not generated in a passive way.” Distinguishing Barton (June 21, 2007), below , where “the evidence established only that the images of child pornography had been downloaded automatically and stored in the defendant's cache folders.” Garcia-Maldonado v. State, 324 Ga.App. 518, 751 S.E.2d 149 (November 6, 2013). Conviction for methamphetamine trafficking affirmed; evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s knowledge, or willful ignorance, of the drugs in the car he was driving. “The evidence showed that Garcia–Maldonado met Flores in the parking lot of a gas station shortly before the drug transaction, where he was given the keys to the green vehicle containing the approximately one- pound of methamphetamine and was instructed where to drive and park; that he arrived at the scene of the drug transaction first, parked the green vehicle, and appeared to wait for the second vehicle; that he was the driver and sole occupant of the green vehicle in which the drugs were stashed; and that, by his own admission, he had been offered a large sum of money to drive the green vehicle to the motel. This combined evidence, particularly in conjunction with the experienced officer's testimony that large drug transactions often involve the use of two cars by drug dealers, was sufficient to authorize Garcia–Maldonado's drug trafficking conviction. See, e.g., Aguilera v. State, 320 Ga.App. 707, 713(2) (740 S.E.2d 644) (2013) (affirming conviction for trafficking in cocaine where there was evidence from which jury could infer that defendant, who was the driver of the vehicle containing the cocaine, had knowingly ferried the drugs necessary for the drug transaction). See generally Floyd v. State, 207 Ga.App. 275, 282(2)(b) (427 S.E.2d 605) (1993) (‘It is a reasonable inference that, as the driver, [the defendant] was in control of the vehicle and had knowledge of its contents.’).” “Alternatively, ‘the knowledge element of a violation of a criminal statute can be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance of criminal activity.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Able v. State, 312 Ga.App. 252, 258(3) (718 S.E.2d 96) (2011). Under the concept of ‘deliberate ignorance,’ the