☢ test - Í

requisite knowledge can be shown where a defendant ‘has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries [ ] because he wishes to remain in ignorance.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) Perez–Castillo v. State, 257 Ga.App. 633, 634 (572 S.E.2d 657) (2002). See also Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 734(6)(b), n. 7 (699 S.E.2d 531) (2010) (charge on deliberate ignorance appropriate ‘when the facts support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution’) (citations and punctuation omitted). Here, in light of the evidence previously discussed, the jury was authorized to find that Garcia–Maldonado acted with deliberate ignorance to the extent that he drove the green vehicle without question to the motel in return for a promise of $500.” Thomas v. State, 319 Ga.App. 690, 738 S.E.2d 149 (February 5, 2013). Physical precedent only. First degree forgery conviction affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant knew check was a forgery. “‘[T]he knowledge element of a violation of a criminal statute can be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.’ Taylor v. State, 293 Ga.App. 551, 553, 667 S.E.2d 405 (2008). Thomas received a $17,450.10 check from an entity with whom she had no connection or expectation of payment, and presented it to a bank teller in an attempt to obtain cash. She never asked the teller whether ‘the check was good or not.’ ‘Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that, at the very least, [Thomas] remained deliberately ignorant of the fraudulent nature of the checks.’ Id. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.” Cooper v. State, 315 Ga.App. 773, 728 S.E.2d 289 (May 3, 2012). Evidence supported defendant’s drug conviction; defendant’s testimony that he thought the drug was ecstasy, not N-Benzylpiperazine, didn’t prevent a different finding by the jury . “‘[B]oth knowledge and possession may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence. And it has long been the law that knowledge may be proved by facts and circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer that a defendant knowingly possessed contraband. Thus, OCGA § 16–2–6 provides that a jury may find criminal intention upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Serna v. State, 308 Ga.App. 518, 522(3) (707 S.E.2d 904) (2011). The jury was not required to accept as true Cooper's assertion that he believed the pills were a different Schedule I controlled substance. ‘It is the jury's prerogative to choose what evidence to believe and what to reject.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sullivan v. State, 277 Ga.App. 738, 741 (627 S.E.2d 437) (2006). Because the issue of Cooper's knowledge that he possessed BZP was for the jury, we affirm his conviction. Cf. Serna, supra, 308 Ga.App. at 521–522(3) (rejecting defendant's sufficiency argument based in part upon alleged lack of knowledge of precise chemical compound in bottle of ‘Amsterdam Poppers’). [fn: Our opinion in Mohamed v. State, 314 Ga.App. 181, 723 S.E.2d 694 (February 16, 2012), does not require a different result. In Mohamed, the defendant testified that he believed ‘the chemicals’ would dissipate from a khat plant during the time it took the plant to be shipped from Africa to the United States. Slip Op. at 5–8(1). In this case, however, Cooper admitted that he possessed an illegal drug, and it was for the jury to determine whether he knowingly possessed the chemical compound specified in the indictment. ] ” Mohamed v. State, 314 Ga.App. 181, 723 S.E.2d 694 (February 16, 2012). Conviction for possession of cathinone reversed; evidence failed to show that defendant knowingly possessed that chemical, the active ingredient in the African plant khat . “Given (1) the State's expert witness's testimony that cathinone converts into cathine, another chemical that Mohamed was not charged with possessing, after some period of time and that cathinone is undetectable without the use of scientific testing equipment; (2) evidence that the khat in this case was harvested more than two days before its subsequent arrival in Clayton County; (3) Mohamed's testimony that he believed the chemical ‘[went] out’ of the khat after two days; [fn: The State presented no evidence to contradict Mohamed's assertion, and instead submitted testimony by an expert conceding that cathinone degrades into cathine. ] and (4) the lack of evidence that Mohamed made any attempt to conceal the nature of the package (by, for example, evading police or showing false identification), we conclude that the State failed to establish that Mohamed knowingly possessed the khat with the knowledge that it contained cathinone. [Cits.] Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.” Accord, Amin v. State , 317 Ga.App. 685, 732 S.E.2d 340 (September 25, 2012) (co-defendant with Mohamed). See also Duvall (July 11, 2011), below. Distinguished, Cooper (May 3, 2012), above. Foster v. State, 311 Ga.App. 129, 714 S.E.2d 748 (July 22, 2011). Evidence supported conviction for forgery. Defendant claimed he didn’t know the check he was given to cash was forged. “Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence. [Cits.] … Foster argues that it is a reasonable inference that he was a victim of a common scam described during trial by Officer Seabolt, one of the arresting officers, where a scout identifies poor or homeless individuals with identification for use in fraudulent check cashing schemes, such as the one at issue in this case. However, we find the