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accused is prosecuted. OCGA § 16-2-6.” Barton v. State, 286 Ga.App. 49, 648 S.E.2d 660 (June 21, 2007). Defendant’s conviction on 106 counts of sexual exploitation of children reversed; evidence failed to establish defendant’s “knowing possession of child pornography” in violation of OCGA § 16-12-100(b)(8), “which makes it unlawful ‘for any person knowingly to possess or control any material which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor’s body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.’” Evidence here showed that pictures were viewed over the internet; files were stored in computers temporary internet files; anything viewed on the internet gets stored in temporary files, even without any affirmative action by the user to access the file, image or page (such as a “pop-up” ad); and the files in question here were never viewed more than once. No evidence showed that defendant was aware that files viewed on the internet would be stored in temporary internet files; prosecution’s expert witness “testified that no one using the computer can retrieve information stored in the temporary internet file folders without special forensic software,” which was not present on defendant’s computer. Held, this evidence was insufficient to show knowing possession of the files by defendant. “In any criminal prosecution for possession … the State must prove that the defendant was aware he possessed the contraband at issue. Thus, in this case, the State was required to show that Barton had knowledge of the images stored in his computer’s cache files.” “[T]he mere existence of pornographic images in the cache files of an individual’s computer is insufficient to constitute knowing possession of those materials absent proof that the individual either: (1) took some affirmative act to save or download those images to his computer; or (2) had knowledge that the computer automatically saved those files .” Opinion notes that defendant here was charged with possession , not control ; expresses no opinion on whether evidence of accessing pictures over the internet would have proven control. Distinguished, Dickerson v. State , 304 Ga.App. 762, 697 S.E.2d 874 (July 1, 2010) (expert testified that images downloaded to CD, unlike images on hard drive, “means that somebody deliberately copied those images to that CD.”); Haynes v. State , 317 Ga.App. 400, 731 S.E.2d 83 (August 8, 2012) (“unlike Barton , … in the case at bar the evidence showed that the files containing the child pornography found on Haynes' computer had been intentionally moved or downloaded to his computer and that the files had been modified on various dates, all actions which indicated that the files did not come to be on Haynes computer in some passive way.”). Distinguished Sorg (November 8, 2013), above (evidence showed defendant had intentionally accessed cache files, officer saw defendant “attempting to close and minimize the pornographic images of children”); New (March 27, 2014), above. Giang v. State, 285 Ga.App. 491, 646 S.E.2d 710 (May 22, 2007). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant had knowledge of tin containing marijuana, located in her dresser drawer. “‘It has long been the law that knowledge may be proved by facts and circumstances from which a [fact finder] could reasonably infer that a defendant knowingly possessed contraband.’ Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga.App. 151, 154(2) (619 S.E.2d 821) (2005). Therefore, in light of the tin’s location and that location’s particular association with Giang, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that Giang possessed the tin containing the methamphetamine residue.” Perez-Castillo v. State, 257 Ga.App. 633, 572 S.E.2d 657 (September 27, 2002). Defendant took delivery of mail containing large quantities of marijuana, signed for it using two different aliases, delivered it to accomplice in a public restroom, and received payment therefor in a different public restroom. Defendant gave different accounts to different people about what he thought the shipments contained, but defended on grounds that he didn’t know what was in the boxes. Held, the trial court properly charged the doctrine of “deliberate ignorance.” “‘The knowledge element of a violation of a criminal statute can be proved by demonstrating either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance. This Court has consistently recognized deliberate ignorance of criminal activity as the equivalent of knowledge. The deliberate ignorance instruction is based on the alternative to the actual knowledge requirement at common law that if a party has his suspicions aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.’” Cautions that such cases will be rare. Quoting from United States v. Prather , 205 F.3d 1265 (11 th Cir., 2000). Accord, Maddox (February 10, 2005), above; Aguilera v. State , 293 Ga.App. 523, 667 S.E.2d 378 (September 11, 2008) (“Aguilera and his co-defendant were paid $100 each to drive to Grantville for the sole purpose of picking up a UPS package being shipped to a vacant address in that city;” also attempted to elude police, gave a false name, and refused to disclose who had paid them.); Garcia-Maldonado v. State , 324 Ga.App. 518, 751 S.E.2d 149 (November 6, 2013) (“the jury could have found that Garcia–Maldonado's testimony that Flores agreed to provide him $500 for merely driving the green vehicle to the motel strained credulity and instead reflected that Garcia– Maldonado knew that he was being compensated for assisting in a high-stakes drug transaction.”). Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s expert evidence that defendant had a