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psychological condition that caused her to “‘to be able to block out things that she doesn't want to see’ and that ‘her whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see things that are too painful to see.’” “Porter's counsel then argued that Porter's defense was that she had no knowledge of the abuse her husband was inflicting on her son. He argued that the psychologist's testimony and report were admissible to show that in her expert opinion Porter was not aware of the signs and symptoms of the abuse, even though a normally perceptive person would have been aware.” 1. The defense presented was not an insanity defense. Rather, the defense went to the defendant’s knowledge, not her intent or ability to form the intent to commit the offenses. 2. Witness’s observation that such conditions “usually happens when one is subjected to some type of abuse or severe emotional distress as a child,” and acknowledgment that she had no knowledge of defendant having experienced such abuse, didn’t make evidence inadmissible. Witness’s testimony that defendant exhibited the condition was based on scientific training plus testing of defendant; she “did not testify she concluded that Porter's condition was the result of childhood trauma.” 3. “ Neither was Dr. Speyer's testimony inadmissible as going to the ultimate issue of whether Porter did have knowledge of her husband's abuse. ‘ It is well settled that an expert may give an opinion or conclusion even on the ultimate issue when that conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. [Cit.]’ Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 458(2), 523 S.E.2d 54 (1999). In this case, it is clear that the jury would have no way of reaching a conclusion on this issue without the testimony of the expert.” 4. Distinguishing cases where defendant sought to present expert testimony of his own state of mind where issue was based on a “reasonable man” standard: justification, Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996) (“justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant”) and voluntary manslaughter, Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997) (“voluntary manslaughter required the jury to decide whether the provocation was sufficient to excite deadly passion in a reasonable person, not in this particular defendant”). “In this case, no ‘reasonable man’ standard is involved. Instead, to prove that Porter was a party to causing her son unnecessary pain and depriving him of medical treatment, it was necessary that the State show that she knew her son suffered such pain and required medical treatment.” Hernandez-Lopez v. State, 319 Ga.App. 662, 738 S.E.2d 116 (February 5, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for driving without license; trial court properly denied motion to suppress. License-plate reader (LPR) system, used to scan car tags for violations and outstanding warrants, isn’t a radar system which must meet the foundational requirements for admission thereof under OCGA § 40-14-7. “Hernandez–Lopez's argument is misplaced because the admissibility of a radar detector is inapposite as that device is used to prove commission of the offense at issue, See Hardaway [ v. State, 207 Ga.App. 150, 150-152, 427 S.E.2d 527 (1993)] (reversing speeding conviction when State failed to strictly comply with third requirement for admissibility of radar detector), whereas the use of the LPR merely provides an officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.” TTT. LINE-UPS See subheading IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT, above UUU. LOST/DESTROYED EVIDENCE Mitchell v. State, 289 Ga.App. 55, 656 S.E.2d 145 (November 28, 2007). Defendant was not entitled to new trial despite incomplete appeal record resulting from lost videotapes, as contents of videotapes was stipulated. “Mitchell … argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the two videotapes admitted into evidence at his bench trial cannot be located and thus cannot be reviewed on appeal. It is true that the loss of transcripts and/or exhibits violates the recording requirements of OCGA §§ 5-6-41(a) and 17-8-5(a) and can result in the grant of a new trial. Cf. In re: L.G., 230 Ga.App. 153, 154-155(1) (495 S.E.2d 628) (1998) (granting a new deprivation hearing when, in contravention of a mandatory recording statute, the tape recording of the hearing had been destroyed). Before a new trial is mandated, however, the defendant must show that the incomplete trial record is harmful in some way or otherwise prevents this Court from carrying out its review function. See Smith v. State, 251 Ga. 229, 230(2) (304 S.E.2d 716) (1983); Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 524, 525-526(1) (642 S.E.2d 170) (2007); Robinson v. State, 221 Ga.App. 865, 867(2) (473 S.E.2d 519) (1996). Mitchell has failed to demonstrate that the loss of the videotapes has harmed him or precludes us from reviewing any of the issues he has raised on appeal. Significantly, although the videotapes themselves are missing, the parties stipulated to the contents of the tapes at the bench trial and to the proffered testimony of the minor female victims, as discussed in Division 1. Thus, while the fact that the two videotapes are missing is troubling, it does not prevent us from carrying out our essential review function. Consequently, the trial court did not err in declining to grant Mitchell a new trial on this ground. [Cits.]” QQQ. LASERS See OFFENSES – UNIFORM RULES OF THE ROAD – SPEEDING, below RRR. LETTERS See subheading FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS – LETTERS, above SSS. LICENSE PLATE READERS