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Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 641 S.E.2d 635 (February 2, 2007). Luggage taken from victim by defendant during armed robbery wa returned to victim upon defendant’s apprehension. Defendant contends his trial counsel should have objected to testimony concerning the luggage, as it was not preserved for his possible use at trial. “‘Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ Brantley v. State , 199 Ga.App. 623, 623-624(1) (405 S.E.2d 533) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). On motion for new trial, Feaster made no showing of bad faith on the part of the police and thus no showing of any denial of due process of law. Consequently, Feaster has failed to show that any such objection to testimony concerning the luggage would have been successful.” Blackwood v. State, 277 Ga.App. 870, 627 S.E.2d 907 (March 3, 2006). No error in denying motion for directed verdict based on State’s accidental destruction of audio tape of drug transaction in question. Quotes language from Hannah, below, then notes: “While an audiotape may have apparent exculpatory value under certain circumstances, Blackwood has failed to establish that the tape in this case had such value. He presented no evidence as to whether anyone had ever listened to the tape or whether it was even audible.” Further, his defense was based on events outside the scope of the recording in question. “‘[W]e cannot say that the State’s failure to turn [the audiotape over to Blackwood] caused him the kind of prejudice that undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial or which created a reasonable doubt of guilt which did not otherwise exist.’ (Citations omitted.) Ely v. State, 275 Ga.App. 708, 711(1)(a) (621 S.E.2d 811) (2005).” Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 599 S.E.2d 177 (July 12, 2004). Defendant complains that the State failed to preserve the pills he gave EMTs when reporting victim’s death; he contends the pills contributed to her death. “‘To be material, the evidence must have had an apparent exculpatory value before it was lost, and be of such a nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. [Cit.]’ Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 74(2)(c) (561 S.E.2d 414) (2002). There is no evidence of bad faith in the State’s failure to produce the bottles of pills. In any event, the medical examiner testified about the drugs found in Rice’s body, and other testimony established the existence of the pill bottles Hannah produced. Thus, as the actual pills would have been simply cumulative of other evidence, there was no violation of Hannah’s due process rights. [Cit.]” Accord, Lonergan v. State , 281 Ga. 637, 641 S.E.2d 792 (February 26, 2007) (No violation of due process where State allegedly failed to preserve cumulative evidence – blood on a flashlight – of an undisputed fact – that murder victim hit defendant with the flashlight.). Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 283, 574 S.E.2d 359 (November 6, 2002). “‘In dealing with the failure of the state to preserve evidence which might have exonerated the defendant, a court must determine both whether the evidence was material and whether the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence.’… ‘Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.’ [Cits.]” VVV. MATERIAL EVIDENCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES See OFFENSES – OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION – PERJURY, and WITNESSES – OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES, below WWW. MEDICAL RECORDS Haithcock v. State, 320 Ga.App. 886, 740 S.E.2d 806 (March 28, 2013). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded hospital records, though properly authenticated, because “such authentication does not eliminate the rule against hearsay. Fuller v. Flash Foods, Inc., 298 Ga.App. 217, 220(2), 679 S.E.2d 775 (2009). Here, Haithcock did not call as a witness the physician or nurse who performed the examination to testify as to their findings. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded the records from the evidence on the basis of hearsay.” Opio v. State, 283 Ga.App. 894, 642 S.E.2d 906 (March 7, 2007). “Under OCGA § 24-7-8(b), ‘[m]edical records or reproductions thereof, when duly certified by their custodians, need not be identified at the trial and may be used in any manner in which records identified at the trial by the custodian could be used.’ ‘Where hospital records are properly certified [under OCGA § 24-7-8], the effect of such certification is to dispense with preliminary proof of authenticity on the part of the custodian of the records[.]’ (Footnote omitted.) Adams v. MARTA, 246 Ga.App. 698, 702(2) (542 S.E.2d 130) (2000). Therefore, because the medical records in this case had been properly certified, they needed no further authentication. Id.”