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XXX. MENTAL RETARDATION See subheading INTELLIGENCE, above YYY. MIRANDA RIGHTS See DUI – MIRANDA , above and subheading STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT, below ZZZ. MISTAKEN IDENTITY

Bennett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 110, 657 S.E.2d 6 (January 8, 2008). “Bennett … contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a person using his stolen driver’s license received two traffic tickets in South Carolina while Bennett was incarcerated. Bennett claims this evidence should have been admitted because it supports his mistaken identity defense, in that the South Carolina officer issuing the citations mistook the driver for Bennett. We do not agree. ‘It is well settled that the admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wilkins v. State, 261 Ga.App. 856, 859(4) (583 S.E.2d 905) (2003). We find no abuse of discretion here. In Wilkins, we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to admit the testimony of a potential witness that he was misidentified by police as the defendant and arrested, finding it irrelevant to any material fact at issue in the case. Id. at 858-860(3)-(4). See also Warren v. State, 158 Ga.App. 533, 534(2) (281 S.E.2d 291) (1981) (exclusion of evidence that [defendant] was misidentified by police on two unrelated occasions was not error where victims in instant case positively identified [defendant] at a lineup and at trial). Likewise here, evidence that an unidentified police officer in South Carolina mistook an unidentified individual for Bennett was irrelevant where both persons present in the store during the robbery identified Bennett at the showup and again at trial as the perpetrator. ‘[G]enerally, the best method of attacking the credibility of an eyewitness’ identification is by cross-examination.’ (Citation omitted.) Wilkins, supra at 860(4).” AAAA. MOTION IN LIMINE Jones v. State, 316 Ga.App. 442, 729 S.E.2d 578 (June 27, 2012). Conviction for family violence battery affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court wasn’t required to rule pre-trial on whether his prior offenses would be admitted for impeachment should he decide to testify. “According to Jones, he could not make an informed decision about whether to testify in the absence of a ruling by the trial court on the admissibility issue. The trial court committed no error. It is well established that ‘[t]he trial court has discretion to hear a motion in limine prior to trial or to reserve ruling on the admissibility of evidence until it is offered during trial.’ Holland v. State, 176 Ga.App. 343, 344(3), 335 S.E.2d 739 (1985). See Wiggins v. State, 249 Ga. 302, 303(1)(b), 290 S.E.2d 427 (1982). Moreover, Jones clearly was aware of the his prior convictions that the State sought to introduce for impeachment purposes, and, therefore, he was able to weigh the risk of those convictions being introduced into evidence when deciding whether to testify in his own defense.” Hampton v. State, 300 Ga.App. 49, 684 S.E.2d 118 (September 9, 2009). Convictions for cocaine trafficking and related offenses reversed; where defendant’s motion in limine was denied, defendant was not required to renew his objection at time the evidence was introduced. “Once Hampton's motion in limine was made and denied, his objection was preserved for appeal. ‘Normally, when a defendant moves in limine for the exclusion of evidence and the trial court, on the record, rules the evidence admissible, the record is preserved and the defendant is not required to object to the evidence during trial. [Cits.]’ Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 767(2)(b) (604 S.E.2d 804) (2004).” Accord, Henry v. State , 316 Ga.App. 132, 729 S.E.2d 429 (June 7, 2012). Hernandez v. State, 291 Ga.App. 562, 662 S.E.2d 325 (May 19, 2008). Convictions for trafficking in methamphetamine and related offenses affirmed. Counsel is not required to make contemporaneous objection to violation of ruling granting motion in limine. “See, e. g., Reno v. Reno, 249 Ga. 855, 856(1) (295 S.E.2d 94) (1982) (if motion in limine is granted, successful movant need not renew objection if evidence is introduced at trial; otherwise, it would require he draw the jury's attention to the prejudicial material, and objecting party could wait until jury recessed to make a timely motion for mistrial). See also Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100, 103(8) (621 S.E.2d 742) (2005) (an adverse ruling by a trial court to a motion in limine seeking to limit a specific argument at trial serves to preserve the issue of the argument's propriety for appellate review).” Rogers v. State, 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007). On habeas petition following murder conviction and death sentence, finding that defendant wasn’t mentally retarded affirmed; trial court properly declined to make pre-trial determination as to admissibility of evidence. “[A] ‘trial court has an absolute right to refuse to decide the admissibility of evidence ... prior to trial. [Cits.] State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413, 415 (291 S.E.2d 543) (1982).” Here, defendant moved in limine to exclude the testing materials and testimony of State’s expert on the subject of defendant’s alleged mental retardation. Trial court deferred ruling until the expert was available for voir dire. Defendant had the