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burden of proof at the civil hearing on the mental retardation issue. Absent a ruling from the court on the admissibility of the testimony and materials from State’s witness, defendant “called a mental health expert who had executed an affidavit in which the expert stated he considered Dr. Hark’s 1977 report when rendering his opinion. The State cross-examined the witness about the 1977 report and the trial court overruled Rogers’s objection because of his expert’s affidavit. Rogers then explored the validity of the 1977 report on re-direct. Subsequently, when the State sought to call Dr. Hark, the trial court examined the witness and ruled inadmissible his testimony and materials related to the 1977 report, finding that Dr. Hark had seen Rogers for treatment. See State v. Herendeen, 279 Ga. 323 (613 S.E.2d 647) (2005) (psychotherapeutic privilege invoked when treatment given or contemplated).” Herring v State, 288 Ga.App. 169, 653 S.E.2d 494 (October 10, 2007). “As the Supreme Court of Georgia has noted, the purpose of a motion in limine is ‘to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the presence of the jury with respect to matters which have no proper bearing on the issues in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit. It is the prejudicial effect of the questions asked or statements made in connection with the offer of the evidence, not the prejudicial effect of the evidence itself, which the motion in limine is intended to reach. ’ (Emphasis added; citations and punctuation omitted.) Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 285 n. 1(1) (260 S.E.2d 20) (1979).” Boynton v State, 287 Ga.App. 778, 653 S.E.2d 110 (October 10, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion in limine, as proferred testimony (that defendant gave child molestation victim drugs) was relevant. Trial court’s ruling was not made erroneous by the fact that the evidence presented differed somewhat from what was anticipated (anticipated: that victim traded sex for drugs; actual: defendant gave her drugs before “he messed with” victim). “A motion in limine is any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered. Walton v. Datry, 185 Ga.App. 88, 90-91(2) (363 S.E.2d 295) (1987). The trial court properly based its ruling on the witness’s anticipated testimony.” Thomas v. State, 287 Ga.App. 124, 650 S.E.2d 793 (August 7, 2007). County Recorder’s Court granted defendant’s motion in limine and dismissed his DUI prosecution. State then refiled charges in State Court. Held, State Court prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy or collateral estoppel. “ A motion in limine is a proper pretrial means by which the movant seeks ‘not a final ruling on the admissibility of evidence, but only to prevent the mention by anyone, during [the course of the] trial, of a certain item of evidence or area of inquiry until its admissibility can be determined[, or, as here,] a ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to the trial.’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) [ State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413, 415(3) (291 S.E.2d 543) (1982)]. Inasmuch as such ruling is subject to modification at trial to prevent manifest injustice, (id.), it does not result in a final judgment limiting issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or bar another trial. Helton v. State, 217 Ga.App. 691, 693(1)(c) (458 S.E.2d 872) (1995); see also OCGA § 16-1-8(a)(2) (‘A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution ... [w]as terminated improperly ..., in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.’)” Bradford v. State, 274 Ga.App. 659, 618 S.E.2d 709 (July 27, 2005). “Although the trial court initially granted the motion in limine …, further research led the court to modify its decision and deny the motion. The trial court has the discretion to modify its rulings on a motion in limine at any time under Helton v. State, 217 Ga.App. 691, 693(1)(c) (458 S.E.2d 872) (1995).” Ferreri v. State, 267 Ga.App. 811, 600 S.E.2d 793 (June 14, 2004). “Ferreri ‘filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence, and when such motion has been filed, a defendant does not need to renew his objection at trial to preserve the issue on appeal.’ [cits.]” Accord, Herring (October 10, 2007), above. Harridge v. State , 243 Ga.App. 658, 534 S.E.2d 113 (April 18, 2000). In defendant’s trial for vehicular homicide and related offenses, trial court properly allowed testimony about beer and wine cooler bottles found in defendant’s truck, even though the bottles themselves were suppressed. “The trial court granted Harridge's motion to suppress the bottles because the deputy seized them without a warrant after the truck had sat for nearly two days in an unsecured wrecker yard. But, the court ruled, the deputy could still testify about what he had seen in plain view at the scene of the accident, including his claim that he saw bottles of alcoholic beverages in Harridge's overturned truck. A trial court's ruling that illegally seized evidence must be suppressed does not necessarily constitute a ruling on the admissibility of testimony related to that evidence. Reid v. State, 129 Ga.App. 660, 663(2)(c), 200 S.E.2d 456 (1973). Such testimony