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599(2) (502 S.E.2d 454) (1998). The jury may make the permissible inference that Oree was encouraged by the movie to order the manner of disposal of the victim’s body. See Beasley v. State, 269 Ga. 620(2) (502 S.E.2d 235) (1998). In light of the precedent established in Rushin and Beasley, we cannot say the trial court erred when it admitted the portion of the movie into evidence.” Sears concurs in judgment only. DDDD. OBJECTIONS See PROCEDURE – OBJECTION AND WAIVER, below EEEE. OFFERS TO COMPROMISE See new OCGA § 24-4-408 Flading v. State, 327 Ga.App. 346, 759 S.E.2d 67 (May 22, 2014). DUI and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence of defense stipulation entered at ALS hearing, wherein defendant agreed to plead guilty in consideration of officer’s withdrawal of notice of license suspension based on implied consent refusal. At trial, “[t]he State … introduced, over objection, a document entitled ‘Final Decision’ completed at an administrative license suspension hearing (‘ALS hearing’).[fn] Officer Ott explained that he was present at the ALS hearing and spoke with Sarah Hoffman, an attorney who represented Flading at that time and agreed that, in exchange for pleading guilty to the DUI charge, Flading would be permitted to keep his license. The Final Decision, which was signed by Officer Ott and Hoffman, was read to the jury in part, including the following: ‘This withdrawal is based on an agreement between the arresting officer and [Flading]. In exchange for the arresting officer's withdrawal of this sworn report, [Flading] shall enter a plea of guilty to the underlying charge of violating O.C.G.A. § 40–6–391. The parties agree that a copy of this final decision may be admitted into any subsequent legal proceeding involving the charge as an admission by [Flading] of [Flading's] guilt or nolo contendere in exchange for the rescission of the administrative license suspension. The parties further agree that if [Flading] fails to enter the required plea, this order may be voided and the sworn report refiled with the [Department of Driver Services].’” 1. Admissions by defense counsel, authorized by defendant, are admissible against defendant. “Flading, having accepted the benefit of the stipulation in the form of the reinstatement of his license and having shown no fraud or mistake, acquiesced to his counsel's stipulation to plead guilty to the DUI and to the admissibility of the Final Decision in a subsequent legal proceedings related to the DUI charge. See Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga.App. 190, 195(3), 744 S.E.2d 413 (2013).” “ FN5: [T]he fact that the stipulation was signed by [defense counsel] and does not contain his personal signature … does not change the outcome here.” 2. Stipulation wasn’t excludable as an offer to compromise. “ FN4: [U]nder our new Evidence Code, the exclusion of offers to compromise ‘shall not require exclusion of evidence offered for another purpose, including, but not limited to, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue delay or abuse of process, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.’ OCGA § 24–4–408(c) (tracking Federal Rule of Evidence 408); see also United States v. Levinson, 504 Fed.Appx. 824, 828 (11 th Cir., 2013) (Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and its exceptions apply to both criminal and civil proceedings).” FFFF. ORDINANCES In re: J.T., 239 Ga.App. 756, 521 S.E.2d 862 (August 30, 1999). Conviction for obstruction reversed; State failed to prove that officer was in discharge of his duties when he attempted to arrest juvenile for loitering under county ordinance, because “the state failed to prove the existence of the local ordinance. Where such an ordinance is relied on, it must be pleaded and proved in the trial court, and absent a properly admitted copy of the ordinance, neither the trial court nor this court may take judicial notice of its existence. OCGA § 24-7-21; Reed v. State, 229 Ga.App. 817, 818(a), 495 S.E.2d 313 (1997); Dudley v. State, 161 Ga.App. 310, 311(1), 287 S.E.2d 763 (1982).” GGGG. OWNERSHIP Self v State, 288 Ga.App. 77, 653 S.E.2d 787 (October 25, 2007). “Self … argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict concerning his conviction for criminal damage to property because the van’s title was in the victim’s wife’s name rather than the victim’s own. The State needed only show that the victim had lawful possession of the van, however. See Rash v. State, 182 Ga.App. 655, 655-656 (356 S.E.2d 719) (1987) (lawful occupancy constitutes ownership for purposes of the damage-to-property statute, and ‘the question of legal title is not involved’); Kerlin v. Lane Co., 165 Ga.App. 622, 623-624(2) (302 S.E.2d 369) (1983) (person damaging property cannot be allowed to raise ‘nice and delicate questions’ concerning title of that property).” Dudley v State, 287 Ga.App. 794, 652 S.E.2d 840 (October 10, 2007). Police set up a drug buy from defendant, but defendant tried to steal the $21,500 used by the police for the buy. In addition to the drug charges, defendant was charged