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with theft by taking of the money. “Dudley … argues that he could not be convicted of theft by taking because the government informant was not an ‘innocent and legitimate’ owner of the money taken and because ‘there can be no intent to steal contraband.’ We disagree. … It avails nothing to question the informant’s title to the money. ‘[T]hose who steal will not be permitted to raise nice and delicate questions as to the title of that which is stolen.... So far as the thief is concerned, he cannot question the title of the apparent owner.’ Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 208(4) (576 S.E.2d 876) (2003).” Weldon v. State, 262 Ga.App. 854, 586 S.E.2d 741 (August 22, 2003). Evidence that damage was done to a “police car” was sufficient to show that the vehicle was “government property” and authorize a conviction for damaging government property. No direct evidence of ownership was required. HHHH. PAROL EVIDENCE Davis v. State, 326 Ga.App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (March 6, 2014). Theft by taking conviction reversed for failure to prove venue, but trial court properly admitted evidence over defendant’s parol evidence objection. Evidence in question was testimony about “promises that Davis made prior to the execution of, yet not incorporated into, the contracts regarding how the funds would be spent.” “[T]he purpose of the parol-evidence rule is ‘to bring finality to an agreement, except when ambiguity requires that the language of the contract be explained but not varied.’ ESI Companies, Inc. v. Fulton County, 271 Ga.App. 181, 184–85(1)(c), 609 S.E.2d 126 (2004); accord Albany Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Henderson, 198 Ga. 116, 143, 31 S.E.2d 20 (1944). … For obvious reasons, criminal law is less concerned with the finality of agreements between two private parties. Rather, the purpose of a criminal trial and the evidence admitted therein is ‘to determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense he is charged with committing.’ Brown v. State, 277 Ga. 573, 574(2), 592 S.E.2d 666 (2004). And in a theft-by-taking case, this requires the State to submit ‘proof of (1) an unlawful taking of the property of another (2) with the intent of depriving him of it.’ Green v. State, 223 Ga.App. 467, 468(1), 477 S.E.2d 895 (1996); see also OCGA § 16–8–2 (‘A person commits the offense of theft by taking when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated.’). Statements made by Davis prior to the execution of the contracts, then, are certainly relevant to proving whether he intended to deprive Pruett of the $350,000. Thus, while we fully recognize that we are in somewhat uncharted jurisprudential waters as far as Georgia law is concerned, this Court does not agree that the parol-evidence rule should be extended to a criminal matter in this particular context. [Citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions]” IIII. PARTIES TO A CRIME/CONSPIRACY See also subheadings CO-DEFENDANTS/CO- CONSPIRATORS and KNOWLEDGE, above Hoglen v. State, A15A1755, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1203839 (March 29, 2016). Evidence didn’t support conviction for aggravated assault. Hoglen ran when sheriff’s deputies arrived at his home to arrest him on an outstanding warrant. “As Hoglen was apprehended, he began screaming, ‘Paw Paw, they’re killing me,’ and ‘They are beating my ass.’ … As Hoglen continued to scream that ‘they’ were ‘killing,’ ‘beating’ and ‘hurting’ him, a shot rang out. At this, Hoglen screamed even more loudly that he was being harmed and also added, ‘Over here, over here[!]’” “The State’s theory of the case is that taken together, evidence of Hoglen’s cries for help before the single shot fired, as well as his exclamation ‘Over here!’ after that shot, authorized this jury to conclude that he was a party to the aggravated assault at issue. Even if, as the dissent asserts, ‘Hoglen intended his grandfather to intervene in his arrest,’ there is no evidence in the record to show that Hoglen knew that his grandfather possessed a pistol while driving his truck to the scene, that the grandfather was likely to respond to Hoglen’s initial cries for help by firing a shot, or that those cries intentionally encouraged the grandfather to discharge the single shot actually fired.” Hoglen’s shout after the shot was fired couldn’t make him anything more than an accessory after the fact, which is not how he was charged. Miller dissents. Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga.App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (November 18, 2015). Physical precedent only. Evidence was insufficient to support burglary and related convictions; although evidence supported defendant’s conviction for other similar home invasions involving the same co-conspirators, “there is no direct evidence that Cisneros participated in any manner in the crimes at Appian Way, either in person or by selecting Appian Way as a target or by planning the crime, or that he knew the group planned to burglarize Appian Way and shared their intent. Compare Greene v. State, 257 Ga.App. 837, 840(3), 572 S.E.2d 382 (2002) (evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction as a party to the crime because, although appellant was not present at the commission of the crime by the group, beforehand he was privy to discussions about the crime and the others in the group requested his participation;