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Nonetheless, C.L. chose to accompany Crittendon into the restaurant parking lot as Crittendon approached [victim] McGauley’s truck with a handgun. Based on C.L.’s prior knowledge of what was going to occur in the parking lot, the juvenile court was entitled to infer that C.L. intended to participate in the crimes committed against McGauley.” Juvenile arguably also acted as look-out; assisted Crittendon when he was struck by McGauley’s fleeing vehicle; and fled the scene with co-defendants after the incident. Rhines v State, 288 Ga.App. 128, 653 S.E.2d 500 (October 11, 2007). “‘The acquittal of one party to a crime does not bar the prosecution and conviction of another party to the crime in a separate and distinct trial of the issues.” Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 738(4) (208 S.E.2d 791) (1974). Under OCGA § 16-2-21, ‘[a]ny party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of the crime upon proof that the crime was committed and that he was a party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly committed the crime ... has been acquitted.’” Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (February 26, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to the crime of murder. “The State presented evidence from which the jury could conclude that [defendant] was willingly present when Abraham was killed in the alley; that Abraham was targeted as part of the on-going attempt, in which [defendant] was involved, to obtain money from the restaurant; that [defendant] fled the crime scene with Horne; and that he afterwards bragged about his participation in the crimes. ‘Since there was evidence that [defendant] was present when the crimes were committed and the jury could infer from [his] conduct before and after the crimes that [he] shared the criminal intent of the actual perpetrator[ ], the evidence was sufficient to authorize [defendant’s] convictions as a party to those crimes. [Cits.]’” quoting Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63, 65(1) (548 S.E.2d 310) (2001). Accord, Emerson v. State , 315 Ga.App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600 (March 23, 2012) (evidence of defendant’s conduct before and after the crime may give rise to inference that he participated therein); Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846 (June 16, 2014). Johnson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 99, 640 S.E.2d 644 (December 1, 2006). Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant as party to crime of rape of her 12-year old daughter by a man living in their home: “the evidence in this case authorized an inference that Johnson encouraged Cannon’s ongoing rapes of her daughter. The state presented evidence that Johnson knew before Cannon’s September 2003 arrest that he had been having sex with V.J. and that V.J. was pregnant. Nevertheless, Johnson told her daughter to lie to investigators and downplay the abuse. While Cannon was in jail, a DFCS worker visited Johnson’s home and impressed upon her the importance of keeping Cannon away from her children. Johnson signed a safety plan agreeing that Cannon would have no contact with her children and that she would seek a restraining order to prevent such contact. Yet Johnson never applied for the order, and she arranged for Cannon’s release from jail by lying to a judge and to personnel from the district attorney’s office, insisting that Cannon was innocent. After Cannon’s release from jail, Johnson allowed him to move back into her home, where he resumed raping V.J., a child under her control.” Court stresses that defendant “was not simply guilty of inaction,” as argued by defendant. Analogized to Hixon v. State, 251 Ga.App. 27, 553 S.E.2d 333 (2001). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga.App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (September 1, 2006). Defendant, get-away driver for jewelry store robbery, was properly convicted as party to crime, and not merely as accessory after the fact, based on the evidence. Whether Jordan was a party to the crimes and aided and abetted her co-defendants or intentionally advised, encouraged, or counseled them to commit the crimes is a jury question. [Cit.] Here, the record contains evidence from which a jury could find that Jordan waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted in the attempted escape, and thus, was a party to the crimes. [Cit.] [Witnesses] observed the four robbers leave the Zales’ parking lot in a silver-gray Buick immediately followed by a black Camry. The men abandoned the Buick a short time later and jumped into the black Camry which sped past Keefe. Officers pursued the black Camry as it drove erratically on the highway and finally stopped it using a rolling road block. At trial, Jordan was identified as the driver and owner of the black Camry. All of the stolen merchandise was found in and around her vehicle.” Accord, Skipper (March 16, 2012), above; Teele v. State , 319 Ga.App. 448, 738 S.E.2d 277 (December 14, 2012). Michael v. State, 281 Ga.App. 289, 635 S.E.2d 790 (August 8, 2006). “[Defendant] argues that the indictment alleged that she directly committed the offenses and did not specify that she was only a party to or co-conspirator in the criminal acts. She contends that therefore the court could not instruct the jury on such nor could she be convicted of being a party to or conspirator in the offenses. However, ‘[i]t has been repeatedly held that a conspiracy may be proven and a jury charge may be given on conspiracy and parties to a crime even though a defendant is not indicted under those theories.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Mangum [ v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 578(3)(d) (555 S.E.2d 451) (2001)]. See Hart v. State, 185 Ga.App. 141(1) (363 S.E.2d 599) (1987). This enumeration fails.” Accord, Hines v. State , 320 Ga.App. 854, 740 S.E.2d