☢ test - Í

786 (March 27, 2013). State v. Carlisle, 280 Ga. 770, 631 S.E.2d 347 (June 12, 2006). A defendant “may not be found guilty as a party to the crime of aggravated stalking” “absent evidence that the person knew of a court order that had been imposed on the second person.” Agrees with Court of Appeals on this point but reverses decision at 273 Ga.App. 567, 615 S.E.2d 543 (2005) by finding evidence that defendant was in fact aware that her co-defendant was under such an order. Analogized to Clyde v. State , 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253 (2003) (defendant properly convicted as party to his co- defendant’s crime of felon in possession of firearm). “ Carlisle did not have to know of the specific type of court order that was in effect on December 20, 1996, when she assisted Gibbs in stalking the victim. Rather, she simply had to be aware that a court order was in effect that prohibited Gibbs from contacting the victim.” Benham dissents on this last point, noting difference between type of order alleged in indictment and that proven at trial. Accord, Patterson v. State , - 284 Ga.App. 780, 645 S.E.2d 38 (March 21, 2007) (State did not have to prove that defendant was aware of his prior probation condition, just that he knew he wasn’t supposed to contact victim). Spradlin v. State, 279 Ga.App. 638, 631 S.E.2d 828 (June 6, 2006). “‘Conspirators are responsible for the acts of each other in carrying out the common purpose or design, although such acts may constitute another criminal offense.... Where two or more persons enter into a conspiracy to commit burglary, and in attempting to carry out such felonious design either of them has in his possession burglary tools, such possession is the possession of all, and each is guilty of a violation of ... OCGA § 16-7-20, prohibiting and punishing the possession of such tools. There was evidence that [Spradlin] and [the driver] jointly participated in the commission of the burglary. Each, then, was responsible for the acts of [the other] in carrying out the common purpose as if he himself had committed the act.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Solomon v. State, 180 Ga.App. 636, 636-637(1) (350 S.E.2d 35) (1986).” Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 627 S.E.2d 579 (March 13, 2006). No fatal variance where indictment charged defendant “with felony murder while in the commission of the felony of cruelty to children in the first degree, ‘by using blunt force, causing trauma to [child victim’s] head and shaking her.’” Although evidence showed that defendant was not present when the injuries were inflicted by co-defendant, evidence shows that defendant was party to the crime based on pattern of child abuse by the co-defendant parents. “With regard to the crime of cruelty to children, ‘criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime.’ Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632, 634, 501 S.E.2d 815 (1998).” Three justices (Sears, joined by Hunstein and Benham) dissent, saying they are “unwilling, ... to expand the ‘party to a crime’ concept to such an extent that a defendant’s past participation in a pattern of conduct qualifies as aiding, abetting, encouraging, or otherwise assisting in a future crime in which he does not participate.” Accord, Tabb v. State , 313 Ga.App. 852, 723 S.E.2d 295 (February 1, 2012). Dixon v. State, 277 Ga.App. 656, 627 S.E.2d 406 (February 17, 2006). “Acting as a lookout for a person who is committing a crime authorizes a conviction for that crime. See Mack v. State, 263 Ga.App. 186, 188(2) (587 S.E.2d 132) (2003).” Morris v. State, 276 Ga.App. 775, 624 S.E.2d 281 (December 9, 2005). “The evidence here that both [defendants] purposefully involved [co-defendant] Herrin in their confrontation with the victim, knew Herrin was armed with a rifle, and assisted Herrin in pursuing the victim at the time of the shooting, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find both [defendants] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to Herrin’s crimes or any lesser included offenses. [Cits.]” Short v. State, 276 Ga.App. 340, 623 S.E.2d 195 (November 14, 2005). Defendant and two others kidnapped victim and stole her car. With defendant in the front seat, one of his accomplices sexually assaulted the victim in the backseat. Held, evidence supported defendant’s convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy as a party to the crimes. “[A] jury could reasonably conclude that sexual assault was a probable consequence of the conspiracy to kidnap the female victim at gunpoint and drive around with her in a vehicle. That Short raised no objection to Cunningham’s actions and continued to take part in the kidnapping conspiracy after the sexual assault occurred supports such conclusion. [Cit.]” Accord, Cisneros v. State , 334 Ga.App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (November 18, 2015) (physical precedent only; “a trier of fact could conclude that the perpetrators’ criminal design was not only to commit burglary and armed robbery, but to threaten, intimidate, and abuse the victims in the process. If the participants did not plan every indignity to be imposed on their victims, the jury could reasonably conclude that sexual battery was a probable consequence of what Cisneros and the others intended to be a brutal home invasion.”). Cert. granted on this issue in Cisneros, case no. S16G0443, February 8, 2016.