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Fitz v. State, 275 Ga.App. 817, 622 S.E.2d 46 (October 13, 2005). No error in charging jury on parties to a crime. “There was ample circumstantial evidence of Fitz’s direct participation in the burglary to warrant the portion of the charge dealing with direct criminal liability. Likewise, the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury on aiding and abetting liability as part of its charge on parties to a crime. Fitz testified that although the stolen items were found in his car, the items were placed there by one of his acquaintances whom he had spoken with on the phone several times earlier that day. Fitz also testified that he argued with that individual outside the home that was burglarized. Given the circumstantial evidence supporting Fitz’s participation in the burglary, there was at least some basis for the jury to reason that even if Fitz’s acquaintance was involved in the burglary, Fitz was his accomplice. Thus, the jury charge was appropriate. [Cit.]” Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 619 S.E.2d 644 (September 19, 2005). Defendant could be found guilty of malice murder although he left the scene before co-defendant shot victim, where evidence showed that defendant “purposefully instigated an organized gang attack of … rival gang members at the restaurant” and “deliberately sought out and attacked the victim in the parking lot as the first person the gang ambushed.” Accord, Taylor v. State , 296 Ga.App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (February 19, 2009) (defendant’s role in starting gang fight supported aggravated assault conviction as to innocent by- standers, though defendant fled before those shots were fired); Emmanuel v. State , 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009); Luke v. State , 324 Ga.App. 531, 751 S.E.2d 180 (November 7, 2013). Coley v. State, 272 Ga.App. 446, 612 S.E.2d 608 (March 24, 2005). In the midst of armed robbery of restaurant, Coley and co-defendant found three women in the women’s room. Coley raped one of them; co-defendant raped all three and committed aggravated sodomy against one. Held, “the jury could reasonably find that Coley and his co-defendant had a common criminal intent to commit these sexual assaults, and Coley could be found guilty of the act performed by the co- defendant as a party. OCGA § 16-2-20; Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 11, 13 (295 S.E.2d 71) (1982). ‘The elements of proof that one is a party to a crime or an accomplice requires proof of a common criminal intent,’ and ‘[c]riminal intent may be inferred from one’s conduct prior, during, and after the commission of the crime charged.’ Id. Given the conduct of Coley and his co-defendant, ample evidence supports his conviction of this crime.” King v. State, 268 Ga.App. 811, 603 S.E.2d 88 (July 29, 2004). “A passenger in a stolen vehicle may be convicted of theft by receiving if other circumstances exist from which guilty knowledge may be inferred, such as some evidence, either direct or circumstantial that the accused was a party to the crime by aiding and abetting its commission. [Cits.] In this case, [co-defendant] testified that King was with him when he stole the truck. In addition, [second co-defendant] testified that it was obvious the truck was stolen because ‘[t]he ignition was messed up.’ Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that King knew, or should have known, that the truck was stolen.” Stuart v. State, 267 Ga.App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (May 18, 2004). “Stuart argues that he is not shown to have signed the credit card slips for the transactions for which he was convicted. … Even if we agree that the evidence does not show that Stuart personally signed for these purchases, a jury could conclude that Stuart aided and abetted the fraudulent use of the card in light of evidence showing Stuart agreed to Misty Lackey’s offer to obtain the Stuart Detail Shop card for his use, that there was no actual business constituting the Stuart Detail Shop, that Stuart was aware of his co-defendants’ scheme to commit fraud through the use of credit cards, and that he was seen often in the Wal-Mart store where the fraudulent purchases occurred. Under Georgia Law, ‘[e]very person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime,’ including a person who ‘intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime,’ OCGA § 16-2-20. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Stuart guilty of financial transaction card fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cummings v. State, 266 Ga.App. 799, 598 S.E.2d 116 (April 7, 2004). Defendant, a party to a scheme to assault victim, could be convicted as a party to his felony murder, even though defendant never possessed the gun used to shoot victim. “‘Mere presence and participation in the general transaction in which a homicide is committed is not conclusive evidence of consent and concurrence in the perpetration of the crime, unless such person participated in the felonious design of the person killing. However, it is not necessary that the crime of murder should be a part of the original design; but it is enough that it be one of the incidental and probable consequences of the execution of the design of the parties, and should appear at the moment to one of the participants to be expedient to the common purpose. In such case, the intent and act of the slayer is imputable to the other party, though he be merely present and he himself does not inflict the mortal wound. Where one is present at the time of the homicide, the question whether or not the defendant participated in the felonious design of the person killing is one to be determined by the jury from all the facts and circumstances of the case. A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct testimony.’ (Citations omitted.) McClung v. State, 206 Ga. 421, 424(3), 57 S.E.2d 559 (1950).”