☢ test - Í

Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457, 588 S.E.2d 691 (November 10, 2003). Defendant and others conspired to commit arson. Months later, one of the co-conspirators killed another, to make sure he didn’t reveal the crime. Defendant took no active part in the murder, but was convicted of the murder on the theory that it was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit arson. Held, defendant could not be convicted of the murder, as criminal responsibility for collateral acts growing out of the original conspiracy arises “only if it can be said that they are a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Huffman v. State, 257 Ga. 390, 392(3) (359 S.E.2d 910) (1987); Burke v. State, supra. See also Crawford v. State, 210 Ga.App. 36, 38 (435 S.E.2d 64) (1993) (defendant who conspired to commit robbery was a party to armed robbery because accomplice's use of weapon was naturally done in furtherance of conspiracy even if not part of original agreement); …. [T]he question is not just one of necessity, but of ‘reasonable foreseeability.’ See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-648 (66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489) (1946) (conspirator is liable for crime committed by co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of conspiracy, unless crime ‘did not fall within the scope of the unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement’).” Guzman v. State, 262 Ga.App. 564, 586 S.E.2d 59 (July 10, 2003). Defendant could be charged as a party to the crime of DUI and vehicular homicide where he provided alcohol and car keys to a 14-year-old and “stood by silently as [he] got behind the wheel. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Guzman and Joey had a common design to allow Joey to drive after drinking alcohol.” “Based on the evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that Guzman knew that Joey would drive in a less safe manner as a result of consuming beer.” And “the jury was authorized to conclude that Guzman’s actions played a substantial part in bringing about the two deaths and that the deaths were a reasonably probable consequence of his actions.” See also Bivins v. State , 166 Ga.App. 580, 305 S.E.2d 29 (1983) (passenger could be party to fleeing/eluding charge). Trumpler v. State, 261 Ga.App. 499, 583 S.E.2d 184 (June 5, 2003). State could use theory of “parties to a crime” even though the indictment made no reference to it. “Although the State was required to prove that Trumpler was a party to the crime under [OCGA § 16-2-20], it was not required to allege theses provisions in the indictment.” Accord, Souder v. State , 281 Ga.App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (August 29, 2006); Young v. State , 290 Ga. 392, 721 S.E.2d 855 (January 23, 2012); Mann v. State , 297 Ga. 107, 772 S.E.2d 665 (May 11, 2015). Head v. State, 261 Ga.App. 185, 582 S.E.2d 164 (May 7, 2003). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant was party to crimes where she was in neighborhood to offer gutter-cleaning services, husband took golf clubs from garages, and defendant and husband drove off together with clubs in their vehicle. “ If the defendant had knowledge of the intended crime and shared in the criminal intent of the principal actor, he is an aider and abettor. Hence, if the defendant was at the scene and did not disapprove or oppose the commission of the offense, a trier of fact may consider such conduct in connection with prior knowledge and would be authorized to conclude the defendant assented to the commission of the offense, that he lent his approval to it, thereby aiding and abetting the commission of the crime.” Accord, Laye v. State , 312 Ga.App. 862, 720 S.E.2d 233 (November 15, 2011) (same quote). Dunn v. State, 245 Ga.App. 847, 539 S.E.2d 198 (September 11, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s convictions as party to co-defendants’ burglaries. Dunn told the burglars that “he wanted certain items-including particular types of guns, and they knew that Dunn would give them money and drugs for the stolen goods. Dunn admitted that he knew the items he received from the others were stolen and also admitted supplying the two with drugs. … Under OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(4), a person who ‘intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit’ a crime may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime. Dunn’s conduct in this case is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this Code section. When one counsels and encourages others to commit crimes by promising to buy the fruits of the crime, he is guilty as a principal. Grant v. State, 47 Ga.App. 234(1), 170 S.E. 394 (1933). Although Dunn did not specifically select places to be burglarized, that fact is irrelevant. That he counseled and encouraged the others to commit burglaries to obtain the items that he wanted is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Todd v. State, 189 Ga.App. 538, 540(2), 376 S.E.2d 917 (1988).” Nanthabouthdy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 456, 538 S.E.2d 101 (August 3, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; evidence was sufficient to convict as party to crime even though defendant fled the scene before all the crimes were committed. Here, Nanthabouthdy’s accomplice stole a car after Nanthabouthdy had fled the robbery scene. “[A]fter persons have associated themselves together to do an unlawful act, any act done in furtherance of that association