☢ test - Í

by any one of them is considered the act of each of them. Ford v. State, 163 Ga.App. 745, 746, 296 S.E.2d 85 (1982).” Hunt v. State, 244 Ga.App. 578, 536 S.E.2d 251 (June 22, 2000). Evidence didn’t support conviction for forgery. Although defendant was in the car with co-defendant Freeman when Freeman passed a forged check to the drive-through teller, there was no evidence Hunt aided or abetted Freeman or advised, encouraged, hired, counseled or procured him to commit the crime. Although the teller thought Hunt looked like the picture ID of the payor on the check, “[t]here is no evidence that Hunt was trying to pose as Mr. David or was even aware of the existence of Mr. David's ID.” Stewart v. State , 243 Ga.App. 860, 534 S.E.2d 544 (May 10, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to shoplifting: defendant acted as getaway driver, and co-defendant testified that “although he and Stewart did not explicitly discuss a plan for shoplifting, he believed Stewart had understood his plans.” Jordan v. State , 272 Ga. 395, 530 S.E.2d 192 (May 8, 2000). 1. Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for malice murder. “The evidence that appellant donned camouflage pants and accompanied to the victim's home two armed men who had just discussed in his presence killing the victim is evidence from which a jury could infer that appellant intentionally encouraged the commission of the criminal act. [Cit.] That same evidence and appellant's actions after the victim was killed (looking for spent shells, wrapping and burying the body) were sufficient for the jury to conclude that appellant had the requisite criminal intent necessary to establish him as a party to the crime.” 2. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, triggerman’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter didn’t preclude defendant’s conviction as a party to malice murder. “Although evidence of the principal's acquittal is relevant in the trial of one accused of being a party to the crime purportedly committed by the principal ( White v. State, 257 Ga. 236, 356 S.E.2d 875 (1987)), the principal's conviction of an included offense does not carry with it the same relevancy as an acquittal. See Harrison v. State, 257 Ga. 528(3), 361 S.E.2d 149 (1987). Furthermore, in the case at bar, the second principal was tried for and convicted of malice murder.” Wyatt v. State , 243 Ga.App. 882, 534 S.E.2d 431 (April 25, 2000). Evidence supported finding that defendant was a party to her husband’s molestation of their ten-year-old child. “‘While mere presence at the scene of the commission of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one of being a party thereto, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred. If the defendant had knowledge of the intended crime and shared in the criminal intent of the principal actor, he is an aider and abettor. Hence, if the defendant was at the scene and did not disapprove or oppose the commission of the offense, a trier of fact may consider such conduct in connection with prior knowledge and would be authorized to conclude the defendant assented to the commission of the offense, that he lent his approval to it, thereby aiding and abetting the commission of the crime.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Butler v. State, 194 Ga.App. 208, 209, 390 S.E.2d 278 (1990).” Evidence showed “that Ms. Wyatt knew Mr. Wyatt was doing these acts to the child, that she watched while the acts were committed, and that she did nothing to stop the acts. Other evidence showed that the Wyatts made the child watch them have sex with each other and with other people.” Accord, Freeman v. State , 297 Ga. 146, 771 S.E.2d 889 (April 20, 2015) (“presence, companionship, and conduct before and after…” supported 16-year old’s guilty pleas to murder and related offenses); Shockley v. State , 297 Ga. 661, 777 S.E.2d 245 (September 14, 2015). Hemphill v. State, 242 Ga.App. 751, 531 S.E.2d 150 (March 13, 2000). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery conviction. “Hemphill's admissions not only show his presence, knowledge, and approval of the planned armed robbery, they also prove that he aided in the robbery by supplying transportation to and from the Waffle House .” Bullard v. State, 242 Ga.App. 843, 530 S.E.2d 265 (March 1, 2000). Medicaid fraud and related convictions affirmed; although defendant wasn’t a “provider” as defined in OCGA § 49-4-146.1(b)(2), defendant could be convicted as party to the crime of Medicaid fraud for aiding a provider in commission of the offense. Kidd v. State, 241 Ga.App. 446, 526 S.E.2d 916 (December 14, 1999). Defendants’ convictions for burglary and related offenses affirmed; evidence supported finding that defendant was party to the crime. “ From Kidd's admitted presence at the scene of the burglary and his physical possession of stolen property, the jury could infer that Kidd intended to participate in the burglary,” though Kidd didn’t personally enter the premises. Crumpton v. State, 240 Ga.App. 422, 523 S.E.2d 624 (October 19, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for burglary reversed; evidence that defendant later “could have been involved in cashing some of the stolen checks” was not proof that