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is sufficient to constitute the crime, the indictment, in order to be good as against a special demurrer, must charge such ways or methods conjunctively if it charges more than one of them.’(Footnote omitted.) Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga.App. 878, 882(3) (510 S.E.2d 570) (1998). OCGA § 16-5-21(a) is worded disjunctively, and the indictment under consideration here charges disjunctively, contrary to the state’s contention. But this does not render the indictment fatally defective as to Daniels. It simply limits the state’s option of proving at trial the manner in which the aggravated assault was committed.” Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 626 S.E.2d 123 (January 30, 2006). Dicta: “‘This court has long held that where one offense could be committed in several ways, it is permissible to incorporate the different ways in one count. [Cits.]’ Leutner v. State, 235 Ga. 77, 79(2), 218 S.E.2d 820 (1975). Thus, indictment for a crime may take the form ‘of a single count which contains alternative allegations as to the various ways in which the crime may have been committed. [Cit.]’ (Emphasis in original.) Lumpkins v. State, 264 Ga. 255, 256(3), 443 S.E.2d 619 (1994).” Thus, here, indictment charging defendant with possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime, ‘to wit: murder, kidnapping or aggravated assault,’ was probably not objectionable – but not actually decided in the decision. Accord, Dugger v. State , 297 Ga. 120, 772 S.E.2d 695 (May 11, 2015) (defendant could be convicted of either malice or felony murder under count which alleged that he “did unlawfully and with malice aforethought and while in the commission of the felony aggravated assault cause the death of Leonard Cox, …”). Collins v. State, 277 Ga.App. 381, 626 S.E.2d 513 (January 5, 2006). “While the indictment charged Collins with striking the victim ‘with his fists and with a bottle,’ the State needed only to prove that Collins struck the victim with his fists or with a bottle in order to establish a prima facie case of family violence battery. Kall v. State, 257 Ga.App. 527, 528(1), 571 S.E.2d 520 (2002).” Accord, Hammontree v. State , 283 Ga.App. 736, 642 S.E.2d 412 (February 23, 2007) (two acts constituting child molestation alleged, but only one proven – sufficient to support conviction); Cain v. State , 310 Ga.App. 442, 714 S.E.2d 65 (July 1, 2011) (same as Hammontree ). Carolina v. State, 276 Ga.App. 298, 623 S.E.2d 151 (November 8, 2005). “‘When an indictment charges a crime was committed in more than one way, proof that it was committed in one of the separate ways or methods alleged in the indictment makes a prima facie case for jury determination as to guilt or innocence,’” quoting Hostetler v. State , 261 Ga. 237, 239-240(2), 582 S.E.2d 197 (2003). Enticing child for indecent purposes under OCGA § 16-6-5 may be proven by showing that the defendant “solicited, enticed, or took” a child; fact that indictment alleged that defendant “solicited, enticed and took” child did not require proof of all three. Accord, Martin v. State , 299 Ga.App. 845, 683 S.E.2d 896 (August 25, 2009) (Indictment charging defendant with child molestation by “‘placing his hand on and about’ S. M.'s vagina ‘with the intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of the accused and the child,” could be proved by evidence showing intent to arouse the sexual desires of either one.). Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 650, 613 S.E.2d 170 (April 6, 2005). Accusation contained two alternative counts of speeding, one for speeding 74 miles per hour in a 55 mile zone, the other for “operating a motor vehicle in excess of the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour.” Held, trial court properly charged the jury on the two different counts: “‘It has long been recognized that “the same offense, that is the same species of offense, may be charged in different ways in several counts to meet the evidence.”’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Lumpkins v. State, 264 Ga. 255, 256(2) (443 S.E.2d 619) (1994).” Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). “It is permissible to allege alternative methods of violating OCGA § 40-6-391(a) in a single count. Morgan v. State, 212 Ga.App. 394, 395(1) (442 S.E.2d 257) (1994). And ‘[i]t is sufficient for the State to show that a crime was committed in any one of the separate ways listed in the indictment, even if the indictment uses the conjunctive rather than disjunctive form .’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga.App. 755, 759-760(2) (577 S.E.2d 825) (2003).” Kall v. State, 257 Ga.App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 520 (September 20, 2002). Accusation charged defendant with “simple battery by ‘contact of an insulting and provoking nature.’” After close of evidence at trial, court, over objection, allowed state to amend accusation to allege “simple battery by ‘contact of an insulting or provoking nature.’” Held, trial court may allow accusation to be amended after commencement of trial only if “the amendment is not material or prejudicial to the defense.” Changing “and” to “or” was not a material change; even with the word “and,” the state was not required to prove that the contact was both insulting and provoking. “ It has long been established that a defendant may be accused of methods of committing a crime in the conjunctive, as is originally the case here, but the jury may be properly charged with these methods in the disjunctive . ... As the accusation was originally formed, the State was